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It is in the interest of many different types of organisations to encourage the 
adoption of specific products or desirable behaviours. Such goal has been 
commonly pursued by offering economic incentives to people with the aim of 
making the desired action more appealing. This type of strategy is based on 
standard economic theory, which assumes that people behave in ways that 
maximise only their own economic benefits. However, behavioural scientists have 
suggested that people frequently make decisions that go against their own benefit 
and are affected by emotions, biases and social preferences, all of which may lead 
to the failure of traditional economic incentives. In the present work, prosocial 
motives are incorporated into the design of incentive schemes by allowing 
participants to give away part of their rewards to relevant peers. We tested whether 
such strategy can outperform the traditional “selfish schemes”. Specifically, four 
experiments using hypothetical scenarios were performed, in which participants’ 
preferences were elicited by implementing different methodologies. The main 
variables considered in this research are the number of recipients and the 
expectations about their reactions, the possibilities of reciprocity, the certainty of the 
reward, the size and framing of the reward, and the fear of negative evaluations. 
The results show a substantial proportion of the participants favouring the 
“unselfish” incentive schemes. Moreover, the expectations about recipients’ 
reactions were particularly relevant in defining the effectiveness of programmes that 
incorporate prosocial motives. Findings also suggest that fulfilling others’ 
expectations allows people to strengthen their self-concept and maintain a positive 
self-image. This research brings a new perspective in the study of adoption and 
diffusion processes by incorporating insights and methods from behavioural 
science, and it considers the role of contextual factors in decision-making processes 
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that have been neglected in the literature. These results can also contribute to the 
understanding of the mechanisms driving prosocial behaviours and inform the 
design of initiatives that aim to encourage desirable actions. 
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PREFACE 
The journey of this research has started with a collaboration between the Design 
Council and the Behavioural Science Group at Warwick Business School. The 
former is a charity recognised as a leading authority on the use of strategic design, 
and it focuses, among other areas, on understanding individuals in order to design 
better products and services with a social purpose. On the other hand, the latter is 
probably the biggest of its kind in Europe and aims to expand knowledge of 
standard economics by incorporating a multidisciplinary approach in which insights 
from psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and experimental economics, 
among other disciplines, are taking into account in order to understand and predict 
human behaviour. 
One common challenge that the Design Council faces – as well as designers, 
marketers, policy makers, and organisations in general –  is that more beneficial 
and convenient solutions are not necessarily adopted and diffused as intended. It is 
therefore of great value to use a scientific understanding of people to encourage the 
adoption and diffusion of new practices. Even though decades of research have 
approached this topic from numerous perspectives, the methods and insights from 
behavioural science have rarely been considered. In the present research, I aim to 
contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the adoption and diffusion of products 
and behaviours and to provide some practical insights that can be tested in real-
world settings. Specifically, I have decided to focus on how insights from 
behavioural science can help to make economic incentives a more effective tool to 
influence behaviours. This aspect is particularly relevant because they represent a 
widespread strategy used for the purpose of encouraging adoption and diffusion 
processes but has not always produce successful results.  
Preface                                                                                                                                                                                       14 
 
The plan for the current thesis is to split the research into four sections. The first 
section consists of an integrative review of the studies from the main research 
traditions regarding the topic of adoption and diffusion processes published during 
the last decades. That summary is organised based on three categories that have 
been proposed for practical reasons, based on whether the studies were focused 
on: 1) Characteristics of the adopters, 2) Social Influence as a driver of adoption 
and diffusion, or 3) Innovation characteristics as a driver of adoption and diffusion. 
This categorisation provides a succinct and cohesive summary that familiarises the 
reader with the topic and positions this research within the current body of 
knowledge.  
In the second section, a set of three experiments is presented in which participants 
have to state their preferences regarding a range of hypothetical incentive schemes.  
Some of these schemes allow participants to share a proportion of their reward with 
relevant peers, with the purpose of appreciating whether such “prosocial” alternative 
would be more appealing to people than the traditional “selfish” schemes. The 
possibilities of reciprocity, the number of people with which the reward can be 
shared, and the degree of certainty about receiving the reward represent the main 
variables manipulated in the experiments. In the third section, a follow-up study is 
performed in order to comprehensively explore some of the insights from the initial 
experiments by measuring preferences with a different methodology and by 
incorporating different variables. In particular, the two variables measured in the 
experiment are the role of expectations regarding how others may perceive us after 
sharing part of our reward with them and the fears of negative evaluations. 
Moreover, the size of the reward and the way in which it is framed are manipulated 
in the study. My results suggest, among other insights, that incentives schemes 
allowing people to show prosocial behaviours can represent a mechanism for 
strengthening the self-concept and for effectively encouraging desirable behaviours.  
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Finally, in the fourth and last section, the conclusions of the whole thesis are 
presented, including the contributions, implications and limitations of the research, 
and discussions on how the insights regarding prosocial motives as a driver of 
behaviour can represent a tool to encourage adoption and diffusion processes.  
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 CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Why do people decide to buy a new product, start a specific diet or switch to a 
different internet provider? The answer to these questions seems very obvious in 
principle: people just want to adopt anything that can put them in a better situation. 
However, the literature is full of examples where innovations that are obviously 
more beneficial are adopted very slowly or not implemented at all (Rogers, 2003). 
Even more surprising are the numerous occasions in which innovations are widely 
adopted by people despite the conspicuous disadvantages of these inventions to 
individuals. Therefore, a very frequent challenge for governments, companies and 
organisations is to understand the drivers that motivate people to adopt certain 
products or behaviours. 
An interesting example that illustrates very clearly the failure to adopt better 
innovations is the case of the QWERTY keyboard that we use in computers and 
other devices nowadays. The QWERTY keyboard, named after the six first 
characters in the upper row of letters, was invented in the nineteenth century and 
even though it makes people work much harder than necessary, its use has 
persisted. When early typewriters were rapidly and successively striking adjoining 
keys in the old machines, the keys used to jam. In an attempt to find a solution, 
Christopher Latham Scholes designed the keyboard in an awkward and inefficient 
way that we use today in order to slow down typist. Decades later, when QWERTY 
design was no longer needed, the Dvorak keyboard was proposed with a more 
efficient arrangement, clustering keys according to the frequency of use and the 
work assigned to each finger proportional to its skill and strength (Rogers, 2003). 
Given the devices used by people today, it is evident that Dvorak never succeeded 
in getting his more efficient design gain widespread acceptance from the public.  
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A fundamental question is whether cases like the Dvorak’s keyboard in which more 
beneficial innovations that are not adopted occur in exceptional circumstances or 
instead they represent the norm. Admitting that these kind of phenomena are 
commonplace in the real world, as it seems to be, would require firms to focus not 
only on creating products and services with greater advantages but also on 
understanding the mechanisms that could make their innovations more “sticky”, that 
is, more likely to be adopted faster and for longer periods.. Considering that 
adoption decisions are ultimately determined by individuals’ preferences; the 
present work aims to contribute to the long tradition of research in adoption and 
diffusion by exploring some of mechanisms driving people’s decision-making 
processes. In particular, we incorporate insights and methods from behavioural 
science to show how unselfish motives can represent a strong mechanism affecting 
individuals’ preferences that can potentially encourage the adoption of products and 
services. 
Even though “adoption” and “diffusion” are concepts that are closely related, they 
represent different processes. Adoption is understood as an individual process 
which involves the mechanisms that encourage a person to acquire a new object or 
behaviour. The present work will focus on identifying some of the mechanisms 
influencing individual preferences for adopting desirable behaviours. On the other 
hand, diffusion represents a wider phenomenon which involves the study of how 
innovations are adopted among a group of people over time.  
In relation to the definition of “innovation”, the term has been approached and 
defined in different ways by a large number of disciplines including business and 
management (Freeman & Engel, 2007), economics (Love & Roper, 2004), 
organisation studies (Garcia-Morales, Matias-Reche, & Hurtado-Torres, 2008), 
innovation and entrepreneurship (Du Plessis, 2007), technology and engineering 
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(Francis & Bessant, 2005), marketing (Berthon, Mac Hulbert, & Pitt, 2004), among 
many others. In the context of the present research, we embrace the broad 
definition provided by Rogers, Singhal, and Quinlan (2009), in which innovation is 
understood as objects, practices or ideas perceived as new by members of the 
social system where the diffusion process is taking place. The studies presented in 
the current work approach the adoption of innovations in a very narrow domain. 
Specifically, the studies concentrate on individual’s preferences for initiatives 
encouraging the adoption of new behaviours in a commercial context. Even though 
the scope of the studies is very specific, we strongly believe that the insights and 
principles revealed in our results can have theoretical and practical implications in 
the wider field of adoption and diffusion. 
The following sections present a succinct and cohesive summary of the most 
important traditions and methodological approaches in the study of adoption and 
diffusion processes. The review offers a general framework to contextualise the 
reader with the current body of knowledge in the field, and show how the study of 
human decision making and individual preferences represent an important research 
opportunity to contribute to the literature focusing on innovation characteristics as a 
driver of adoption behaviour. The end of the chapter focuses particularly on how the 
use of incentives as a tool to encourage adoption can significantly benefit from 
gaining a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms influencing individual 
preferences for unselfish actions. The general framework just described represents 
and introduction to the set of experiments developed in the rest of the thesis, which 
explore the potential effectiveness of unselfish incentive schemes as a tool to 
influence peoples’ preferences in adoption and diffusion processes.  
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1.1- Traditions in diffusion and adoption research 
The study of the adoption and diffusion of innovations started several decades ago. 
The research conducted by Ryan and Gross (1943) on the adoption of corn hybrid 
seeds among farmers in Iowa is commonly cited as the first formal approach and 
probably the most influential research in the study of diffusion of innovations. These 
authors were surprised to find that the widespread diffusion of the seed was only 
achieved after 12 years, even though the new seed was significantly more beneficial 
than those used for previous practices (Rogers et al., 2009). The main contributions 
of this pioneering study were identifying the importance of social networks in 
diffusion and setting research paradigms that are useful for understanding this 
process.  
After the mentioned research was performed during the 40’s, the disciplines and the 
range of innovations studied increased significantly. By performing a meta-analysis 
of the relevant literature, as many as 13 different traditions in the study of diffusion 
of innovations were identified by Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, and 
Kyriakidou (2004), whilst Rogers (2003) summarised up to 9 different areas of 
knowledge where studies on this topic have been successively developed. In this 
regard, the three most prolific traditions seem to be rural sociology, communication 
and marketing.   
A detailed exposition of all the topics studied in each tradition goes beyond the 
scope of the present analysis (for a review see Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Rogers, 
2003). However, I offer below a review of some of the topics most commonly found 
in the literature by categorising them based on the elements involved in the diffusion 
process that researchers have focused on. Specifically, we have separated the 
topics according to those research works that emphasise the characteristic of the 
products being diffused, the characteristics of the adopters, and the role of social 
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influence. In reality, the different research streams are closely related. Nonetheless, 
the categorisation that we have created represent a conceptual framework that aims 
to facilitate the review of the current body of knowledge in adoption and diffusion 
research and position more clearly the present work within the literature.  
 
1.1.1- Characteristics of the adopters 
One apparent observation from the initial studies about diffusion was that some 
individuals decided to adopt innovations relatively earlier than other members of the 
same social systems. Rogers (2003) defined “innovativeness” as the degree to 
which this earliness in adoption characterise people. It involves all the mental, 
behavioural, and demographic characteristics associated with consumer willingness 
to adopt innovations (Hauser, Tellis, & Griffin, 2006). 
Traditional approaches exploring adoption and diffusion processes have put 
particular attention on identifying personal characteristics that could make some 
people more likely to adopt innovations than others do. In this regard, Rogers 
(2003) found that “Innovativeness” represented almost two-thirds of all publications 
from a comprehensive review summarising all the different types of diffusion 
research commonly found in the literature. This finding shows a great deal of 
attention that this topic has attracted in the last few decades. 
During the 50’s Everett Rogers, probably the most prominent exponent in the study 
of diffusion of innovations, first published a classification of adopters based on the 
concept of innovativeness previously mentioned. Even though innovativeness is 
understood as a continuum, the author introduced the categories as a conceptual 
device to facilitate the identification of adopter types (Rogers, 2003; Rogers et al., 
2009).  
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By realising that the adoption rate typically resembles a normal distribution, Rogers 
established 5 categories by lying off standard deviations from the average time of 
adoption, as shown in Figure 1. These five categories are as follows: Innovators, 
Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late Majority and Laggards; they differ from each 
other in the proportion of people they represent from the total population in the 
social system and in the characteristics and values that are expected to be 
observed within each group.  
 
Figure 1: Adopters categories based on Innovativeness (Rogers, 2003). 
 
Individuals under the categories of “innovators” and “early adopters” are of particular 
interest for anyone aiming to get an innovation diffused. In this regard, some 
research traditions like marketing have largely focussed on identifying the specific 
characteristics and conditions that distinguish the people under these categories 
with the aim of targeting them first when trying to spread a product or idea in a given 
social system. 
When attempting to identify “innovative” people, one common approach has been 
consistent in assuming that some individuals are more innovative than others 
because they have innate characteristics that make them more likely to adopt new 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                                                                   22 
 
products or ideas. Therefore, developing methods to measure these characteristics 
became an important goal. In this sense, the definition and measures of 
innovativeness have been very diverse within the extensive literature regarding the 
topic (Roehrich, 2004). Some have understood innovativeness as an innate or 
learned openness to novel ideas (Clark & Goldsmith, 2005; Mansori, Sambasivan, & 
Md-Sidin, 2015), intentions to adopt new products (Van Ittersum & Feinberg, 2010; 
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003), actual ownership and usage of 
innovations (Im, Bayus, & Mason, 2003; Im, Mason, & Houston, 2007), relative time 
of adoption (Rogers, 2003), or a combination of different approaches that aim to find 
convergent validity (Arts, Frambach, & Bijmolt, 2011; Demoulin & Zidda, 2009). Of 
course, that heterogeneity when defining and measuring innovativeness has been a 
challenge when trying to consistently link people’s characteristics to the actual 
adoption of innovations. 
In terms of the specific measures of innovativeness, we are not aware of any formal 
attempt to synthesise the numerous scales and measures that have been 
developed to quantify innovativeness. However, Roehrich (2004) have provided a 
broad classification of these type of scales, dividing them into two broad groups: 1) 
adoptive innovativeness scales, and 2) life innovativeness scales. The first group 
refers to those measures capturing the tendency to adopt products in specific 
contexts, whereas the second group involves those factors measuring 
innovativeness as a general behaviour. The scales measuring innate 
innovativeness have been found to have, in general, low power to predict the 
willingness to adopt innovations when focusing on general innovativeness, but the 
predictive power seems to improve for scales focusing on domain-specific 
measures (Hauser et al., 2006; Roehrich, 2004).  
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In sum, innovativeness as a personality predisposition has been found to be very 
inconsistent as a predictor of adoption of innovations. Some authors have found 
strong positive relationships between the adoption of innovation and psychological 
variables such as innovativeness (Arts et al., 2011; Rogers, 2003). Nonetheless, 
other researchers have found no relationships (Im et al., 2003) or only indirect links 
between innovativeness and personality traits when incorporating other mediating 
variables into their analysis (Im et al., 2007; Mansori et al., 2015).  
Apart from personality traits, the second approach that has been implemented when 
trying to link people’s characteristics with the tendency to adopt innovations is the 
study of socioeconomic variables. Personal characteristics such as age, level of 
education and level of income have been often considered because, among other 
reasons, they are relatively easy to observe and allow companies and organisations 
generally to segment audiences based on these features. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that socioeconomic or demographic variables are poor and inconsistent 
predictors of adoption behaviour (Arts et al., 2011).  
Even though generalisable and systematic evidence has not been found regarding 
the relationship between the adoption of innovations and demographic variables, 
some interesting insights can be identified in the literature. Early adopters have 
been found to have more years of formal education and a higher social status, but 
their age seems irrelevant as a criterion for innovativeness (Rogers, 2003). 
However, when studying the adoption of electronic products, age, level of income 
and other innate consumer traits seems to be a strong predictor of adoption (Arts et 
al., 2011; Im et al., 2003). Moreover, demographic variables can be powerful 
mediators when building models to predict adoption (Venkatesh et al., 2003). We 
can, therefore, conclude that demographic variables may have a limited impact on 
predicting diffusion in general, but they can be very valuable when considering 
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specific contexts such as the adoption and diffusion of technology products or when 
building multi-caused predicting models. 
In summary, even if we consider that some characteristics that are specific to 
people (e.g. age and personality traits) may favour some predispositions to be 
innovative, it seems clear that other contextual factors should play a role. This is 
probably why it is not uncommon to see people showing innovativeness in certain 
domains but not in other fields.  
The third type of variable that has been studied to predict innovativeness based on 
people’s characteristics are the values and beliefs that they hold. The demographic 
characteristics and innate traits previously described as a potential predictor of 
adoption of innovations can be considered as relatively stable. In contrast, Mansori 
et al.(2015) argue that the advantage of approaching values and beliefs as a 
predictor of innovativeness is that they may change or evolve as a consequence of 
environmental factors. Therefore, values and beliefs associated with adoption of 
innovations can be identified and potentially modified.  
Some research traditions such as anthropology have shown particular interest in 
understanding why and how people’s values and beliefs can facilitate or represent 
barriers to the adoption of innovations. By observing participants and getting 
immersed into people’s day-to-day activities, researchers aim to understand and 
adopt participant’s perspectives regarding the adoption of a new behaviour (Rogers, 
2003). In other words, they could foresee which features of innovations could be 
against current values, traditions or cultural norms. A common practice under this 
approach consists of identifying “Positive Deviants”, who are individuals that are 
already showing the desired behaviour, while most other members from the same 
social system have not yet engaged in such behaviour (Pascale & Sternin, 2005; 
Rogers et al., 2009). The knowledge gained by understanding the characteristics of 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                                                                   25 
 
these outliers can then be used to promote the adoption of innovativeness by other 
members of the social system.  
People’s values and beliefs – as well as demographic variables, personality traits, 
and other characteristics – are frequently taken into account by marketers when 
establishing market segmentation strategies. This consideration involves 
implementing different communication channels and messages to target sub-
audiences based on their characteristics. This kind of approach could help identify 
people who are more likely to adopt products and services in different contexts. One 
limitation of this perspective is that a large proportion of research about the topic is 
sponsored or directly performed by private companies aiming to gain a competitive 
advantage (Rogers, 2003). Consequently, scholars have limits on accessing the 
knowledge obtained from these studies. Even so, numerous publications linking 
values and beliefs with innovativeness can be found. A recent example was 
presented by Mansori, et al. (2015) who found that religiosity, ethnicity and the basic 
values of individuals influenced the acceptance of novel products. 
We have described how different types of individual characteristics have been 
studied with the purpose of identifying potential drivers underpinning adoption 
behaviours. Even though our summary is not a comprehensive review, it is 
extensive enough to illustrate that individual characteristics provide useful insights 
to understand why products, services or behaviours in general are adopted. 
However, it is clear that they do not represent an analytical tool that can fully explain 
and predict adoption behaviour. Moreover, a particular problem that has been 
identified when targeting early adopters of innovations is that these are commonly 
the individuals that least need the benefits associated with the adoption of the new 
practice (Centola, 2010; Rogers, 2003). This fact is particularly relevant when trying 
to tackle social issues; for instance, when new beneficial technologies like novel 
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contraceptive methods are adopted only by well-off families, who probably are in a 
better position to raise more children compared to poorer families who cannot do so. 
For these reasons, diffusion researchers have realised that in order to explain and 
promote adoption behaviours, they need to go beyond studying people’s 
characteristics and consider how individuals’ interactions influence each other’s 
behaviours. In the following section, we present a general review regarding the 
research on social influence as a driver of adoption behaviour and diffusion. 
 
1.1.2- Social Influence as a driver of adoption and diffusion 
The benefits of understanding the impact of individual’s network and social influence 
in adoption behaviour have significantly increased its relevance during the last few 
years, especially because the technological and methodological tools that are 
currently available were not present during the early years of diffusion research. We 
will present a brief review of the main research streams on this topic. We will also 
divide them, for practical reasons, into two broad categories: 1) micro-level influence 
and 2) macro-level influence. The first group involves those studies exploring how 
the influences among immediate peers affect adoption behaviours. On the other 
hand, research from the macro-level perspective includes studies in which social 
network configurations as a whole are explored as a driver of diffusion patterns. 
Examples of both types of research are presented in the next sections.  
1.1.2.1- Micro-level research on social influence 
Adopting a new product, service or behaviour is a risky choice. New things can 
always go wrong, and the fear of failure can refrain people from taking the 
associated risks. Indeed, it is a well-established insight from behavioural science 
that most people have a natural tendency to be risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979; Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). It means that they tend to prefer small gains with 
certainty rather than larger rewards under a situation with a known probability of 
losing the reward (higher risk). Such preference is prominent because individuals 
are more motivated to avoid losses than to obtain gains. Moreover, people tend to 
show ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). Put simply, events that people know 
more about are preferred over uncertain situations. The subtle difference between 
risk and ambiguity aversion is that in the former the probabilities of the expected 
outcomes are known by the decision maker, whereas in latter such probabilities are 
unknown. 
Both risk and ambiguity aversion are very crucial principles to take into account 
when trying to understand how people influence each other to adopt behaviours. As 
a mechanism to reduce uncertainty, potential adopters may need to seek for 
different sources of information before making the decision to adopt an innovation. 
In this context, behaviours from other individuals who are socially closed could 
heavily affect the adopter’s decision because they may provide signals informing 
them about the quality of the innovation. Therefore, according to Aral (2011), social 
influence occurs when peer’s behaviours change one’s expected utility and 
consequently affect the extent to which one will engage in a given behaviour.  
Based on the idea previously described, Valente (1996) proposed a very influential 
model in which individuals are characterised by different adoption thresholds. 
Specifically, he argues that once a person is exposed to a certain proportion of 
people from his or her personal network that has already adopted the innovation 
(threshold), then this person will also accept the innovation. Also, the model takes 
into account the time of exposure to the members of the local network who have 
already adopted the product or behaviour. By re-analysing the data from three 
classic studies considering different sort of innovations in different countries, the 
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author managed to predict the adoption patterns. Moreover, the adopter categories 
described in the previous section (Innovators, Early Adopters, Early Majority, Late 
Majority and Laggards) were explained by the model, suggesting that external 
influences from a person’s network can actually define the level of innovativeness 
relative to the entire social system.  
The impact of interpersonal influence on adoption behaviour is frequently 
understood as social contagion. That involves to assume that behaviours can 
spread in a social system as if they were infectious diseases, a system in which 
behaviours patterns are copied by other people who are exposed to them 
(Christakis & Fowler, 2007; Fowler & Christakis, 2008). Some evidence suggests 
that social influence occurs not only because of the mere exposition to peer’s 
adoption, but peer’s usage volume also seems to be one of the main factors driving 
the influence process (Iyengar, Van den Bulte, & Valente, 2011). Moreover, the 
direct observation of others seems not to be always required to generate influence, 
but also descriptive norms about how other people behave have been found to be 
significantly influential (Bond et al., 2012; Duflo & Saez, 2003; Nolan, Schultz, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2008; Sotiropoulos & d'Astous, 2012).  
One of the main challenges that researchers have faced when attempting to explore 
the effects of social influence is the presence of “homophily”. Homophily refers to 
the degree to which linked people are similar to each other (Rogers, 2003). 
Generally, individuals tend to make friends with people who are like them or with 
individuals whose company they enjoy (Aral & Walker, 2011b). Hence, if people are 
very similar to each other, their adoption patterns can be explained, at least in part, 
by their personal characteristics and not because of their social influence. For that 
reason, numerous studies in recent years have implemented complex statistical 
methods and creative research designs that aim to isolate the effect of social 
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influence from other factors (Aral & Walker, 2011a, 2011b, 2012), disentangle the 
effect of homophily (Centola, 2011) or even quantify the weight of both effects, 
social influence and homophily, within the same data set (Aral, Muchnik, & 
Sundararajan, 2009). Nonetheless, controversies and challenges to these type of 
analysis are not uncommon in the literature (Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 2008; Fowler & 
Christakis, 2008). 
Another important research stream, regarding the impact of social influence on 
adoption behaviour at a micro-level, is related to the identification of those 
individuals who have distinctive abilities to alter the behaviours of other members 
within a social system. People with such outstanding characteristics are frequently 
defined as “opinion leaders”. According to Iyengar, et al. (2011), opinion leadership 
has been associated with the early adoption and heavy use of the innovation been 
adopted. From the perspective of the threshold model proposed by Valente (1996), 
opinion leaders are represented by those individuals with a low adoption threshold 
who are able to influence the most to those people with higher adoption thresholds. 
Moreover, distinctive characteristics have been identified for people labelled as 
opinion leaders. Specifically, Rogers (2003) summarises empirical evidence 
suggesting that opinion leaders have greater exposure to mass media, greater 
social participation, greater contact with change agents, higher social status, more 
cosmopolitanisms and more innovative.  
Due to the crucial role that opinion leaders can have on adoption and diffusion, 
researchers have developed a large number of methodologies that aim to identify 
these kinds of individuals. Indeed, in a meta-analysis performed by Valente and 
Pumpuang (2007) in which about 200 relevant papers were considered, the authors 
found up to 10 different types of methodologies. Specifically, these methods of 
identifying opinion leaders in order to promote behaviour change were named as 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                                                                   30 
 
follows: (1) Celebrities, (2) Self-selection, (3) Self-identification, (4) Staff Selected, 
(5) Positional approach, (6) Judge’s ratings, (7) Expert identification, (8) Snowball 
method, (9) Sample sociometric and (10) Sociometric. Different approaches of 
identifying opinion leaders may lead to different outcomes; therefore, many methods 
are likely to differ from each other in the constructs that they capture (Iyengar et al., 
2011). Hence, the identification of effective opinion leaders should be driven by the 
theory underpinning the implementation of the behaviour-change programme and 
the type of behaviour being targeted (Rogers, 2003).  
Opinion leaders are usually influential within a specific category. Other types of 
individuals that have been defined in the literature as “Market Mavens” are 
characterised by their influence across a large number of categories. These 
individuals know different facets of markets, and they are very active in initiating 
discussions and responding to requests from other people regarding market 
information (Feick & Price, 1987). They have been associated with higher self-
esteem and a need for uniqueness, and at the same time, they seem to operate 
within a system of social norms (Clark & Goldsmith, 2005). Even though market 
mavens have been less studied than opinion leaders, they are also very valuable 
individuals to target when promoting diffusion of innovations.  
We have briefly described so far how social interaction can affect adoption 
behaviours and how certain individuals can be more influential than others. An 
additional research theme that have caught great attention is how organisations and 
firms, in general, can encourage social interaction. Valente (2012) has defined 
“induction” as all the strategies that aim to intervene in a social network by 
stimulating or forcing peer-to-peer interaction in order to produce diffusion of 
behaviours or information.  
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Word-of-Mouth (WOM) is probably the induction strategy that has been more widely 
studied in the literature. It consists of stimulating interpersonal communication to 
persuade others to adopt a new behaviour (Valente, 2012). It is worth noting that 
this type of research is different from that found in the tradition of communication 
studies. According to Rogers, et al. (2009), a distinctive characteristic is that the 
communication messages being studied when approaching WOM are perceived as 
new by the receiver, and they aim to go beyond mere awareness but produce 
decision making and behavioural change. Furthermore, diffusion studies put greater 
emphases on interpersonal communication networks, whereas communications 
studies tend to focus more on creating awareness or knowledge about a given 
innovation. 
Intuitively, we could expect that people happy with a given product or behaviour will 
immediately generate positive WOM within their social network. Similarly, 
undesirable experiences should always produce negative WOM among relevant 
peers. However, evidence shows that individuals’ satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) is 
usually necessary but not sufficient to generate these kinds of referrals (Wirtz & 
Chew, 2002; Wirtz, Orsingher, Chew, & Tambyah, 2013; Wojnicki & Godes, 2008). 
For that reason, an important body of knowledge have been developed in order to 
understand the conditions in which both positive and negative WOM occurs. 
Presenting a detailed review of the extensive literature on WOM goes beyond the 
scope of the present work (for a recent review see Berger, 2014). However, we 
mention below some emblematic themes that have been of great interest in the 
literature.  
A first important topic in the WOM literature has been to understand the 
psychological and social function that it serves. For instance, a plausible 
explanation is that people are altruistic; consequently, they are motivated to help 
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their friends by recommending products or behaviours that might be useful to them 
(Berger, 2013; Berger & Milkman, 2012; Price, Feick, & Guskey, 1995). Another 
approach is to study the extent that WOM relates to the need of boosting or 
strengthening the self-concept, maintaining self-esteem and reaching a positive 
image by behaving in a way that is likely to result in a positive feedback from others 
(Alexandrov, Lilly, & Babakus, 2013; Berger & Shiv, 2011; De Angelis, Bonezzi, 
Peluso, Rucker, & Costabile, 2012; Wien & Olsen, 2014; Wojnicki & Godes, 2008). 
Moreover, the impacts of many contextual factors on WOM have been studied. 
These impacts include the culture (Chung & Darke, 2006) and the size of the 
audience that will receive the message (Barasch & Berger, 2014), and the 
communication through electronic channels (Eisingerich, Chun, Liu, Jia, & Bell, 
2015; Hennig‐Thurau, Gwinner, Walsh, & Gremler, 2004; Kim, Lee, & Elias, 2015), 
among many others.  
Another predominant theme in the literature has focused on understanding how 
organisations can encourage WOM. Even though WOM can occur spontaneously, 
firms and organisations can exogenously encourage conversations by providing 
economic incentives where none interpersonal communications would naturally 
have happened otherwise (Godes & Mayzlin, 2009). This initiative is very crucial in 
order to achieve diffusion, because messages about products or behaviours that 
have been received from a friend are more persuasive and influential than those 
obtained from traditional marketing campaigns that aim to affect behaviours (Arthur, 
Motwani, Sharma, & Xu, 2009; Berger, 2013; Wirtz et al., 2013; Xiao, Tang, & Wirtz, 
2011). Such situation occurs, at least in part, because close peers seem more 
honest and objective (Day, 1971; Wirtz et al., 2013).  
The initiatives in which firms and organisations generally provide economic 
incentives to encourage recommendations are frequently called Rewarded Referral 
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Programmes (RRP). Even though these types of programmes are very popular in 
the industry, some pieces of evidence have identified many situations in which this 
kind of initiatives fails (Tuk, Verlegh, Smidts, & Wigboldus, 2009; Verlegh, Ryu, Tuk, 
& Feick, 2013; Wirtz et al., 2013). Therefore, an important volume of research has 
been dedicated to better understand the mechanisms underlying externally 
incentivised recommendations. For example, some topics that have been 
approached are incentives magnitude (Ahrens & Strahilevitz, 2007; Ryu & Feick, 
2007) reward distributions (Verlegh et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2011), referral 
incentives and social norms (Tuk et al., 2009), perception of the recommendations 
(Wirtz et al., 2013), impact of the strength of social ties (Ryu & Feick, 2007; Wirtz & 
Chew, 2002; Wirtz et al., 2013), and value of referred customers (Schmitt, Skiera, & 
Van den Bulte, 2011), among many others.  
We have previously presented a brief review of some of the most important 
research streams that have been developed in order to understand how peer-to-
peer interactions can affect adoption behaviour. In the next section, we will explore 
how these interactions produce patterns of adoption among groups of people that 
can be analysed at an aggregated level or, in other words, in terms of patterns of 
diffusion over time.  
1.1.2.2- Macro-level research on social influence 
We have just presented some evidence on how immediate peers can heavily 
influence individuals’ behaviours. The research of social influence at a macro-level 
involves considering a different conceptual dimension in which the unit of analysis is 
not the relationship between a few people but the collection of all individuals from a 
social group of interest and their social ties. In other words, groups are better 
understood as a network where each person represents a node, and nodes are 
connected by links. In this regard, Easley and Kleinberg (2010) argue that the 
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definition of “links” is very flexible, and depending on the context, they can represent 
different forms of relationships between nodes (e.g. friendship, communications 
exchanged, and physical proximity). In summary, the general purpose of study is to 
understand how the arrangement of the collection of linked nodes affects the spread 
of communication and behaviours over time.  
One of the main research streams in the area aims to identify which nodes can be 
more influential within a given social network. Unlike the opinion leadership concept 
presented in the previous section, in this perspective influence is not defined based 
on personal characteristics or just by the amount of nodes that someone is 
connected to, but it is also crucial to consider the extent to which people are 
connected with nodes that are “central” within the network (Canright, Engø-Monsen, 
Weltzien, & Pourbayat, 2004). The main idea is that the identification of network 
centres that reach larger parts of the network may lead to accelerate diffusion 
processes. In this regard, central nodes are identified by implementing complex 
mathematical methods such as eigenvector centrality (Canright et al., 2004), 
betweeness centrality (Kratzer, Lettl, Franke, & Gloor, 2016), closeness centrality 
(Sabiduss.G, 1966), and super mediators (Saito, Kimura, Ohara, & Motoda, 2016), 
among many others. None of the methodologies available are equally effective in 
identifying influential nodes across different types of networks. On the contrary, their 
outcomes and assumptions about the way in which information flows through a 
network are different from each other (Borgatti, 2005). Therefore, the 
implementation of these methods requires a clear understanding of their reach and 
assumptions. 
Another predominant topic within the literature on social networks has been the 
identification of methodologies to capture network properties and how those 
properties affect diffusion processes. In particular, it is common to appreciate the 
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organisation of nodes which are connected by many links between each other, but 
have only a few links with other nodes of the network. Revealing such dynamics that 
characterises the networks’ topologies has become a crucial task. That is achieved 
by implementing one of the vast amount of algorithms and complex methodologies 
that are available to identify the formation of clusters, measure the isolation of 
communities, and identify how links are distributed and how dense they are, among 
many other features (for a review of the methodologies see  Fortunato, 2010). 
Moreover, according to Valente (2012), once the topology of a network is 
understood, the structure may be deliberately altered in order to facilitate diffusion 
processes by: 1)adding/deleting nodes, 2) promoting/eliminating links between 
nodes, 3) rewiring existent links.  
Apart from capturing the properties of social networks, researchers have frequently 
focused on understanding why networks have these features. For instance, social 
networks have been repeatedly found to form clusters because of homophily 
(Rogers, 2003). In other words, such clustering of social networks happens because 
people tend to become friends and establish links with other people who are similar 
to them. The relevance of understanding these patterns is that they can profoundly 
impact diffusion processes. In particular, more homophilous and clustered networks 
have been found to increase adoption behaviour (Centola, 2011). Also, even though 
clustered ties could be considered redundant in networks transmitting information or 
diseases, they seem to be highly effective when it comes to behavioural contagion 
(Centola, 2010). However, the acceleration of diffusion processes under these 
conditions seems to be limited to those people connected in a close-knit network 
(Rogers, 2003). Moreover, the presence of long weak ties in networks has been 
largely studied as a potential promoter of diffusion in clustered networks. To say it 
another way, bonds connecting socially distant locations in a network (weak ties) 
may speed up behavioural contagion (Centola & Macy, 2007; Easley & Kleinberg, 
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2010; Rogers, 2003). In summary, the examples just presented above represent a 
small sample of the many insights that can be obtained when exploring and 
understanding the features and topology of a social network.  
Researchers have also shown particular attention to the development of predictive 
models based on the structural properties detected in social networks. A first type of 
predictive model aims to forecast how the connections and nodes in a social 
network will evolve based on its current and past properties. Some of the most 
popular models predicting network growth assume that new links will preferentially 
bond to nodes that are already well-connected, thus producing a self-organising 
phenomena governed by a power-law distribution of people’s attachments (Barabasi 
& Albert, 1999; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010). In other words, networks tend to be 
characterised by having few people with a large number of attachments and many 
individuals with very few links with other members. Numerous complex models 
predicting network growth are currently available and the area is in constant 
evolution (for a review of network growth models see Newman, 2003).  
The second type of predictive models commonly found in the literature on diffusion 
pretends to forecast how the adoption of behaviours will spread through networks. 
These type of models, also known as cascades behaviour models (Leskovec, 
Singh, & Kleinberg, 2006), usually take into account variables such as adoption 
thresholds, which can be understood from the social influence micro-level, and also 
elements from the macro-level of analysis such as node clusters or the presence of 
long weak ties (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010; Kleinberg, 2007). In the marketing 
tradition, the diffusion model proposed by Bass (1969) more than four decades ago 
has been the most influential predictive tool. This tool takes into account the effect 
of both mass media and interpersonal influences on adopters, and it is still 
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encouraging research nowadays (e.g. Hong, Koo, & Kim, 2016; Ratcliff & Doshi, 
2016).  
The emerging body of knowledge aiming to identify the most appropriate ways to 
measure networks’ characteristics has provided a much better understanding of 
how social influence operates within a large group of people. However, being highly 
central in a network of having a lot of links with other members of the system cannot 
define whether someone is influential or not, but the individual’s “potential” to reach 
more people and therefore influence larger segments of the social network. As  Aral 
(2011) argues, to be influential it is not enough being connected or passing 
information to a significant amount of people. Instead, individuals must cause a 
behavioural change in others. In this sense, such behavioural change is better 
explained by the type of variables covered in the previous section regarding social 
influence at a micro-level.  
In the previous sections, we have presented how both personal characteristics and 
social influence have proven to be important factors to consider when promoting 
adoption and diffusion of innovations. However, one disadvantage of these 
approaches is that they are relatively difficult to control or manipulate by people or 
organisations interested in encouraging adoption behaviours. In the next section, we 
will discuss how certain characteristics of the innovation itself, which are easier to 
manipulate, can also favour adoption and diffusion.  
 
1.1.3- Innovation characteristics as a driver of adoption and diffusion 
It is extremely sensible to assume that, at least in part, innovations’ features have 
an impact on adoption and diffusion processes. After all, when people are asked 
about the reasons why they decided to buy a product or follow a given behaviour, 
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people tend to say that the new practice/product is more beneficial than the current 
one. In this regard, it is crucial to emphasise that the objective attributes of an 
innovation are not necessarily the most important aspects when it comes to 
adoption decisions but how people “perceive” those attributes. According to 
Greenhalgh et al. (2004), the marketing tradition on diffusion is built under the 
assumption that organisations can make efforts to influence the judgement of 
potential adopters by increasing the perceived benefits or decreasing the perceived 
costs of a novel product or behaviour. 
In the influential diffusion theory proposed by Rogers (2003), the attributes of an 
innovation leading to adoption behaviours have been classified into five different 
conceptual categories. Even though the different types of attributes proposed are 
empirically highly related, the categorisation serves as a useful analytical tool. The 
first attribute suggested by Rogers is compatibility. People compare new products or 
ideas with practices currently prevalent and evaluate whether they may match or 
not. This compatibility assessment not only involves considering products or 
practices previously adopted, but also includes how innovations match needs and 
current beliefs. The second relevant innovation attribute is complexity, which 
consists of evaluating the extent to which potential adopters perceive the innovation 
as something easy to use or understand. Of course, they are likely to refrain from 
adopting innovations perceived to be too complex. Observability is the third 
important attribute that makes innovation more likely to be adopted. It refers to the 
degree to which the outcomes from adopting an innovation are visible to other 
members of the social system. The presence of public consequences can help 
potential adopters to reduce uncertainty regarding the innovation. The fourth 
attribute, the possibility of testing the innovation for a limited time before adopting it, 
has also been found to favour acceptance of novel products or practices. This 
attribute is called trialability. The fifth and final attribute is relative advantage. 
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Potential adopters need to perceive that the innovation is more beneficial than what 
they are currently doing in order to change their behaviours. Benefits are frequently 
assessed in terms of economic profitability; however, other variables such as 
perceived comfort, time or effort saved, and social prestige are considered when 
evaluating the relative advantage. In general, the impact that the different attributes 
previously presented have in adoption rates may differ depending on the context, 
the type of innovation being diffused or even the personal characteristics. 
Overall, the relative advantage as an innovation attribute has been found to be one 
of the strongest predictors of adoption behaviour (Rogers, 2003). One extremely 
common strategy of increasing the degree of relative advantage is to offer direct or 
indirect economic incentives. In other words, potential adopters are entitled to 
receive economic rewards as a consequence of their decision to adopt the new 
product or practice. The present work focuses on contributing to the understanding 
of how incentives can be used as a mechanism in order to encourage adoption and 
diffusion. For that reason, in the next section, we will briefly review some of the most 
relevant research regarding incentives as a driver of behavioural change. 
1.1.3.1- Incentives as an attribute driving adoption and diffusion 
Incentives are considered as a tool that can lead to adoption behaviour among 
individuals who would not adopt given products or behaviours otherwise or would do 
it much later (Rogers, 2003). This is why its use as an instrument to encourage 
diffusion can be appreciated in many different contexts, either with the aim to 
achieve desirable social outcomes (Heil, Gaalema, & Herrmann, 2012; Rogers, 
1971), or to simply sell products and services (Berman, 2006; Henderson, Beck, & 
Palmatier, 2011). 
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Regardless of the contexts in which incentives are implemented, the assumptions 
underpinning their usage are usually the same. People are rational agents who 
evaluate carefully the characteristics of potential products or practices to be adopted 
in each situation, and based on that assessment, only those behaviours maximising 
their own benefits are pursued. This assumption is the cornerstone of standard 
economic theories (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). From that perspective, individuals are 
mainly motivated to perform selfish behaviours that will maximise their own utility; 
and therefore, providing them with financial incentives is an easy way to encourage 
them to behave in ways that favour adoption and diffusion.  
The variety of incentive schemes used as a mechanism to promote adoption and 
diffusion can be divided into two conceptual categories: 1) incentives encouraging 
own adoption and, 2) incentives encouraging recommendation behaviour. The first 
type involves providing rewards either because someone decided to adopt a new 
practice/behaviour for the first time or because the person has maintained the 
desirable behaviour over time. This type of strategy, extensively used by marketers, 
is represented by the so-called Loyalty Programmes, which aim to retain customers 
and/or increase the frequency with which they acquire products or services by 
providing them with different types of rewards. There is a broad body of knowledge 
that aims to identify the conditions in which these kind of programmes are 
successful. Some examples of the topics explored are the magnitude and frequency 
with which a reward should be offered (Bagchi & Li, 2011; Kivetz & Simonson, 
2003), the types of rewards (Nunes & Dreze, 2006b; Verhoef, 2003), and the way 
the communication about the reward should be framed (Daryanto, de Ruyter, 
Wetzels, & Patterson, 2010; Nunes & Dreze, 2006a), among many others. 
Regarding the second category of incentives, they involve strategies in which 
individuals are incentivised after someone whom they recommended adopt the new 
product or practice. These types of schemes are frequently called Rewarded 
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Referral Programmes in the literature. Compared to the Loyalty Programmes, more 
limited amount of research aims to understand the mechanisms driving these 
initiatives, and variables that have been approached include the reactions of the 
recommendation’s receiver (Verlegh et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2011), rewards size 
(Ryu & Feick, 2007), and strength of the relationship between recommenders and 
receivers (Wirtz & Chew, 2002; Wirtz et al., 2013), among others.  
Based on the assumptions of the standard economic theories, we should expect the 
types of incentive schemes previously described to be highly effective in promoting 
adoption and diffusion. This expectation is because they allow people to increase 
their own benefits and maximise their utility. Moreover, there is empirical evidence 
supporting the idea that incentives can represent an important source of motivation 
(Lazear, 2000). Nevertheless, failures of initiatives promoting adoption through the 
use of incentive are not uncommon (e.g. Nunes & Dreze, 2006b; Obrien & Jones, 
1995).  
One of the reasons that could explain the failure of the use of incentives as a tool for 
encouraging adoption and diffusion is that this type of rewards may not be the only 
one and not even the most important driver of human behaviour. Indeed, during the 
last two decades, the evidence contradicting the positive effect that incentive should 
have on motivation has been increasingly common (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Frey & 
Jegen, 2001; Garnefeld, Iseke, & Krebs, 2012; Heyman & Ariely, 2004). In this 
regard, research from behavioural science, in general, and in particular from 
behavioural economics, has emerged as an alternative to the standard economic 
approach. From the perspective of behavioural economics, people are not 
considered rational decision makers who seek to maximise their utility in every 
choice that they face. On the contrary, behavioural economists claim that people 
frequently make decisions that may be considered irrational because they go 
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against their own benefit. These decisions are also expected to be affected by 
variables such as social preferences (regard for others) and emotions, instead of 
being only driven by selfish motives (Kahneman, 2011; Sustein & Thaler, 2008). In 
this sense, by incorporating these type of factors into traditional economic models, 
the explanatory power of economics can increase while providing more realistic 
psychological foundations (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012).  
Despite the insights from behavioural science regarding the drivers of human 
motivation, the different incentive schemes that aim to promote adoption and 
diffusion in different context are still predominately relying on the assumptions from 
standard economics. In such schemes, larger economic rewards are considered a 
synonym of higher engagement to adopt novel products or practices. In the set of 
studies contained in the present work, we challenge this idea and test whether 
incorporating insights from behavioural science when designing incentive schemes 
could actually outperform traditional approaches.  
Randomised control trials or experiments have been the predominant 
methodological approach characterising research on behavioural science, and this 
approach is implemented in the studies presented in this work. Nonetheless, this 
type of methodology has not been the most frequent in diffusion research. In the 
next section, we will present a general review of the methodological approaches 
that has traditionally been used in the area and provide more details about the 
experimental approach that we have decided to adopt.  
 
1.2- Methodological approaches in diffusion research 
After more than seven decades of research in diffusion of innovations, different 
methodological approaches have been developed in order to understand how 
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behaviours spread in social networks. The main paradigms that have been used in 
the area with the aim of gathering and analysing data are summarised in this 
section. As it will be explained below, methods have been very homogeneous 
during the first decades of research, and in more recent years, a wider range of 
perspectives have been more frequently adopted.  
Early adoption and diffusion research mainly relied on self-report measures. This 
methodological paradigm was defined by Ryan and Gross (1943) in their pioneering 
hybrid corn study, which is usually identified as the first formal study on diffusion 
(Rogers, 2003). In this kind of approach, participants reported in short interviews, 
surveys, phone calls or similar methods what they could remember when they 
adopted a given innovation. These methodologies explore variables such as 
channels of communication, network links, and personal and social circumstances, 
among many others (Rogers, 2003; Rogers et al., 2009).One of the main 
weaknesses of this paradigm is that it depends on the participants’ ability to 
accurately reconstruct their past experiences with the innovations. Because 
diffusion is a process that occurs through time, there could be some limitations in 
the possibility of reconstructing precisely the variables related to the diffusion 
progression (Rogers, 2003). Nonetheless, important conclusions have been 
obtained through these kinds of methodologies; and in fact, most of the body of 
knowledge in the field is based on this paradigm.  
An alternative way to gather data in diffusion research, which does not imply relying 
on peoples’ ability the reconstruct past events, consist of using archives or historic 
data which are obtained without interacting directly with the participants. When 
these kinds of records are available, researchers could retrospectively track 
adoptions and analyse variables linked to the diffusion process. A good illustration 
of this sort of techniques is presented by Christakis & Fowler (2007) who analysed 
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raw data from 12, 067 participants over a period of 32 years. Based on the data 
from a longitudinal health-related study, the authors examined social ties and 
changes in weight over time and were able to perform statistical analysis in order to 
observe the extent to which changes in one person’s weight was associated with 
the weight gained by other members of their social network (friends, neighbours, 
spouse and siblings). The authors of this study have generated controversy by 
concluding that obesity could be socially transmitted, and further analysis of the 
data and their assumptions have been performed (e.g. Cohen-Cole & Fletcher, 
2008; Fowler & Christakis, 2008; Trogdon, Nonnemaker, & Pais, 2008). 
A shortcoming of using these methods to gather data is the bias produced when 
studying diffusion processes retrospectively. According to Rogers (2003), this 
approach led to the study of only successful diffusion processes, and rejected or 
discontinued innovations are therefore less likely to be analysed because they 
would not leave any traces that can be easily rebuilt.  
The direct and thorough observation of people interacting in given social systems 
represents an additional method used to gather data with the aim of understanding 
the diffusion of innovations. This approach is clearly qualitative and attempt to 
capture information by sharing day-to-day experiences with participants (Rogers, 
2003). In this kind of immersions, researchers can understand the culture and the 
context of the social system in order to identify variables encouraging or 
discontinuing the diffusion of a given innovation. In addition, qualitative 
methodologies also focus on political, conflictual and institutional factors that explain 
the effectiveness of spreading given practices (Nicolini, 2010). Among the different 
constraints that could be attributed to this kind of methodologies, it can be 
highlighted that they are restricted to small social systems due to logical limitations 
in the number of resources (researchers) that should collect the data individually 
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(Rogers, 2003). The types of research relying on in-depth interviews, 
anthropological observations and other qualitative techniques are extremely unusual 
compared to other methods of gathering data (Rogers et al., 2009). 
Another methodological paradigm that is relatively infrequent in the literature 
consists of using computer simulations of diffusion processes based on tools such 
as agent-based models (e.g. Garcia, 2005), hazard models (e.g. Aral & Walker, 
2011a, 2012) and other analytic tools. This kind of techniques is usually grounded 
on assumptions coming from the observation of data previously gathered. However, 
those suppositions are not necessarily precise; therefore, the results obtained 
through these kinds of methods should be considered cautiously. Probably, these 
models can represent an intuitive guide to understanding network dynamics rather 
than signifying accurate predictive models.  
In terms of research designs, the literature shows a predominant application of 
correlational approaches implemented in cross-sectional data that are frequently 
collected with one-shot surveys (Rogers, 2003). However, the recent development 
of on-line data sources has opened the possibility of accessing big data sets, which 
allow the application of complex methodologies to analyse network dynamics. This 
kind of methods implements statistical models and visualisation tools that permit the 
identification of network clusters, communication links, influential nodes and other 
variables that account for the interaction in social systems, and therefore can 
describe diffusion of innovations (e.g. Canright et al., 2004; Christakis & Fowler, 
2007). 
The sort of research just described implies identifying events co-occurring when 
innovations are accepted or used by members of a social system. In that way, 
researchers can understand which variables are “associated” with the event of 
adoption. In this sense, Rogers (2003) argues that the network analyses represent 
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an important change in the nature of diffusion research and reveal interpersonal 
mechanisms in diffusion processes that were not available in the past. Nonetheless, 
it is pertinent to understand that studies based on observations of co-occurring 
events or “associations” between variables cannot establish indisputable causal 
relations; therefore, their claims may be limited. For that reason, some researchers 
have implemented complex statistical methods in an attempt to separate correlation 
from causation in the analysis of social networks. For instance, some methods take 
into account the timing of actions performed by agents as well as the asymmetric 
social ties in each period in order to establish clearer explanations when changes in 
behaviour occur (e.g. Anagnostopoulos, Kumar, & Mahdian, 2008; Aral et al., 2009; 
Aral & Walker, 2011b). However, Anagnostopoulos et al. (2008) recognise that this 
kind of techniques cannot answer every question related to diffusion and social 
interaction, and probably approaches like randomised controlled trails are highly 
desirable as a complement. 
When one or more variables are manipulated in a controlled fashion and everything 
else is kept constant, it is possible to directly establish the causality underlying the 
diffusion of a given innovation or behaviour in a social system. This type of 
interventions is usually called randomised controlled trails. For instance, imagine 
that in the study about the spread of obesity and other behaviours from Christakis & 
Fowler (2007) presented early in this section, the authors were able to ‘magically’ 
intervene to change the weight of a random subset of people, and then observe the 
implications on the weight of other people in their immediate social network. In this 
case, such intervention would provide conclusive (and less controversial) evidence 
regarding the spread of obesity. However, in many domains (including this one), 
such manipulation is not possible. Therefore, a key challenge is to find the domains 
in which this sort of interventions could directly be made. 
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Such contexts as different as adoption of pension plans (Duflo & Saez, 2003), 
voting behaviours (Bond et al., 2012), spread of health behaviours (Centola, 2011) 
and animal social diffusion (Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008) represent some examples in 
which adoption and diffusion processes have been studied by implementing 
experimental designs or randomised controlled trials. However, this type of 
approach has been very uncommon in diffusion and adoption research, and its use 
has been identified as an important tool to enhance the development of knowledge 
in that field (Rogers, 2003). The set of studies contained in the present work aims to 
contribute to the adoption and diffusion literature by implementing an experimental 
approach. 
The practical relevance and applied nature of the research on diffusion and 
adoption have made it a prolific field during several decades. However, its 
development has been partially limited by the scope of the predominant methods 
characterising the field since its early studies back in the forties. In more recent 
years, different methodological tools, such as social network analysis or randomised 
controlled trials, have been used to approach research questions regarding the 
causes of diffusion processes that were unanswered until now. Nonetheless, 
numerous topics can still be addressed in ways that have not been considered in 
the past.  
In addition, the current conceptions explaining why people adopt innovations can be 
broadened in light of the relatively new developments in judgements and decision 
making brought by behavioural scientists, in which traditional assumptions about 
individuals’ rationality are challenged. In summary, adopting a new practice is 
ultimately an individual decision, consequently, incorporating the use of randomised 
controlled trials to understand how people define their preferences represents an 
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opportunity to identify novel strategies aiming to encourage adoption and diffusion 
processes. 
In the next section, we discuss the specific contributions from behavioural science 
that underlies the fundamental principles and ideas being tested in the present 
work.  
 
1.3- Behavioural science perspective 
As it was mentioned in section 1.1.3.1, incentives have traditionally represented a 
very popular tool to encourage adoption behaviours. However, we have also pointed 
out that the failure of this type of initiatives is not uncommon, and that insights from 
behavioural science may inform the design of novel and potentially more attractive 
incentives schemes. In particular, evidence suggesting that people are strongly 
driven by unselfish motives lead us to propose a type of scheme in which 
participants have the opportunity to share part of their rewards with relevant peers. 
In this section, we discuss the cognitive mechanisms underlying that proposal. 
Specifically, we focus on the research about “mental accounting” and “social 
rewards”, to justify the potential effectiveness of the unselfish incentive schemes 
proposed in the present work.  
1.3.1 Mental Accounting.  
The term mental accounting was originally introduced in the influential paper 
“Mental accounting and consumer choice”, written by Thaler (1985) and updated a 
few years later (Thaler, 1999). This theoretical framework suggest that people 
perform a set of cognitive operations in order to code, categorise and evaluate their 
financial activities; comparable to the financial accounting practices observed in 
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organisations. Such cognitive operations influence the perceived attractiveness of 
choices, and how people’s decision are made and evaluated.  
Unlike the traditional accounting practices, humans’ mental accounting operations 
do not follow the economic notion of fungibility. In other words, the money allocated 
in one specific account is not a perfect substitute of similar resources allocated in a 
different account. For instance, people may assign their income to different monthly 
budget accounts, such as “having drinks at pubs” or “buying gifts to friends”. 
However, they may constrain their purchases of “drinks at pubs” when the budget is 
running out, while not limiting their purchases in other accounts like “buying gifts to 
friend”. It means that even though the resources of both accounts came from the 
same “fungible” income (e.g. salary), the rules governing how people experience 
and decide to use them differ depending on the “mental account” to which those 
resources were allocated. This fact has profound implications for the use of 
incentives, because people may perceive and consequently treat differently the 
resources that were received as a consequence of an external economic reward.   
Research on mental accounting has consistently found that resources coming from 
recent gains are not treated in the same way as the money that is already part of 
people’s wealth (Thaler, 1999; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). 
The classic example to illustrate this phenomenon is capture by gamblers’ attitude 
towards the money they have just won in a casino. Commonly, they treat resources 
coming from recent gains as “money from the casino” that they can spend in risky 
gambles without regrets. For that reason, this behaviour was first described by 
Thaler and Johnson (1990) as the “House money effect”. According to the authors, 
after a recent gain, people integrated the following loses with the prior gain, as long 
as the loses do not exceed the original gain. It means that losing “money from the 
house (casino)” is less painful than losing “one’s own (previous) resources”.  
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The money house effect has been documented in contexts in which both large and 
small unexpected gains are received. For instance, investors in the financial 
markets has been found to make riskier investments after large recent gains (Huang 
& Chan, 2014; Wen, Gong, Chao, & Chen, 2014). Similarly, receiving small windfall 
gains as it is the case for customers’ promotions has also been found to change the 
way in which people categorise and evaluate their financial activities. In particular, 
customers receiving small rewards tend to increase their habitual spending and 
focus on acquiring products that they do not typically buy (Heilman, Nakamoto, & 
Rao, 2002; Milkman & Beshears, 2009; Reinholtz, Bartels, & Parker, 2015). In 
summary, regardless the size of the recent gain, people do not tend to mentally 
attach resources resulting from windfalls to their own wealth, and consequently, 
they tend to use them in ways they would not normally do.  
In addition, people have been found to assign their gains to different mental 
accounts depending on how they obtained the resources. For example, experiments 
exploring social preferences have found that participants are more selfish when they 
have to earn their endowment (e.g. by performing a task in the experiment) 
compared to the situation in which their endowment is merely allocated involving no 
efforts from the participant (Cherry, Frykblom, & Shogren, 2002). Moreover, people 
receiving more tangible rewards (e.g. cash) has also been found to show more self-
interested behaviours compare to people receiving less tangible endowments (e.g. 
tokens) (Reinstein & Riener, 2009).  
Contrary to the assumptions from standard economics, the present research 
proposes that people can find appealing to participate in unselfish incentive 
schemes in which participants are allowed to share part of their rewards with 
relevant peers. In this regard, we claim that the notion of mental accounting may 
partially explain why this type of initiatives can be effective. Specifically, people 
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should be expected to be more open to use their rewards in non-habitual activities 
(e.g. sharing it with a friend) because they are less mentally attached to small 
windfall gains (like the rewards from incentive schemes). Moreover, based on the 
evidence previously presented, people should be incline do use their rewards in an 
unselfish way considering that the schemes being proposed involved rewards that 
are earned with very little effort, and are presented as an intangible incentive 
(voucher),  
Even if people code and categorise small windfall in a different way, and 
consequently, they are less mentally attached to this type of resources, it does not 
completely explain why people would choose to share such resources with others 
instead of using them for selfish consumption. In the following section we discuss 
evidence suggesting why people may actually prefer to give away at least part of 
their recent gains. In particular, we discuss in detail the concept of “social rewards”.   
 1.3.2 Social Rewards. 
In their daily life, people constantly face scenarios in which they are required to 
choose one of many different courses of action. In this regard, people are expected 
to select the alternative associated to the most “rewarding” experience.  In other 
words, the different potential outcomes have motivational properties that induce 
people to pursue certain behaviours in order to achieve the most attractive result. 
Some stimuli in the environment, known as primary rewards, are naturally rewarding 
because they are essential for survival (e.g. food, liquids) and help to correct 
homeostatic imbalances in the body. Other secondary or non-primary rewards 
enhance chances of survival but do not directly support essential body functions 
(Schultz, 2015). A clear example of this is represented by monetary rewards, which 
cannot directly satisfy people’s nutritional needs, but can be used to buy the food to 
do so. For that reason, monetary resources are expected to have motivational 
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properties, because they can be exchanged for other resources in order to fulfil 
more basic needs.  
Standard economic theories, focus on the motivational attributes of economic 
benefits to explain peoples’ decisions. They claim that individuals define their 
preferences for a specific action by weighting the cost, gains and probabilities of 
occurrence of each potential outcome and then choose the one that maximise their 
own benefits. This is commonly known in the literature as the expected utility 
maximisation hypothesis (Becker, 1976; Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). Such premise, 
however, cannot account for people’s behaviours leading to outcomes with no 
apparent personal benefits. For instance, individuals frequently choose to do 
voluntary unpaid work, give money to charity, cooperate with unknown people, 
among many other actions that reflect unselfish motives in people’s decisions. 
Recent developments in neuroscience and neuro-economics suggest that such 
social interactions can be rewarding in itself, consequently, they are more similar to 
monetary rewards than what economist have traditionally acknowledge.  
When making a decision, the human brain needs to assign values to the different 
stimuli associated with each choice alternatives, in order to create a representation 
of the reward magnitude or utility to be experienced (Lin, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2012). 
In this sense, advances in neuroimaging have allowed to visualise and reveal the 
structures activated when choices are made. Surprisingly, recent evidence supports 
the idea that the paths and areas engaged when processing economic incentives 
strongly resemble those activated when social rewards (e.g. feedback from others) 
are expected to be received. The evidence shows that both monetary and non-
monetary stimuli are transformed into a “common currency” that allows to compare 
rewards of different nature (Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; 
Lin et al., 2012; Ruff & Fehr, 2014; Saxe & Haushofer, 2008; Zink et al., 2008).  
Chapter 1                                                                                                                                                                                   53 
 
In the past, the standard economics perspective has explained prosocial actions as 
a strategic decision. In other words, even in one-shot anonymous games, they 
assume that people show unselfish behaviours because it may bring them future 
material benefits or avoid them punishments from others in future interactions 
(Samuelson, 2005; Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). From this perspectives, prosocial 
actions are just a mechanism through which people can achieve material rewards. 
On the contrary, the evidence from neuroscience previously mentioned strongly 
suggest that the feedback from social interactions can be rewarding in itself. 
Not only similar brain structures have been found to be activated when both 
monetary and social rewards are expected to be received. Additionally, regardless 
of the type of reward, the neural activation has been found to increase proportionally 
to the levels of the expected incentive. For example, Spreckelmeyer et al. (2009) 
found that anticipating to see different types of happy face expressions with 
increasing intensity (happy closed mouth; happy open mouth; happy open mouth 
exuberant) produced similar activation levels compared to increasing monetary 
rewards. Similarly, Davey, Allen, Harrison, Dwyer, and Yuce  (2010) made 
participants believe that other people had formed an opinion on their likability based 
on the appearance in a picture. They found greater neural activation for being liked 
by people who participants regarded highly compared to those they regarded less. 
Moreover, Van Hoorn, Van Dijk, Guroglu, and Crone (2016) manipulated increases 
in social pressure by asking people to make donations either alone, in front of a 
passive spectator, or before an evaluator who provides positive feedback (likes) for 
larger donations. They found that both the amount donated and the neural activation 
increased in the presence of peers and even more when others gave evaluative 
feedback. These examples highlight the idea that social rewards have an important 
role on stimulating neural circuits associated to pleasurable experiences.  
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The rewarding properties of social behaviour are likely to have evolved to enhance 
the chances of survival by facilitating cooperation and encouraging group cohesion. 
This is probably why this type of behaviours has also been observed in non-human 
primates (Ruff & Fehr, 2014). For instance, macaques has been found to be willing 
to exchange access to food for the possibility of viewing the pictures of others 
socially relevant, suggesting that such social stimuli can have even more value than 
food (Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005). Similarly, what is known in the literature as 
“vicarious reinforcement” has been observed in monkeys, when performing actions 
that do not lead to rewards for themselves but for other monkeys (Chang, Winecoff, 
& Platt, 2011). These are just a few of many evidence supporting the evolutionary 
value of prosocial behaviours.  
Despite the overwhelming evidence in favour of social rewards as source of 
motivation, the initiatives aiming to encourage desirable behaviours are frequently 
based on the idea that only economic incentives represent a driver of human 
motivation. In the present work we claim that by designing initiatives that allow 
people to show behaviours that are perceived as “unselfish”, they could obtain 
social rewards that can potentially be equally or even more motivating than the 
classic monetary incentives. In the following section the focus of the present work is 
explained in more detail.  
1.4- Research focus 
The general focus of the present research is to explore how unselfish motives can 
influence people’s preferences, with the purpose of informing the design of 
initiatives aiming to encourage adoption behaviours. Since the implementation of 
incentive schemes is one of the most common tools used to promote adoption and 
diffusion, we aim to shed some light on how this kind of initiative may be more 
effective. In particular, we challenge the assumptions from standard economics in 
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which people are perceived as naturally self-interested and motivated to maximise 
their utility. Instead, we propose alternative incentive schemes that incorporate 
unselfish motives as a driver of human behaviour. 
In terms of research design, randomised controlled trials or experiments will be the 
methodological paradigm to be followed in the present work because they represent 
the most effective way to establish causal relationships between variables. 
Specifically, participants will be randomly allocated to different conditions, and then 
their preferences will be measured and compared.  
The experiments being run are based on hypothetical behaviours. In other words, 
participants are asked to imagine hypothetical scenarios and state how they would 
react under certain conditions. This type of experiments allows researchers to 
collect data in a very cost-effective way while allowing them to control external 
variables that may create noise in the experiments’ outcomes. Moreover, even 
though the conclusions from this kind of approach may be considered not valid in 
real-life settings, there is evidence suggesting that hypothetical-scenario 
experiments can lead to similar results compared to real-behaviour experiments 
(Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011). For that reason, these 
research can provide useful insight that can inform further research in more realistic 
settings.  
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CHAPTER 2: CUSTOMERS SHARING THEIR LOYALTY REWARDS. A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN LOYALTY PROGRAMMES. 
 
2.1- Introduction 
Being offered a “reward card” in the checkout point when you are about to pay for 
goods has become something extremely common when visiting outlets as different 
as supermarkets, coffee shops, and restaurants, among many others. In the last two 
decades, the global economy has witnessed an exponential increase of initiatives in 
many different industries aiming to reward customers based on the frequency with 
which they consume products or services from a given firm (Dorotic, Bijmolt, & 
Verhoef, 2012; McCall & Voorhees, 2010). Marketers seem to have realised that 
their efforts should involve not only making people aware of new products and 
services but also engaging customers in a long-term relationship that guarantees 
the sustainability of their business in the future.  
It is a well-known fact that retaining old customers is worth more than attracting new 
consumers (Nunes & Dreze, 2006b; Yoo & Bai, 2013). For that reason, the sort of 
initiatives previously mentioned, known in the literature as loyalty programmes 
(LPs), represent a multimillionaire marketing industry. The estimation of its size in 
the US range from about one billion dollars (Wagner, Hennig-Thurau, & Rudolph, 
2009) to about six billion dollars (Berman, 2006). Moreover, LPs have reached more 
than 1.3 billion people participating in the US, averaging 12 separate programmes 
per household (Ferguson & Hlavinka, 2007). The dimension and popularity of this 
kind of programmes are not too different from the trends observed in other 
developed countries, such as the UK and Canada, where participation represents 
more than 90% of total customers (Berman, 2006). Nonetheless, despite the 
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significant number of programmes offered and a large number of members, an 
important proportion of them has not been successful (Berman, 2006). Moreover, it 
has been found that only about 39% of members are active participants (Ferguson 
& Hlavinka, 2007) and the awful performance of many of these programmes results 
in their abolition (Nunes & Dreze, 2006b). The findings suggest that there is not a 
comprehensive understanding of how these kinds of programmes operate. Also, the 
lack of success could be because people are part of multiple similar programmes; 
therefore, it is difficult to maintain a competitive advantage (Berman, 2006). For 
these reasons, in the present study, we propose a novel approach that challenges 
traditional assumptions about the design of LPs with the aim of providing both 
theoretical and practical insights that could result in competitive advantages.  
The term LP captures a wide range of marketing activities such as reward cards, 
special gifts, tiered service levels, and other initiatives that intent to affect client’s 
attitudes towards a firm (Henderson et al., 2011). Most of them have in common the 
fact that they provide different forms of financial incentives, either in the short-term 
or long-term, with the aim of making more appealing the offering from the firm. Many 
programmes strongly rely on the assumption from standard economics that 
proposes that people’s behaviour is driven by a desire for maximising their own 
economic benefits. In other words, these programmes assume that customers will 
prefer to be loyal to companies or brands that offer better economic incentives and 
therefore improve their overall wealth. In the present study, we will challenge that 
assumption by showing that people might actually be more engaged with firms that 
give lower economic incentives but offer the possibility of obtaining social 
reinforcement by sharing an economic reward with relevant peers.  
In the last few decades, evidence from behavioural economic, psychology, cognitive 
science, and other behavioural sciences have challenged the idea of the homo 
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economicus proposed in standard economic theories. According to this perspective, 
people are naturally self-interested, they are utility-maximizers, and they can make 
perfectly rational individual decisions (Becker, 1976). On the contrary, behavioural 
scientists have argued that people’s decisions are not necessarily “rational” and, 
crucially, not necessarily selfish because they frequently choose course of actions 
that clearly reduce their possibilities of maximising their own utility. Moreover, they 
claim that people show social preferences that lead them to care about the material 
resources allocated to others or what others might think of them (Bowles & Polania-
Reyes, 2012; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Frey & Jegen, 2001; 
Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Kamenica, 2012).  
One of the most popular experimental paradigms used during the last three 
decades with the aim of demonstrating that people have social preferences is the 
“Dictator Game” (Colin Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). The dictator game is a 
modification made by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) of the “Ultimatum 
Game”, that was originally introduced by Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 
(1982). Similar to the dictator game, in the ultimatum game a player (proposer) has 
to divide a sum of money between herself and a second player (receiver). However, 
unlike in the dictator game, in the ultimatum game, the receiver can either accept or 
reject the proposer’s offer. Therefore, there is a strategic element in the ultimatum 
game in the sense that the proposer needs to anticipate the amount of money or the 
type of offer to be accepted or rejected from the receiver. Hence, the dictator game 
eliminates that strategic aspect, and it represents a clearer test of social 
preferences. 
Even though this approach has not been exempted from criticism (Bardsley, 2008), 
it has systematically shown that human populations are more benevolent than homo 
economicus (Branas-Garza, 2006; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; Eckel & Grossman, 
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1996; Engel, 2011). In other words, it has been consistently observed that people 
prefer to share an important proportion of their endowment with others, even though 
they have the possibility to keep it to themselves. If that is actually the case in real 
world behaviours (not only Lab experiments), then it is sensible to ask whether 
people would be more engaged with initiatives that allow them to share with 
someone else an endowment that they have received from a third party. For that 
reason, we will explore the extent to which the customers of a firm would be willing 
to share with a friend the endowment received as a consequence of a LP. 
Moreover, we will compare people’s preferences for LP in which the amount to be 
shared and the number of people with whom to share the reward is manipulated.  
In order to contextualise the approach to be considered in the present research, 
imagine that you have two firms offering comparable products. One of the firms, let 
say Firm A, gives you a £1 incentive any time you buy a given product and allow 
you to redeem the accrued rewards after reaching a specific target. The other firm, 
Firm B, offers you £0.7 after each purchase of a similar product but also allow you 
to share a £0.3 reward with a relevant friend. From the standard economic 
perspective, most people would prefer Firm A because buying in that store would 
allow them to maximise their economic benefit. On the other hand, being more loyal 
to Firm B would represent a violation to the homo economicus conception in which 
customerss are selfish and self-interested individuals motivated by economic 
incentives. Our results contradicted the homo economicus perspective.  
The kind of benevolent behaviour observed in the dictator game (and other 
comparable games) has been sometimes attributed to the expectation of a 
reciprocal behaviour from the person with whom the player who received the 
endowment is sharing the reward (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). If that is the case, sharing the 
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endowment in the dictator game could be considered a self-interest act. 
Nonetheless, some pieces of evidence suggest that reciprocity cannot account for 
such kind of behaviours in a dictator game (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Branas-Garza, 
Duran, & Espinosa, 2012; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1999). In our experimental 
paradigm, we explored whether those apparent social preferences can be explained 
by an expectation of reciprocity. In this regard, our results partially supported such 
hypothesis.  
The use of the dictator game (and other simple set of games) to investigate 
unselfish behaviour could be considered as unrealistic because, among other 
things, participants might not perceive the experimental context as a situation that 
occurs in their everyday lives, and because the “other” person with whom the 
reward is shared is commonly a stranger. In this regard, the characteristics of the 
experimental paradigm and the exclusion of context-specific social norms could 
drive the results and therefore limit its external validity (Bardsley, 2008). The set of 
experiments presented in our study represents an opportunity to test selfish 
behaviour in a setting comparable to the dictator game but framed in a more 
realistic context. Therefore, our results can contribute to the literature about 
unselfish behaviour by using a novel experimental paradigm that may increase the 
validity of previous findings in the field.  
In our first experiment, we test the willingness of a hypothetical customers to share 
the reward from a LP with a friend, and the possibilities for reciprocity is 
manipulated by making the receiver be either aware or unaware of the identity of the 
customer. In our second experiment, we also manipulated the possibility of 
reciprocity. However, in this case, participants chose their favourite LP from a 
sequence of pairwise comparisons, a study in which the amount to be shared with 
their friend are varied in each loyalty scheme. The last experiment is very similar to 
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the second one, but in this case, the reward of the LP can be shared with either two 
friends or one friend. In other words, the third experiment allowed us to test whether 
people’s preferences for sharing a specific proportion of their endowment change if 
the receivers are more than one person.  
In the following sections, we will develop our hypothesis and briefly review the 
literature on LPs, unselfish behaviour and the relationship with the “dictator game”.  
2.1.1- Loyalty programmes and incentives 
Marketing initiatives named with terms as different as loyalty cards, reward 
programmes, frequent-shoppers programmes, among many other incentives are 
included under the umbrella that we called Loyalty Programmes in the present 
study. It is difficult to have a single definition for all these kind of initiatives because 
of the large variety of schemes. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this study, we will 
delimit the term LP to any marketing initiative containing the distinctive features 
defined by Dorotic, et al. (2012), which are summarised below:  
- Foster Loyalty: The primary purpose of a LP should be to encourage 
consumers to buy from the provider more frequently, to increase the 
amounts of purchase over time and to augment the share of their wallets. 
- Structured: Customers must formally enrol in a LP to obtain certain benefits 
from it. Consequently, they represent structured membership-based 
initiatives. 
- Long Term: LPs are not offered for a short period as it is the case for sales 
promotions. Instead, they involve a long-term investment from both the 
provider and the customer.  
- Rewarding: A LP rewards its members with a form of currency (e.g. goods, 
discounts and preferential treatment) based on their current or future value.  
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- Ongoing Marketing Effort: The activities regarding the programme 
represent a continuous effort (e.g. mailing list and personalised offers), 
instead of a specific activity.  
 
The beginning of large-scale and long-term LPs, containing the features previously 
described, is usually linked to the airline sector in which companies were struggling 
to obtain competitive advantages after the “Airline Deregulation Act” in the US 
during the 80’s. During that period, American Airlines came up with the idea of 
creating a frequent-flyers reward programme to differentiate themselves from 
competitors (Berman, 2006; McCall & Voorhees, 2010). From the 90’s, this kind of 
initiatives increased exponentially not only in the US but also in other developed 
countries (Berman, 2006; Dorotic et al., 2012; Yoo & Bai, 2013). Such increase has 
led to the proliferation of academic research about LPs and customer loyalty (Yoo & 
Bai, 2013). However, after decades of research, there are still numerous 
contradictory results that bring practitioners confusion rather than providing 
guidance (Dorotic et al., 2012; McCall & Voorhees, 2010), and even challenge the 
effectiveness of this kind of programmes as a mechanism to increase customers 
loyalty and firms value (e.g.Obrien & Jones, 1995).  
One of the reasons that explain why LPs do not always show positive effects on 
customers behaviours is that they might depend on the level of competition among 
different programmes (Dorotic et al., 2012). In other words, its effectiveness might 
decrease if similar programmes saturate the markets. For that reason, obtaining 
theoretical insights that help produce innovative and effective loyalty schemes is 
crucial for practitioners who aim to create competitive advantages. 
In the last few decades, research has shown particular interest in understanding 
which type of rewards should be offered in LPs and what are the conditions in which 
those rewards increase customer engagement (McCall & Voorhees, 2010). 
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Specifically, some of the topics that have caught researchers’ attention are: whether 
the rewards should be products from the same firm or indirect rewards that are not 
tied to products from the provider (Dorotic et al., 2012; Kivetz, 2005; McCall & 
Voorhees, 2010), the effort needed to obtain the reward (Kivetz, 2005; Kivetz & 
Simonson, 2003), the magnitude and frequency of the reward (Bagchi & Li, 2011; 
Kivetz & Simonson, 2003), the timing of the reward (Roehm & Roehm, 2011); the 
use of economic vs non-economic rewards (Nunes & Dreze, 2006b; Verhoef, 2003), 
the communication and framing of the reward (Daryanto et al., 2010; Nunes & 
Dreze, 2006a) and whether the programme is offered by a single vendor or a 
partnership involving several firms (Dorotic, Fok, Verhoef, & Bijmolt, 2011), among 
other topics. Even though the topics previously mentioned are different from each 
other, all of them share one similar assumption: They all assume that customer’s 
engagement is driven by the desire to obtain benefits from providers with the aim of 
maximising their own wealth, status or both. However, as it was mentioned in the 
introduction, evidence from behavioural science suggest that people’s behaviour 
can also be driven by social motives, not only by individual and selfish preferences.  
A fairly robust finding in behavioural science is that social pressure could be a 
strong mechanism to influence peoples’ behaviour. It has been observed in context 
as different as political mobilisation (Bond et al., 2012), web applications diffusion 
(Aral et al., 2009) , micro finances (Karlan, 2007), natural resources conservation 
(Van Vugt, 2009) and energy consumption (Nolan et al., 2008; Yoeli, Hoffman, 
Rand, & Nowak, 2013), among many others. Based on that evidence, Mani, 
Rahwan and Pentland (2013) formalised a model in which monetary incentives are 
used to promote social pressure. In this regard, they claimed that instead of directly 
rewarding or punishing a given Agent “A” to influence his or her behaviour, it is more 
effective and sustainable to incentivise agent A’s peers to exercise social pressure 
on Agent “A”.  
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The idea previously mentioned has proved to be effective in a field experiment were 
the authors tried to increase participant’s daily physical activity (Aharony, Pan, Ip, 
Khayal, & Pentland, 2011). In one experimental condition, people were rewarded 
based on their own performance, but they could observe the activity levels of the 
two peers (Peer-View Condition). In a second condition, participants were rewarded 
based only on their peer’s physical activity (Peer-Reward Condition). In the control 
condition, people were rewarded based on their own physical activity, which is the 
traditional way to influence behaviour. The researchers found that the conditions 
“Peer-View” and “Peer-Reward” outperformed the control group, thus suggesting 
that social aspects could be more effective in influencing behaviour than do 
traditional direct incentives rewards. Moreover, the Peer-Reward Condition resulted 
in being the most sustainable form of reward in the long run. We claim that a 
comparable result could be achieved if a similar approach is implemented in the 
context of the LPs. Specifically, we expect that people would prefer providers that 
gives, at least, part of their purchase’ rewards to a relevant peer instead of giving 
the entire reward to the customer.  
 
Finding that people favour providers that share part of the consumer’s reward with 
relevant peers could be a consequence of the expectation of social feedback or 
even the expectation of reciprocity from the relevant peer receiving the reward. 
However, an alternative explanation is that people derive utility from helping others 
without expecting something in return. In other words, the preference for sharing a 
purchase reward with a relevant peer could be seen as an act of altruism. In the 
next section, we will briefly review the literature on altruism and unselfish behaviour.  
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2.1.2- Unselfish behaviour and the Dictator Game  
People frequently donate to charities or help others regardless of the sacrifices it 
might imply. It seems that social reinforcement as a result of such behaviours could 
be as rewarding as monetary incentives as suggested in our first chapter. Since 
unselfish behaviours represent a violation of the assumptions underpinning 
standard economics, the topic has been the focus of attention among experimental 
economists and behavioural scientists in general during the last few decades 
(Branas-Garza, 2006; Colin Camerer, 2003; Dana et al., 2006; Eckel & Grossman, 
1996; Engel, 2011). As it was mentioned in the introduction, the dictator game has 
been one of the most popular experimental paradigms to explore social preferences 
because of its simplicity to model key features of human behaviour (Colin Camerer, 
2003; Engel, 2011).  
 
The prolific literature on dictator (and ultimatum) game have explored numerous 
issues during the last decades, that can be summarised into five categories defined 
by Camerer (2003). This taxonomy based on the variable being manipulated 
includes the following: methodology (e.g. anonymity and stakes), demographic (e.g. 
age, gender and beauty), culture (e.g. origin of participants), description (e.g. 
framing and context), and structure (e.g. addition of moves). Those variables could 
cause differences in the results regarding social preferences. However, both 
structural and cultural variables seem to be the ones producing the biggest effects, 
whereas the other categories have shown in average more modest effects (Colin 
Camerer, 2003). 
 
Even though the payoff maximisation perspective would predict that most people 
would share nothing in a dictator game because there are no economic incentives 
to do so, it is usually not the case. Some “dictators” might give nothing to the 
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receiver; however, it is extremely rare to find a situation in which most participants 
behave in a selfish way by keeping 100% of their endowment. The proportion of the 
stake that the “dictators” share varies from one study to another. For that reason, 
Engel (2011) presented a comprehensive meta-study that summarises  25 years of 
research based on the dictator game paradigm. A total of 616 different treatments 
from 129 publications were included, and the author found that the grand mean of 
the proportion of the endowment that dictators were willing to give was 28.35% of 
the total pie. 
 
In our study, we claim that the rewards received as a consequence of a LP can be 
understood as a dictator-game type of situation. The homo-economicus hypothesis 
in the dictator game establishes that people will prefer to keep 100% of their 
endowment in order to maximise their payoff. In the same way, if customers are 
utility-maximisers, they should prefer firms that offer the highest economic rewards 
in their LPs (assuming that products and brands are similar among firms). 
Furthermore, according to the payoff-maximiser perspective, if customers have the 
possibility of sharing their consumption rewards with a relevant peer (e.g. a friend) 
they will not be willing to do so. Therefore, programmes offering that possibility will 
not be attractive to customers. Nonetheless, since evidence from the dictator game 
paradigm has consistently shown that people have social preferences, we 
hypothesise that those preferences can also be present when judging the 
attractiveness of firm’s loyalty schemes. Specifically, our first hypothesis is shown 
below: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: People will prefer LPs that allow them to share at 
least part of their consumption rewards with a customer’s friend, 
compared to the situation in which a comparable reward is only 
offered to the customer. Moreover, we expect that the preferences 
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for sharing the consumption reward will be close to the giving 
behaviour observed in the dictator game, where participants give 
away on average about 30% of their endowment (although with wide 
individual variation). 
     
2.1.3- Reciprocity in the Dictator Game 
 
Even though dictator game experiments consistently result in most participants 
giving away part of their endowment, the reasons underpinning such behaviour are 
not absolutely clear. With the aim of understanding what is motivating dictator’s 
seemingly altruistic behaviour, researchers have manipulated variables such as the 
social distance between participants (Branas-Garza et al., 2012; Charness & 
Gneezy, 2008), anonymity of the participants (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman, 
McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996) and 
characteristics of the recipient (Branas-Garza, 2006; Eckel & Grossman, 1996), 
among many others. In the present study, we will try to identify the reasons that 
might lead a customer to share a loyalty reward with a friend by manipulating the 
possibility of reciprocity from the receiver.  
 
In the original design of the dictator game, the authors assumed that by keeping the 
anonymity of both the dictator and the recipient, they were able to control social 
influences, and therefore, they could attribute dictator’s giving to a purely altruistic 
act (Kahneman et al., 1986). Nonetheless, it might be the case that participants are 
motivated to give away part of their endowment in order to cause a positive 
impression to the experimenter. In this regard, some subsequent studies introduced 
a double-blind procedure in which neither the experimenter nor any other observer 
could know the subjects’ decision (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1994; 
Hoffman et al., 1996). After introducing such procedures with the aim of achieving 
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social isolation, the amount of money shared by dictators was significantly reduced 
(Hoffman et al., 1994). In contrast, in a follow-up study in which the social isolation 
was weakened by increasing the possibility of experimenters to identify participant’s 
allocations, dictators giving increased compared to the situation in which complete 
anonymity was guaranteed (Hoffman et al., 1996). These changes in self-regarded 
behaviours suggest that financial allocations in the dictator game are the result of 
implicit concerns about what others may expect. Specifically, the authors claimed 
that previous knowledge regarding social norms and reciprocity is activated once 
the social distance is reduced, even though the experimental design explicitly rules 
out the possibility of reciprocal sanctions or rewards. In other words, people learn in 
life’s interaction that reciprocity is expected when social distance is reduced, and 
these expectations might be unconsciously brought into the laboratory.  
An alternative explanation for the reduction of the endowment shared in the 
experiments previously mentioned is that the attempts to keep anonymity in double-
blind designs create doubts to the participants about whether a real person is 
actually receiving the money allocated (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, & Moore, 2001). 
Bohnet & Frey (1999) also challenged the results from Hoffman, et al., (1996) by 
manipulating the degree to which dictators and recipients could identify each other 
in the experimental situation rather than varying the social distance between 
experimenters and subjects. They found that reciprocity was not the factor 
influencing behaviour but the possibility of identifying the participants involved in the 
experiment. Their findings suggest that details about recipients in the dictator game 
play an important role in defining the size of the amount of money allocated. 
Aligned with that idea, it has been found that when dictators are presented with the 
family name of the recipients, they give significantly more money away than the 
situation in which such information is not provided (Charness & Gneezy, 2008). In 
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addition, replacing anonymous recipients by a well-known charity has tripled 
dictators sharing (Eckel & Grossman, 1996). Furthermore, in a study in which 
hypothetical and real experiments were combined, the authors found that when 
participants were told that the recipients were poor or that the money to be shared 
would be used to buy medicines for disadvantage people, the proportion of the 
stake to be shared significantly increased (Branas-Garza, 2006). These and many 
other evidence suggest that, at least in part, information that makes recipients to be 
perceived as socially closer increase dictator’s desire to engage in unselfish 
behaviours in the dictator game.  
In our study, the social distance between the person sharing the reward and the 
recipient is probably the closest possible because they are meant to be friends. 
Under comparable circumstances, previous studies have found that offers 
significantly increase when friends perform the role of recipients (Branas-Garza et 
al., 2012). Specifically, participants in that experiment identified their network of 
friends in a classroom; in the second stage of the experiment, they played the 
dictator game either with friends or with strangers. Even though the dictators knew 
whether recipients were a friend or not, the exact identity was not revealed. They 
found that even though reciprocity was controlled, donations to friends were 35% 
higher than those to strangers.  
Interestingly, the study just mentioned also found that participants that initially 
identified only one person as a friend in the classroom gave more money than those 
who elicited a larger network of friends during the first stage of the experiment. 
Since those with one friend were able to infer the person to whom they donated the 
money, the differences in donations between conditions could be explained by 
direct reciprocity. It might be the case that when people are able to easily identify 
the recipient they try to be more generous in order to respond to a previous positive 
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action from their friends. However, some pieces of evidence suggest that dictator’s 
allocations are independent of previous recipient’s kindness (Heinrich & Weimann, 
2013). Another potential explanation is that dictators are more benevolent in their 
allocations when they can easily identify the recipient because in that way they can 
certainly signal a positive action to the recipient and therefore expect something 
back from them in the future. We test that idea in the present study.  
As it was mention in our first hypothesis, in the present study we expect people to 
prefer loyalty schemes that allow customers to share at least part of their loyalty 
rewards with a friend. In our second hypothesis, we propose that when the recipient 
can easily identify the customer sharing the reward, such preference will be 
stronger. Formally,  
 
Hypothesis 2a: People will prefer to share a higher proportion of 
their loyalty rewards with a friend when the recipient can identify 




2.1.4- Recipient’s expectations and Dictator Game 
In the previous sections, we have suggested that people have social preferences 
that can be inferred from their willingness to share part of their endowment in the 
dictator game. The social distance and possibilities of reciprocity have also been 
pointed out as variables that could motivate people to engage in self-sacrificing 
behaviours. These explanations suggest that, at least in the context of the dictator 
game, participants allocating the money care about improving the receiver’s wealth 
either because of altruistic reasons or because they are expecting some reciprocal 
behaviours in the future. It means that any amount of money shared by the dictator 
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that is higher than nil should be sufficient to improve the recipient’s situation. 
Surprisingly, the fact that dictators shared an average of 20 to 30 percent of their 
endowment is very robust. However, the reason why this percentage is the 
preferred proportion, instead of other proportion is not completely clear. Further 
investigations on this issue could enable a greater understanding of the motivations 
behind the behaviours in the dictator game and in real-world unselfish acts.  
It might be the case that people simply have in their mind a pre-defined proportion 
of their endowment that they are willing to give away regardless of recipients’ 
expectations. This idea has been defined in the literature as “fixed total sacrifice” 
(Selten & Ockenfels, 1998). The proposers of this concept created a modified 
version of the dictator game called “the solidarity game”, in which groups of 3 
participants have the opportunity to win either a given amount of money with a 
probability of 2/3 or zero with a probability of 1/3. Before a random draw was 
performed with the aim of defining the winners, participants had to decide how much 
they would be willing to give away to each loser in case they win. The results 
showed that people tend to keep constant the same amount to be shared 
regardless of whether there were less or more “losers” to split the prize with. In 
other words, the total amount offered when there were two losers was very similar 
to the one shared when it only needed to be shared with one loser. In a different 
study, the researchers tested the differences between giving participants the chance 
to share a big endowment with one recipient (e.g. One game splitting $10) or giving 
applicants the opportunity to share small endowments with several recipients (e.g. 
10 games splitting $1 in each game). They found that the total amount of money 
allocated was very similar across the different conditions (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 
1998). They argued that their results seem to be a consequence of the “fixed total 
sacrifice” effect because participants behaved as if they determined in advance how 
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much money they would keep depending on the total amount of money available for 
the experiment.  
In the context of LPs, the previous idea implies that customers might be willing to 
share a proportion of a loyalty reward with someone else, but the amount that they 
are willing to give away would be the same no matter how many available friends 
with whom they can share the reward, or regardless of how recipients would react 
when receiving such reward. Nonetheless, some pieces of evidence suggest that 
participants in the dictator game are not only interested in giving something that 
improves recipient’s wealth, but they also seem to care about what the recipient’s 
expectations are how they could react (Dana et al., 2006; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 
2008). In a modified version of the dictator game, in one of the experimental 
conditions the recipients had the opportunity to send an anonymously written 
message to the dictator after the dictator’s allocation. On the other hand, in the 
control condition, there were no communication options between the dictator and 
the anonymous recipient. It was found that the participant’s allocations significantly 
increased when recipients had the opportunity to communicate (Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2008). These results suggest that the anticipation of recipient’s 
reactions might play a major role in dictator’s allocations.   
 
Another interesting modified version of the dictator game also supported the idea 
that giving not only reveals a desire to improve other’s wealth but also fulfils other’s 
expectations. In a first experiment that used a novel version of the dictator game, 
participants were asked to allocate $10 between themselves and a recipient in the 
same way it was done in the original version of the game. However, in this case 
after making their decisions and before recipients were told about the game, 
dictators had the opportunity of exiting the game and getting $9 without playing; and 
consequently, the recipients would never know about the game. Surprisingly, a 
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“substantial minority” was willing to leave the game and take the $9 rather than 
following the most convenient strategy of playing the game and keeping $10 (Dana 
et al., 2006). In a second experiment, the same authors introduced a “private 
dictator game” form in which receivers were not told why they were receiving the 
money allocated; therefore, no expectations could be possibly created. When the 
“private” condition was introduced, the number of participants exiting the game was 
significantly reduced. The results from Dana, et al. (2006) strongly suggest that 
people’s giving, at least in part, is driven by a desire of not violating other’s 
expectations.  
 
In a case in which people are motivated to give away what recipients expect them to 
give, then they should be willing to share only part of their endowment when they 
can guarantee that others will receive the “expected” allocation. In other words, 
people should prefer to share something with only one person instead of two or 
more people, if splitting the allocation among more people is not likely to fulfil the 
recipients’ expectations. We formalise this hypothesis in the context of LPs as 
follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: When a larger proportion of the customer’s loyalty 
reward is available for sharing with someone else, people are more 
likely to prefer to share the reward with two friends rather than with 
one friend. On the contrary, when the available proportion to be 
shared is smaller, they will prefer to give it to only one friend instead 
of two.   
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2.1.5- Uncertainty and Dictator Game 
We have previously argued that the possibility of sharing the reward received from 
LPs can be understood as a dictator-game type of situation. In this regard, 
customers could be more engaged with programmes in which they can give up part 
of their reward and share it with a relevant peer who receive it with certainty. 
However, with the intention of optimising costs, some companies in the real world 
offer a chance of getting an incentive instead of not a reward with certainty. We are, 
therefore, interested in understanding the consequences of introducing uncertainty 
in contexts where customers are entitled to share their loyalty reward. 
The literature from behavioural science on attitudes toward risk would predict that 
adding uncertainty into an incentive scheme would reduce the attractiveness of the 
programme. Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) described in their highly 
influential Prospect Theory what they have labelled as the “certainty effect”, which 
refers to people’s  tendency to avoid risky or uncertain outcomes when they face 
gains. On the other hand, some evidence from academic research as well as the 
prevalent use in industry of schemes including risky rewards suggest otherwise. In 
particular, uncertain outcomes have been found to prolong (Wilson, Centerbar, 
Kermer, & Gilbert, 2005) and intensify (Bar-Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009) positive 
emotions, thus, making more attractive an uncertain loyalty reward or promotion. 
Moreover, the human tendency to make overoptimistic assessments found in 
different contexts has also been linked to preferences for incentive schemes offering 
uncertain outcomes, in the sense that people seem to react to uncertain offers as if 
they expect to obtain the best possible reward from the probabilistic incentives 
(Goldsmith & Amir, 2010).  
A few studies have attempted to reconcile the contradictory evidence just described 
by identifying conditions in which incentive schemes considering uncertain 
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outcomes may or may not be more attractive to customers than the traditional 
rewards offered with certainty. For instance, incentive schemes with uncertain 
rewards have been found to be more attractive when people focused on the process 
of pursuing the reward instead of the reward itself (Shen, Fishbach, & Hsee, 2015). 
Moreover, effort requirements to obtain the reward have been associated to 
preferences for sure-small rewards instead of large-uncertain incentives (Kivetz, 
2003). These studies represent a few examples of the attempts to understand the 
attractiveness of unpredictable incentive schemes. Nevertheless, the mechanisms 
underlying the preferences for this type of strategies are far from being fully 
understood.  To our knowledge, the role of uncertainty in the type of unselfish 
incentive schemes proposed in the present study has not been previously explored. 
Neither the role of uncertain outcomes is normally considered in experiments based 
on the dictator game paradigm, which resemble to the situation presented in the 
unselfish loyalty schemes. However, some authors have explored the impact of 
uncertainty in the assignation of the roles performed by participants. For instance, 
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) compared three situations: (1) role certainty: participants 
were certain about their roles as “Dictator” and ”Receiver”; (2) role reversals: 
participants had the opportunity to perform both “Dictator” and ”Receiver” roles; (3) 
role uncertainty: participants were uncertain about which role they would perform in 
the experiment. The authors observed more frequent unselfish behaviours under 
uncertain assignation of roles. In our experiment, we are not interested in the 
certainty with which roles are assigned in the experiment; instead, our focus is on 
how people’s preferences would change when uncertainty in the expected 
outcomes is introduced. In this regard, we are not aware of any previous attempt to 
approach the role of uncertainty in the dictator game, in the way that we are 
proposing it.   
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In order to illustrates our approach more clearly, let us imagine that after each 
customer’s purchase of a given amount, Firm A offers a loyalty reward of £0.50 to 
the client and £0.50 to a client selected friend. Another Firm B also offers a £1 
reward in total, but it is divided into two portions: £0.25 and £0.75. The client and a 
client’s friend can randomly receive either portion. Both firms are offering 
programmes where customers and customer’s friends have exactly an expected 
value of £0.50, Firm A= £0.50*(1)=0.5, Firm B= £0.75(0.5)+0.25(0.5)= 0.5). In the 
absence of risk aversion, , people should be equally likely to prefer any of the firms. 
On the other hand, preferences for Firm B would support the thesis of the emotional 
benefits when experience uncertain prospects. On the contrary, evidence from 
Prospect Theory suggests that people are risk averse and that participants would 
prefer Firm A to Firm B even if both firms offer similar expected values (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Previous evidence does not allow to assume a clear prediction in 
the direction of our results. However, we will assume that the preferences about LPs 
will follow the direction suggested by Prospect Theory, considering that this is the 
most robust and widely accepted theoretical approach. Below is our fourth 
hypothesis:       
Hypothesis 4a: People would be more likely to prefer a loyalty 
scheme in which the rewards for both the customer and the selected 
friend are received with certainty compared to programs giving 
payoffs under uncertainty, even though the “expected payoff” to be 
received in both programmes is similar. 
 
The tendency to prefer options offering payoffs with certainty to alternatives that 
offer similar or higher expected payoffs under uncertainty seems to be a fairly robust 
finding among people making decisions about their wealth. However, it is unclear 
whether risk aversion would play an important role when deciding the possible 
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outcomes that others could receive. To frame that in the context of LPs, let assume 
that Firm A offers again £0.50 reward to the client and £0.50 to a client’s friend. Firm 
C also offers a reward of £0.50 to the customer but a randomly assigned payoff of 
either £1 or nothing to the selected friend. The expected values are again similar in 
both loyalty schemes. In this regard, if people are only risk averse when they are 
making decisions about their own income, participants should be equally likely to 
prefer either programme because both are offering a reward of £0.50 to the client 
with certainty. On the contrary, if people favour Firm A, it would suggest that they 
also show risk aversion when making decisions about the outcomes for other 
relevant peers. In this regard we aim to explore whether people are averse to both 
types of risks: the risk directly affecting people’s own payoff and the risk affecting 
relevant peers’ payoffs. We hypothesise that:       
 
Hypothesis 5a: Loyalty schemes offering rewards with similar 
“expected values” under uncertainty would be equally likely to be 
preferred, regardless of whether the payoffs are uncertain only for 
the selected friend or for both the customer and the selected friend.  
  
We will test our five hypothesis in a set of three different experiments that are 
described in details in the following sections. 
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2.2- Experiment 1 
2.2.1- Method 
2.2.1.1- Participants and Data Collection 
The experimental sample consisted of 377 participants who were randomly 
assigned to three experimental conditions (123 in the Reciprocity Condition, 131 in 
the No-Reciprocity Condition and 123 in the No-Awareness Condition). The 
participants were 186 males and 191 females, with an average age of 48 years. In 
Appendix 33, a more detailed exploration of the sample considering the different 
demographic variables collected is shown. They were recruited through an online 
platform from the company Bilendi (former Maximiles), which is a UK based 
company comparable to Amazon Mechanical Turk service that matches demand 
and supply of online tasks that involve human intelligence. There seems to be little 
evidence suggesting that the data collected through this kind of methods 
necessarily have poorer quality than other traditional methods (Paolacci, Chandler, 
& Ipeirotis, 2010).  
All the experimental tasks that were used in the present research have been 
designed in Qualtrics, which is a popular software for data collection. In addition, the 
data collected has been analysed with the free software R. In order to favour the 
reproducibility of our research, we have made public in the following link: 
http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/207175, the coding to transform the raw data obtained 
from the survey into a clean data set. Similarly, all the coding related to the results 
analysis can be accessed in the following link: http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213121.  
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                                                                                 78 
 
2.2.1.2- Design and Procedure  
The experiment consisted of three independent groups. After reading the general 
instructions of the experiment (see Appendix 1) and completing some demographic 
information, participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they 
had to imagine that they were customers from a coffee shop. Specifically, they had 
to imagine that their favourite coffee shop was about to launch a loyalty scheme 
which involved receiving a reward in a loyalty card after each purchase. Part of this 
reward could also be shared with a friend selected by the customers (coffee 
partner), and both rewards could be redeemed after reaching a given threshold (see 
Appendix 2). The next screen presented to the participants in the online experiment 
was randomly varied depending on the experimental condition. In the “Reciprocity 
Condition”, participants were told that the friend whom (coffee partner) they would 
end up selecting to share the reward with would be able to participate in a similar 
promotion; therefore, the friend could select the customer (participants) as a coffee 
partner as well (see Appendix 3). In the second group, (“No-Reciprocity Condition”), 
it was also mentioned that the coffee partner receiving the reward could participate 
in a similar promotion. However, in this case, the friend was not allowed to choose 
the customer as a partner to share the reward with (see Appendix 4). In the control 
condition called “No-Awareness Condition”, participants are told that there is no way 
in which the coffee partner can tell if she is obtaining a specific reward as a 
consequence of the customer’s consumption (see Appendix 5). Also, in both the 
Reciprocity Condition and the No-Reciprocity Condition, participants were reminded 
that their selected friends would be notified each time they receive a reward as a 
consequence of customer’s purchases. 
After the experimental manipulation, participants across the different conditions saw 
a screen explaining the rules to obtain the £1 reward after each consumption. In 
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addition, they were asked to define how the £1 reward should be split between them 
(The Clients) and the friends (Coffee Partners) in order to engage them as clients to 
buy more frequently in the coffee shop. The proportion of the reward allocated to 
them and the coffee partners represents the main dependent variable in this 
experiment (see Appendix 6). 
2.2.1.2- Design and Procedure  
The experiment consisted of three independent groups. After reading the general 
instructions of the experiment (see Appendix 1) and completing some demographic 
information, participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which they 
had to imagine that they were customers from a coffee shop. Specifically, they had 
to imagine that their favourite coffee shop was about to launch a loyalty scheme 
which involved receiving a reward in a loyalty card after each purchase. Part of this 
reward could also be shared with a friend selected by the customers (coffee 
partner), and both rewards could be redeemed after reaching a given threshold (see 
Appendix 2). The next screen presented to the participants in the on-line 
experiment, was randomly varied depending on the experimental condition. In the 
“Reciprocity Condition”, participants were told that the friend (coffee partner) they 
end up selecting to share the reward with would be able to participate in a similar 
promotion, and therefore the friend could select the customer (participants) as a 
coffee partner as well (see Appendix 3). In a second group, (“No-Reciprocity 
Condition”), it was also mentioned that the coffee partner receiving the reward was 
able to participate in a similar promotion, but in this case the friend was not allowed 
to choose the customer as a partner to share the reward with (see Appendix 4).  In 
the control condition, called “No-Awareness condition”, participants are told that 
there is no way in which the coffee partner can tell if she is obtaining a specific 
reward as a consequence of the customer’s consumption (see Appendix 5). Also, in 
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both the Reciprocity and No-Reciprocity conditions participants were reminded that 
their selected friends would be notified each time she receives a reward as a 
consequence of customer’s purchases. 
After the experimental manipulation, participants across the different conditions saw 
a screen explaining the rules to obtain the £1 reward after each consumption. In 
addition, they were asked to define how the £1 reward should be split between 
themselves (The Clients) and the friends (Coffee Partners) in order to engage them 
as clients to buy more frequently in the coffee shop. The proportion of the reward 
allocated to themselves and to the coffee partners represent the main dependent 
variable in this experiment (see Appendix 6).    
2.2.2- Results and Discussion 
In our first hypothesis, we stated that people would prefer to share with a relevant 
peer at least part of the reward received as a consequence of their purchases. This 
was actually the case for participants in the three experimental conditions. People 
had the opportunity to share their loyalty reward with a friend and were asked to 
split it in a way that “induces them as clients to buy more frequently in the shop”. 
Selfish and self-interested individuals would probably have taken the entire reward 
for themselves; however, we observed that these people were willing to share a 
significant proportion of their reward with their friends. Specifically, the median 
proportion that people were willing to give away in each condition was as follows: 
Reciprocity Condition= 30%; No-Reciprocity Condition= 25%; No-Awareness 
Condition=30%. None of the participants decided to give their friends zero. These 
values are surprisingly close to those traditionally observed in the dictator game and 
other paradigms in which social preferences are measured (Engel, 2011).  
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In addition, Figure 2 shows that participants in the No-Reciprocity Condition tend to 
be more willing to offer a smaller proportion of their loyalty rewards. In other words, 
they seemed to be slightly less generous than the participants from the other two 
experimental conditions. However, the differences in the distribution of the offers 
across conditions (see Figure 3) were not statistically significant based on the 
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum test (chisq= 3.07, df=2, p=0.23).  Therefore, the first 
experiment found no support for our Hypothesis 2a, which assumes that in the 
Reciprocity Condition, participants (customers) would be more generous in order to 
encourage a reciprocal behaviour from the recipient, because the coffee partners 
receiving the reward could clearly identify the customer’s kindness and participate in 
a similar promotion. One factor that could explain why limiting the possibility of 
reciprocity did not significantly reduce participant’s giving is the social distance 
between recipients and customers. Previous studies have found that the more 
information people have about the recipients, the more pronounced is their 
willingness to give away part of their endowment (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Branas-
Garza et al., 2012; Charness & Gneezy, 2008; Eckel & Grossman, 1996). 
Therefore, the giving behaviours in these cases might be more driven by altruism 
than by an expectation of reciprocity. In the next sections we will explore if 
participant’s tendency to share their rewards with a friend remains when their 
preferences are elicited in a different way. Also, alternative explanations to the 
results observed in Experiment 1 will be discussed.  
 








Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of participants’ offers in each experimental condition. 
 
In Experiment 1 that has been just described, participants’ preferences have been 
elicited by asking people to write down how they wanted to divide a loyalty reward 
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aim to explore whether the trends observed in the previous results remain after 
implementing a different methodology to measure participants’ tastes. Specifically, 
we develop an experiment in which preferences for sharing part of a loyalty reward 




2.3- Experiment 2 
2.3.1- Method 
2.3.1.1- Participants and Data Collection 
In total, 148 people participated in the second experiment, 68 males and 80 
females, with an average age of 47 years old. Appendix 34 allows to appreciate the 
distribution of the participants’ age taking into account the demographic variables 
collected in the survey/experiment. As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly 
assigned to three different conditions (49 in the Reciprocity Condition, 49 in the No-
Reciprocity Condition, and 50 in the No-Awareness Condition). They were recruited 
by using the same online platform from the company Maximiles that was described 
in Experiment 1. It is pertinent to note that participants who took part in the first 
experiment were not allowed to participate in the second test. The platform was 
designed to deny such participants access to this experiment in order to prevent 
results from being affected by the influence of previous experimental tasks. The R 
code used to clean the data collected (http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213110), 
perform the exploratory analysis (http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213116) and the 
choices modelling (http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213169) is publically available in the 
links just provided. 
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2.3.1.2- Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure of the second experiment are very similar to the first test, 
especially in the early stages of the experimental task. However, participant’s 
preferences are elicited by implementing a different paradigm. In the real world, 
people do not always have the possibility to define the characteristics of the 
products or services that they would like to receive (e.g. deciding how to split a 
loyalty reward like in Experiment 1); instead, they have to choose among a set of 
pre-defined options that are available. For that reason, we have decided to use 
pairwise comparisons to elicit participants’ preferences in the second experiment. 
Specifically, this technique consists of the repeated process of presenting 
participants with a pair of objects taken from a bigger set of alternatives and asking 
them, in each case, to state which element of the pair is preferred. These paired 
choices can be used to obtain a rank-ordering of the objects assessed in an interval 
scale (Dittrich & Hatzinger, 2009; Dittrich, Hatzinger, & Katzenbeisser, 1998). The 
details of the second experiment are presented in the following paragraph, including 
the pairwise comparison between different LPs that participants faced.  
In the initial screens, participants had to complete some demographic information 
and read the general instructions of the experiment (see Appendix 1). Next, an 
identical hypothetical scenario to that presented in Experiment 1 describes a 
situation in which people had to imagine that their favourite coffee shop was 
launching a loyalty scheme that rewards their purchases under certain conditions; 
and the scheme also gives them the opportunity to reward a selected friend after 
client’s purchases (see Appendix 2). The following screen was a reminder that 
purchases greater than £2 would generate a reward that could be split between the 
participant (client) and a selected coffee partner (recipient). Also, they were told that 
in the subsequent screen, information about how different shop brands were 
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planning to split the rewards between customers and coffee partners was displayed 
(see Appendix 7). Specifically, the next screen observed by participants contained 
five different combinations of the split of the loyalty reward between customers and 
coffee partners, as presented in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4: Incentive schemes Stage 1, Experiment 2. 
 
In the first experiment, participants were asked to indicate their preferences about 
sharing part of their rewards by typing the amount of money that they were willing to 
give to the coffee partner and the proportion that they would like to keep for 
themselves. In the second experiment, after observing the five different incentive 
schemes presented in the previous box, participants were asked to indicate which 
stores offer the most appealing scheme in order to “induce them as clients to buy 
more frequently from a given coffee shop” (see Appendix 8). Then, one of the three 
messages related to each experimental conditions was randomly presented to the 
participants. The awareness of the recipient (coffee partner) about who was 
responsible for her reward and her possibilities of reciprocity towards the customer 
(participant) were again manipulated by introducing the same conditions used in the 
first experiment: Reciprocity, No-Reciprocity and No-Awareness. (see Appendices 
3, 4 and 5). 
Each transaction higher than £ 2 will give: 
 
STORE A: 
£ 0.5 reward to you and £ 0.5 reward to your friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE B: 
£ 0.25 reward to you and £ 0.75 reward to your friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE C: 
£ 0.75 reward to you and £ 0.25 reward to your friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE D: 
£ 1 reward to you and nothing to any friend. 
 
STORE E: 
No reward to you and £1 reward to your friend (Coffee Partner). 
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Participants’ choices were not framed as a single decision; instead, pairwise 
comparisons between the different stores were presented. In other words, stores 
were compared with one another, and in total, participants had to make ten 
decisions based on the format presented in Appendix 9. The position (top or bottom) 
of each loyalty scheme in the pairwise comparisons was randomised in each trial in 
order to control for order effects.    
The five incentive schemes just described involve rewards that can be obtained with 
certainty by the customer and/or the coffee partner if the conditions of the LP are 
accomplished. Nonetheless, in the real world, some firms also offer rewards that 
cannot be obtained with certainty, but a chance of winning a prize is offered. In this 
regard, we also wanted to observe people’s preferences about LPs that offer 
rewards under uncertainty. For that reason, after participants made the ten 
decisions regarding the pairwise comparisons of the five loyalty schemes, a new 
stage of the experiment was presented with additional schemes containing some 
outcomes that were defined by uncertainty. Specifically, participants were told that 
some additional coffee shops were planning to offer new schemes. Also, the 
instructions mentioned that the subsequent screen would show how different stores 
were planning to split the loyalty rewards between customers and coffee partners 
(see Appendix 10). Then, a new screen with three different loyalty schemes was 
shown as presented in Figure 5:  
  














Figure 5 :Incentive schemes Stage 2, Experiment 2 
 
As it can be observed in Figure 5, one of the new loyalty schemes includes an equal 
reward for both the client and the coffee partner, a reward that can be obtained with 
certainty (Store F), whereas the other two schemes incorporate some randomness 
when defining the amount of money to be received. Despite their differences, the 
three loyalty schemes have the same expected values for both the customer and 
the coffee partner. It means that when we sum up all the possible outcomes 
multiplied by their probability of occurrence (which is 1/2), we end up in all the cases 
with an expected reward of £0.50 for the client and £0.50 for the coffee partner. In 
other words, they offer equivalent rewards regardless of the variations in the design 
of the three programmes. In this regard, we wanted to appreciate which of the 
different formats that participants favour the most. For that reason, after presenting 
the incentive schemes from the three stores, we ask participants again to select in 
pairwise comparisons which scheme they find more appealing in order to “induce 
them as clients to buy more frequently from a given coffee shop” (see Appendix 8). 
Similar to the first stage of the experiment, one of the three messages related to 
each experimental conditions (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5) were presented to the 
Each transaction higher than £ 2 will give: 
 
STORE F: 
£0.50 reward to you and £0.50 reward to your friend (Coffee Partner). 
STORE G: 
£0.50 reward to you while your friend (Coffee Partner) has a 50% chance 
of receiving £1 each time a valid transaction is completed (it means that 
the friend could receive either £0 or £1). 
STORE H: 
You will randomly receive either a reward of £0.75 or £0.25 after each 
transaction. Each time your reward is equal to £0.75, your friend (Coffee 
Partner) will obtain £0.25. Instead, when you receive £0.25 your Coffee 
Partner will obtain a reward of £0.75. 
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participants just before the pairwise decisions.  In total, participants made three 
additional decisions that correspond to the total number of possible pairwise 
comparisons among the new schemes.  
The total frequency with which participants selected each incentive scheme as the 
more appealing option in each pairwise comparison represented the main unit of 
analysis in this experiment. The probability of selecting each option was compared 
among the three experimental groups (Reciprocity, No-Reciprocity, and No-
Awareness Condition) to appreciate whether participants’ preferences are affected 
by the expectation of reciprocity from the recipients. The model implemented to 
analyse the data is presented in the following section.  
2.3.1.3- Choices analysis 
As it was mentioned in the previous section, participants in the experiment had to 
choose their preferred loyalty scheme from pairwise comparisons. This useful 
mechanism, which aims to elicit preferences, has been used in many different fields 
to establish the value of different alternatives in a continuum of preferences that 
might not be easy to identify. One of the main advantages of this approach is that 
people usually find it easier to compare two objects than to establish a ranking from 
a list of elements. The statistical models, which have been developed to analyse the 
data resulting from paired comparisons, are very extensive. It is beyond the scope 
of this work to present a detailed review of all the available models (for a review see 
Cattelan, 2012). Nonetheless, the following are the most prominent models, 
including those selected to analyse the data from our experiment.  
A few decades ago, Bradley and Terry (1952) proposed one of the most noticeable 
and largely used models to analyse pairs comparison data, and it is commonly 
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known as BTL model due to the extension made by Luce (1959) in order to consider 
multiple variables.  
In its most simple version, the BTL model defines the probability of preferring an 
object j (Oj) to an object k (Ok) when j and k are compared, as presented in the 
following expression: 
𝑝(𝑂𝑗 > 𝑂𝑘|𝜋𝑗, 𝜋𝑘) =
𝜋𝑗
𝜋𝑗+𝜋𝑘
 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘  (1) 
Where π values represent “worth parameters” that locate each object being 
compared (the different coffee shops), in a preferences scale (Hatzinger & Dittrich, 
2012). 
Different extensions of the BTL basic model have been proposed over the years. 
For instance, a highly influential approach was presented by Sinclair (1982), who fit 
one of the first log-linear representations of the model. Moreover, commonly found 
in the literature are the attempts to incorporate additional complexity to the original 
model such as the possibility of having no preferences between two objects 
(Davidson, 1970), and the effect of the presentation order (Davidson & Beaver, 
1977), among many others. In the present paper, we will focus on a very 
comprehensive extension proposed by Dittrich, et al. (1998). In this extension, a log-
linear formulation is developed considering some of the previous extensions 
incorporating the main effects related to the objects being compared as well as the 
subject-specific covariates. The advantage of this approach is that the model can 
provide both a parameter to establish the ranking of the different loyalty schemes 
being compared, and allow subject-specific covariates to incorporate the 
experimental condition that each participant belongs. This model also allows us to 
define whether interactions between object parameters and subject-specific 
covariates occur. In this case, an interaction between the experimental conditions 
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(subject covariate) and the object parameters (loyalty schemes being compared) 
would indicate that participants rank the different coffee shops (and their loyalty 
schemes) in a different way depending on the experimental group to which they 
belong.  
 
In terms of the specifications of the model, let 𝑚(𝑗𝑘)𝑗|𝑙 be the expected number of 
times a loyalty scheme j is preferred to a scheme k, among participants classified in 
the different experimental conditions as covariates class l, l=1,2…, L. The Bradley –
Terry extended model proposed by Dittrich, et al. (1998), which allows the 
incorporation of subject-specific covariates, is formalised in a log-linear 
representation by the equations presented below:  





𝑂𝑆,   (2) 





𝑂𝑆,       (3) 
 
To obtain greater clarity and better understanding of the main model, we described 
each of its elements in the following table: 
 







J and k represent a pair of loyalty schemes (objects) being compared in a 
given trial.  
 
l L is a covariate in the model. In our study, the experimental conditions are 
represented by the covariate l, l= No Reciprocity Condition, Reciprocity 
Condition, and No Awareness Condition.  
 
𝑚(𝑗𝑘)𝑗|𝑙 Matrix containing the expected number of times a loyalty scheme j is preferred 
to a scheme k, among participants that are part of the experimental condition 
(covariates) l. 
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𝑚(𝑗𝑘)𝑘|𝑙  Matrix containing the expected number of times a loyalty scheme k is 
preferred to a scheme j, among participants that are part of the experimental 
condition l (covariates). 
 
µ Nuisance parameter, which can be interpreted as an interaction parameter 




 Scheme-related term for the option j (k) preferred in its comparison k (j). The 




 Parameter related to the covariate representing the experimental condition to 





 Parameter related to the interaction between the incentive scheme selected 
(object) and the experimental condition (subject covariate), when option j (k) is 
preferred in its comparison k (j). 
  
 
The previous model is parametrised in such a way that its coefficients are 
interpretable with respect to a pre-defined reference group, in terms of log-odds. In 
this regard, λ𝑗
𝑂 represents the main effect for preference ordering in the baseline 
group. For the purpose of our analysis, in the first stage of the second experiment, 
the LP where the customer gets 100% of the reward and the coffee partner gets no 
benefit (Store D) has been defined as the reference group (baseline group). In the 
case of the second stage, the condition in which the reward is given with certainty to 
both the coffee partner and the customer (Store F) has been defined as the 
reference group. Both reference groups have been selected because they represent 
people’s preferences corresponding to the null hypotheses being tested. In addition, 
for the parameter λ𝑙
𝑆, related to the subject-specific covariate describing the 
experimental conditions, the “No-Awareness” control condition has been defined as 
the reference class for this parameter.  
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The model gives initially the ordering parameter for only the reference group. Then, 
the ordering for the additional groups can be obtained by adding the specific λ𝑗𝑙
𝑂𝑆’s to 
condition l to the λ𝑙
𝑆’s of the baseline group. As an illustrative example, the definition 
of preference values for group 1 and 2 can be obtained by: 
 
(reference group) Group 1: preference for object j: λ𝑗
𝑂 




The BTL model allows the estimation of a parameter π which does not change 
under variations of scale and which represents the “worth” of each object being 
compared. This “worth parameter” requires ∑ 𝜋𝑖 = 1𝑖 , and its relationship with λs 
parameters is given by the expression shown below: 
 
𝜋𝑗 = exp(2λ𝑗
𝑂) / ∑ exp(2λ𝑖
𝑂), 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽.𝑖     (4) 
More details about the mathematical development of the model just presented and 
further extensions and applications can be found in Dittrich, et al. (1998), Dittrich & 
Hatzinger (2009), and Hatzinger & Dittrich (2012).  
There are a few packages of functions that have been developed in the free 
statistical software R (see www.r-project.org) that can estimate BTL models such as 
EBA (Wickelmaier & Schmid, 2004), BradleyTerry2 (Turner & Firth, 2010), 
psychotree (Strobl, Wickelmaier, & Zeileis, 2011) and the prefmod package 
(Hatzinger & Dittrich, 2012; Hatzinger & Maier, 2014). We have chosen the R 
package prefmod to perform the estimation of the model and parameters in the 
present research. One of its advantages is that the model implemented can deal 
with dependencies. In other words, it does not assume that choices are independent 
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of each other (Hatzinger & Dittrich, 2012). Moreover, prefmod is particularly suitable 
to easily implement object-subject covariates in a linear model framework (Cattelan, 
2012), as it is required for the data in our second experiment.  
The results of the analysis and model estimations previously described are 
presented and briefly discussed in the following section. 
2.3.2- Results and Discussion 
2.3.2.1- First Stage - Experiment 2 
In the first section of our second experiment, we wanted to explore whether people’s 
preferences about splitting up a loyalty reward between themselves and a friend 
vary depending on the possibility of reciprocity from the friend. Specifically, in our 
Hypothesis 2a, we stated that when the friend (receiver) could identify the customer 
sharing the reward, then the customer would tend to be more generous compare 
with the situation in which the reward is shared anonymously. Our results support 
this claim and suggest that expectations of reciprocity is at least one of the variables 
that play a crucial role in participant’s preferences about the LPs presented.  
As a first step, we fitted the BTL model described in the previous section to the data 
from participants’ decisions in order to establish the initial model. Subsequently, we 
estimated again the BTL model, including the experimental condition as a subject-
specific covariate, to appreciate whether it improves the model. Finally, we 
estimated the general ranking of the five different loyalty schemes (stores) based on 
the parameters from the final model. In this regard, by adding the experimental 
conditions as a covariate, the model fitting had an improved statistically significant 
difference (changed in deviance= 17.758 based on 8 DF) as it can be appreciated in 
Table 2. This result suggests that overall, the possibilities of reciprocity that was 
manipulated in each condition plays a role in participants’ preferences. 
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Additionally, even though incorporating the experimental conditions as a subject-
specific covariate significantly improved the fitting of the final model, it is still 
underfitting the data (p=0.000). This finding suggests that other variables not 
considered could have a relevant role in the model; consequently, it might not 
predict preferences in a reliable way. It is therefore important to be cautious when 
generalising the model to different contexts.  
Regarding the preferences for each specific incentive scheme from the standard 
economic point of view, in the first stage of pairwise comparisons, we should expect 
most people trying to maximise their income by selecting more frequently “Store D", 
in which customers keep 100% of the reward for themselves and nothing is given 
away. Nevertheless, if our Hypothesis 1a is confirmed, people should prefer to 
choose more frequently those stores that allow them to share part of their reward 
with a coffee partner. In particular, the store that offers the possibility of sharing 25% 
percent of the endowment (Store C) should be the most appealing by participants 
according to our Hypothesis 1a, because it would reflect the “social preferences” 
observed in other experimental paradigms such as the dictator game. In short, our 
results support this prediction. 
To explore the results of the paired comparisons, we have first observed the 
frequency with which each scheme is selected in relation to the total number of 
times these schemes were compared. In Figure 6, we show such frequencies 
(expressed as a percentage) in order to make them comparable across conditions. 
Models Resid. DF Resid. Dev Df Deviance Pr(>Chi)
initial model 26 80.452
initial model‡ + experimental 
condition covariate
18 62.694 8 17.758 0.02312
*
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In addition, the graph shows the five different loyalty schemes in the x-axis 
expressing the proportion of the client’s endowment that they established to be 
share with a friend. It can be appreciated that, as proposed in Hypothesis 1a, the 
loyalty scheme that was selected more frequently was the scheme offering 25% of 
the reward to the coffee partner and 75% of the reward to the customer (Store C). 
Specifically, the store offering these conditions was selected in average 40.9% of 
the times it was compared with other stores. It is worthwhile highlighting that even 
though Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 used different methodologies to elicit 
participants’ preferences about loyalty schemes, both of them led to similar results. 
Stated another way, both experiments showed that people would be more engaged 
with a loyalty scheme that offered to share about 25% to 30% of the loyalty reward 
with a relevant peer. 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of participants selecting to share a given proportion of 
the reward with respect to the total number of choices. 
 
 
In addition to the previous exploratory analysis, we have estimated the λ𝑙
𝑆parameter 
for each incentive scheme and their interactions with the different experimental 
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of each coffee shop being compared, in a scale-invariant measure that goes from 
cero to one (see Table 4). Moreover, in Figure 7, we present a visually clear 
representation of the “worth parameters” for the three experimental conditions.  
 









Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
GIFT100 -1.41845 0.14905 -9.517 < 2e-16 *
GIFT75 -0.64591 0.1105 -5.845 5.06E-09 *
GIFT50 -0.12344 0.10176 -1.213 0.22511
GIFT25 0.18302 0.10458 1.75 0.08011 **
GIFT0 0 NA NA NA
GIFT100:gr-No-Reciprocity -0.09245 0.22047 -0.419 0.67496
GIFT100:gr-Reciprocity 0.49943 0.1926 2.593 0.00951 *
GIFT75:gr-No-Reciprocity -0.04945 0.16067 -0.308 0.75823
GIFT75:gr-Reciprocity 0.40791 0.14815 2.753 0.0059 *
GIFT50:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.11257 0.1457 0.773 0.43975
GIFT50:gr-Reciprocity 0.22849 0.14124 1.618 0.10571
GIFT25:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.07675 0.1503 0.511 0.6096
GIFT25:gr-Reciprocity 0.15283 0.1459 1.047 0.29488
GIFT0:gr-No-Reciprocity 0 NA NA NA




No Awareness NO-Reciprocity Reciprocity
Give-100% 0.016 0.012 0.032
Give-75% 0.077 0.063 0.125
Give-50% 0.220 0.247 0.248
Give-25% 0.405 0.425 0.394
Give-0% 0.281 0.253 0.201




Figure 7: Worth parameters of each loyalty scheme in Experiment 2, comparing the three 
experimental conditions (possibilities of reciprocity). 
 
The parameters related to the coffee shop that offers a scheme in which 25% of the 
reward is shared with a friend has the highest λ‘s values across the different loyalty 
scheme options which confirm the participants’ preference for this kind of 
programme (λ = 0.183). This scheme had a marginally significant difference 
(p=0.08) compared to the reference group, which in this case is represented by the 
scheme were no money is shared with the coffee partner. In fact, from the worth 
parameters, we can estimate the odds in favour of preferring a coffee shop offering 
a scheme where customers can share 25% percent of their reward compared with a 
scheme where nothing was shared. For instance, we can state that when no 
anonymity is in the sharing mechanism (Reciprocity Condition), customers are 
almost twice (odds=1.96) more likely to prefer a coffee shop that allow them to 
share 25% of their loyalty reward with a friend than a coffee shop that gives the 
customer 100% of the loyalty reward. The odds related to the different types of 
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Table 5: Odds of selecting each scheme compared to the reference group                                        




Even though the store offering the entire loyalty reward to the customers (Store D) 
was less preferred to that which allow them to share 25% of the stake (Store C), 
that observation was not the case when it was compared with the other incentive 
schemes. The “selfish incentive” was indeed more attractive than other schemes 
that shared a large proportion of the stake with a partner. Specifically, the parameter 
λ for the scheme where nothing was shared with the coffee partner was significantly 
different from the LPs where 75% (p=0.000) and 100% (p=0.000) of the rewards 
were offered to the coffee partner. No statistically significant differences were found 
between the scheme where 50% of the reward could be shared and the 
arrangement where nothing was offered to the coffee partner (p=0.225). 
When estimating the model parameters, we also found interactions statistically 
significant between the Reciprocity Condition and the schemes where 100% 
(p=0.009) and 75% (p=0.005) of the loyalty reward were shared with a friend. It has 
to be remembered that the model is parametrised in a way that comparisons are 
made against a reference group. In the case of the experimental treatments, we 
defined the No-Awareness Condition (control group) as our baseline. It means that 
schemes that allow the sharing of 100% or 75% of the loyalty reward were 
significantly more valued in the Reciprocity Condition than in the No-Awareness 
Condition. In other words, keeping less money for the customer and more for the 
coffee partner was more valued when the coffee partner was aware of where his or 
Proportion shared 
with Coffee Partner
No Awareness NO-Reciprocity Reciprocity
Give-100% 0.059 0.049 0.159
Give-75% 0.275 0.249 0.621
Give-50% 0.781 0.979 1.234
Give-25% 1.442 1.681 1.957
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her reward was coming from; and the client knew that the coffee partner had such 
information, compared to the situation in which absolute anonymity in the 
transaction was present. It suggests that customers tend to be more generous when 
the parties involved can identify one another. Therefore, customers can expect a 
reciprocal act from recipients as a consequence of their “generosity”.   
The link between expectations of reciprocity and generosity can also be appreciated 
in the worth parameters (see Table 4) and in the frequency with which the scheme 
that gives nothing away to the coffee partner was selected in relation to the total 
number of times of comparison (see Figure 7). Specifically, that scheme was on 
average less selected in the Reciprocity Condition (56.6%) than in the Reciprocity 
Condition (65.8%) and No-Awareness Condition (67.5%). Moreover, the worth 
parameter for the scheme that gives zero to the coffee partner was remarkably lower 
in the Reciprocity Condition (π=0.20) than in the No-Reciprocity Condition (π =0.25) 
and No-Awareness Condition (π =0.28). In other words, if customers’ generosity can 
be observed by coffee partners, the selfish incentive scheme where customer can 
share nothing with a friend become less appealing. 
In summary, the expectations of reciprocity seems to play a paramount role in people’ 
preferences about LPs that allow customers to share their rewards with a relevant 
peer. Nonetheless, other variables need to be considered in order to achieve a more 
robust model.  
In the second stage of our second experiment, three additional incentive schemes 
were assessed by participants by performing additional paired comparisons. The 
results of these decisions are presented in the following section. 
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2.3.2.2- Second Stage - Experiment 2 
In the second stage of Experiment 2, three new loyalty schemes were compared by 
asking people to perform pairwise comparisons in the same way they did in the first 
stage of the experiment. In this case, the intention was to identify the consequences 
of introducing uncertainty in the rewards of the LPs being compared.  
One of the programmes being compared offers a £1 reward where 50% goes to the 
client and 50% goes to a selected friend (Store F). We will refer to this programme 
as “Certainty Both”, because both the client and the coffee partner always receive 
the same amount of money for sure if they fulfil the promotion rules. Another 
scheme (Store G) offers a reward or £0.500 for the client with certainty, but the 
selected friend has a 50% chance of receiving either £1 or nothing. We are defining 
this scheme as “Uncertainty Partner”. The last LP also offers an overall reward of 
£1, divided into two portions of £0.75 and £0.25. The client and the selected friend 
have a 50% chance of receiving either portion. We will call the loyalty scheme just 
described “Uncertainty Both”.  
We first fitted the data from participants’ decisions to the basic BTL model. Then, a 
new model incorporating the experimental conditions (Reciprocity, No-Reciprocity, 
and No-Awareness Condition) as subject-specific covariates was estimated. As 
shown in Table 6, the fitting of the model does not improve significantly (p=0.76) 
after incorporating the covariate. Therefore, we kept the initial model in order to 
estimate the programmes’ ordering parameters. The results from the goodness-of-fit 
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As we did for the data from the first stage, we have performed an initial exploratory 
analysis by aggregating the frequency with which each loyalty scheme was 
selected. In Figure 8, we displayed these frequencies expressed as a percentage, 
with the aim of making them comparable across conditions. The figure showed a 
clear preference for the Certainty Both scheme which was selected on average 
45.74% of the times it was compared. In contrast, the programmes Uncertainty 





Figure 8: Proportion of selections, with respect to the total number of choices, of schemes 
with different levels of reward certainty. 
 
Models Resid. DF Resid. Dev Df Deviance Pr(>Chi)
initial model 7 2.283
initial model‡ + experimental 
condition covariate
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In our Hypothesis 4a, we have claimed that loyalty schemes with features like those 
observed in the Certainty Both schemes would be preferred to programmes that are 
associated with any uncertainty, even though the expected values to be received for 
each person are similar across programmes (£0.50 for each person). The 
parameters λ ‘s of the model observed in Table 7 confirm that assumption. Both the 
Uncertainty Partner (p=0.000) and the Uncertainty Both (p=0000) programmes were 
significantly different from the reference group, which offers rewards under complete 
certainty for both the client and the selected friend. In fact, the Certainty Both 
schemes were twice more likely to be selected than the Uncertainty Partner 
(Odds=2.11) and the Uncertainty Both (Odds=2.26) programmes. 
 




In addition, we obtained the π worth parameters, which were 0.25, 0.23 and 0.52, for 
the Uncertainty Partner, Uncertainty Both, and Certainty Both schemes respectively. 
These results also confirm our Hypothesis 5a, thus showing that the programmes 
involving uncertainty were almost equally likely to be preferred even though in one of 
them, the customer (participant) had the possibility of receiving her percentage of 
the reward with complete certainty.  
In short, the results just described suggest that people are risk averse not only about 
their own expected outcomes but also about the expected outcomes of relevant 
peers. Therefore, risk aversion should be an element to be considered when 
designing LPs offering incentives under uncertainty.  
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
Uncertainty_Partner -0.37387 0.07123 -5.249 0.000*
Uncertainty_Both -0.40694 0.07163 -5.681 0.000*
Certainty_Both 0 NA NA NA
Signif. *0.05
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The previous two experiments have shown that generally, people are willing to share 
an important proportion of their loyalty reward with a friend. It is not clear, however, 
whether such behaviour would be affected by an increase or decrease in the number 
of recipients (friends). In other words, it may be the case that people are willing to 
share a larger proportion of their endowment when more friends are expected to 
receive it. On the contrary, the amount that they are willing to share may remain the 
same regardless of an increase in the number of recipients. We have designed a 
third experiment (see next section) to shed more light on this question.  
 
2.4- Experiment 3 
With the aim of understanding more clearly the drivers leading participants to share 
their loyalty reward with others, we have run an additional experiment very similar to 
the two previous trials, but we have made two fundamental changes in terms of the 
characteristic of the coffee shop presented. The first difference has to do with the 
proportion of the reward to be shared with the coffee partner. In Experiment 1 and 2, 
we found that generally most people prefer programmes that shared no more than 
50% of the loyalty reward. We have therefore included in the third experiment only 
schemes offering to share a proportion of the reward equal or lower than that value 
(50%, 30% and 10%) because they proved to be the most popular among 
participants (see Figures 2 and 6). The second difference in the third experiment is 
that we have included schemes were the reward can be shared with not only one 
friend but with two recipients. 
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2.4.1- Method 
2.4.1.1- Participants and Data Collection 
Just as in Experiment 1 and 2, participants in the third experiment were recruited 
through the online platform provided by the vendor Maximiles. In total, 227 
participants, 116 males and 111 females took part in the experiment. The average 
age of the participants was 48 years old. Further details regarding the 
characteristics of the experimental sample can be observed in Appendix 35. 
Participants were again randomly assigned to the three different experimental 
conditions: 75 in the Reciprocity Condition, 76 in the No-Reciprocity Condition, and 
76 in the No-Awareness Condition. Like previous experiments, the data was 
collected through Qualtrics, and analysed with the free software R. Codes regarding 
data cleansing (http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213235), exploratory analysis 
(http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213237), and choices modelling 
(http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213242) are publically available in the links just 
presented.  
2.4.1.2- Design and Procedure 
In the third experiment, participants faced a very similar task to the undertaking 
described in Experiment 2. In the initial stages, people completed some 
demographic information and read the details about the hypothetical scenario 
regarding coffee shops planning to offer different loyalty schemes (see Appendix 12 
and 13). After that, a screen showing the text related to one of the three possible 
experimental conditions was randomly presented (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5). 
Again, in each condition, the possibility of reciprocity towards the customer 
(Reciprocity, No-Reciprocity, and No-Awareness Condition) was manipulated. The 
subsequent screen displayed to the participants provided information on how the 
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different coffee shops were planning to split the rewards between clients and 
selected friends in their loyalty schemes. Unlike the previous experiments, in this 
occasion the schemes offered the possibility of sharing comparable incentives with 
either one or two friends. In total, six different loyalty schemes were presented to 
the participants as illustrated in the following in Figure 9:  
  
 












Figure 9: Incentive schemes, Experiment 3. 
 
Just as the second experiment, participants made the pairwise comparison between 
the different schemes just presented (See Appendices 8 and 9). In total, each 
participant had to make 15 decisions, which corresponded to the total number of 
possible comparisons among the programmes presented. The model used to 
analyse the results from these decisions is briefly described in the following section.  
2.4.1.3- Choices analysis 
The paired comparisons of the six different loyalty schemes previously described 
were analysed by implementing the same extension of the Bradley-Terry-Luce 
Each transaction higher than £ 2 will give: 
 
STORE A: 
£0.50 reward to you and £0.50 reward to one friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE B: 
£0.50 reward to you, £0.25 reward to one friend and £0.25 to a second friend (Coffee Partners). 
 
STORE C: 
£0.7 reward to you and £0.3 reward to one friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE B: 
£0.7 reward to you, £0.15 reward to one friend and £0.15 to a second friend (Coffee Partners). 
 
STORE E: 
£0.90 reward to you and £0.10 reward to one friend (Coffee Partner). 
 
STORE F: 
£0.90 reward to you, £0.05 reward to one friend and £0.05 to a second friend (Coffee Partners). 
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model, which was applied in Experiment 2. In the case of the third experiment, we 
not only had the possibility of incorporating the experimental condition as a subject-
specific covariate, but it was also feasible to incorporate an object-specific 
covariate. Specifically, we compared loyalty schemes that allowed participants to 
share a given proportion of the reward with either one or two friends (coffee 
partners). In order to appreciate whether a property common to a group of LPs (e.g. 
sharing the reward with two people) affects participants’ preferences, a 
reparameterisation of the original model needs to be done (Dittrich & Hatzinger, 
2009; Dittrich et al., 1998; Hatzinger & Dittrich, 2012). In particular, the λs 
parameters can be calculated based on the following formula:  
𝜆𝑗 = ∑ 𝛽𝑞
𝑄
𝑞=1
𝑥𝑗𝑞  (5) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑗𝑞 represents the characteristic q of the loyalty scheme j, whereas the effect 
of characteristic q is given by 𝛽𝑞. The log-linear formulation of the BTL model 
incorporating the object-specific covariate, for the preferences in comparisons jk, is 
given by the following formula:  
 
ln 𝑚(𝑦𝑗𝑘) = 𝜇𝑗𝑘 +  𝑦𝑗𝑘 ∑ (𝑥𝑗𝑞 − 𝑥𝑘𝑞 )𝑞 β𝑞 , (6) 
 
The model estimations, as well as other results from the third experiment, are briefly 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.4.2- Results and Discussion 
Like in Experiment 1 and 2, in the third experiment we were also interested in 
exploring the impact of manipulating customers’ expectations of reciprocity on 
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preferences about loyalty schemes. In the first two experiments, we found evidence 
supporting Hypothesis 2a, in which it is assumed that people will prefer to share a 
higher proportion of their rewards with a coffee partner if the former can identify the 
customer’s sharing behaviour; therefore, the customer might expect a reciprocal 
action. Our results in Experiment 3, based on a different sample of participants, also 
support that claim.  
We have fitted the BTL model explained in previous sections to the data from the 
pairwise decisions with the aim of estimating the initial model describing participant 
preferences about loyalty schemes. After that, the second model has been fitted, 
including the experimental conditions as a subject-specific covariate, with the 
purpose of appreciating whether it improves the fitting in comparison with the initial 
model. In Table 8, the contrast between the two models can be appreciated. It 
shows that incorporating the experimental condition as a covariate in the model 
improves its fitting significantly (changed in deviance= 22.836 based on 10 DF). 
This result, as well as the evidence from the two previous experiments, supports the 
idea that expectations of reciprocity can affect people preferences about LPs in 
which a portion of the rewards can be shared with other people.  
 




Despite the improvement of the model after adding the experimental conditions as a 
covariate, it underfits the data (Resid. Deviance=51.859, df=30, = p=0.008). The 
model is therefore not robust enough and might not have the flexibility to capture the 
Models Resid. DF Resid. Dev Df Deviance Pr(>Chi)
initial model 40 74.695
initial model‡ + experimental 
condition covariate
30 51.859 10 22.836 0.01137 *
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underlying trends in participants’ decisions. It implies that other variables not 
considered might also play and important role in people’s preferences.  
Reparameterising the model might be a way to improve its fitting even more. 
Therefore, we have tested a different model in which the two object-specific 
covariates replaced the six objects being compared (loyalty schemes). One object 
covariate has been defined as “split” and assigned the value “0” if the scheme offers 
to share the reward with one person, and the value “1” when the reward is shared 
with two people. The second covariate refers to the proportion of the reward being 
shared (50%, 30%, or 10%). Table 9 presents the comparison between this model 
and the one that includes the six LPs and the experimental condition as subject-
specific covariate. 
 
Table 9: Second model comparison, Experiment 3. 
 
 
Table 9 shows that substituting the six loyalty schemes for objects covariates did 
not reduce the deviance; rather, it worsens the model fitting. For that reason, we 
retain the previous model, which considers the six objects and the experimental 
conditions as a subject-specific covariate.  
An initial exploration of the participant’s preferences can be obtained by plotting the 
frequencies with which each loyalty scheme was selected among the total amount 
of decisions made by each experimental group. That summary can be observed in 
Figure 10. In the x-axis of the graph, the six loyalty schemes, which were compared, 
are represented based on the proportion of the reward shared with the coffee 
Models Resid. DF Resid. Dev Df Deviance Pr(>Chi)
Initial model‡ + experimental 
condition covariate
30 51.859
Model including two object 
specific covariates
39 194.055 -9 -142.2 0.0000 *
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partner (£0.50, £0.3, or £0.1) and whether the reward was shared with either one or 
two persons.  
 
 
Figure 10: Proportion of selections, with respect to the total number of choices, comparing 
number of coffee partners and experimental condition. 
 
The results from the third experiment also allow us to test our Hypothesis 1a, which 
states that people will prefer LPs that permit them to share part of their reward with 
someone else, and in particular, schemes allowing to share about 30% of the loyalty 
reward would be more appealing because they match the social preferences 
observed in different experimental paradigms. In the case of the schemes been 
compared in Experiment 3, we would expect Store B and C, where 30% of the 
loyalty reward is shared with either one or two friends, to be preferred to the rest of 
the incentive schemes presented. The trends observed in Figure 10 support that 
claim. Overall, the schemes offering to share 30% of the loyalty reward with a friend 
were more attractive (selection=41.06%) than were the programmes sharing 50% 
(selection=26.29%) and 10% (selection=32.65%) of the reward. When the schemes 
are compared individually, the two most appealing were the programme that offered 
30% of the reward to only one friend (selection=22.56%) and the scheme that 
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allowed customers to share 10% of the incentive with one coffee partner 
(selection=22.78%). This preliminary analysis suggests that participants were not 
indifferent about the number of people with whom they shared the reward (one or 
two friends). We will explore this idea in more details by plotting and interaction 
graph to observe the relationship between the amount being shared and the number 
of coffee partners receiving part of the reward but without considering the 




Figure 11: Proportion of selections, with respect to the total number of choices, comparing 
number of coffee partners and proportion of the reward being shared with others. 
 
In Figure 11 a very clear trend can be observed. Put simply, when a large proportion 
of the reward is shared (e.g. 50%), people are almost equally likely to prefer giving it 
away to either one or two friends. However, people start favouring the schemes 
where the reward is shared with only one friend and when the proportion being 
shared is reduced. This support our Hypothesis 3a, which states that schemes 
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more likely to be preferred when the reward is shared with only one friend instead of 
two friends.  
In order to better understand the patterns underpinning participants’ preferences 
about LPs, we have estimated the parameters of the BTL model, including the effect 
of each incentive scheme and their interaction with the experimental conditions. It is 
worth mentioning that the model parametrisation needs to be compared with a 
baseline group. In this case, the No-Awareness Condition represents the baseline 
for the experimental groups as it occurred in the previous experiments. Regarding 
the loyalty schemes, the programme which the client keeps 50% of the reward and 
shares the other 50% with one friend (Store A) has been defined as the reference 
group because, among the options presented, this is the choice that implies the 
most selfish behaviour, and therefore, the option expected to be preferred according 
to the assumption from standard economy theories. As shown below, Table 10 
summarises the results of the model estimation.  
 
Table 10: Model parameters, Experiment 3. 
 
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
GIFT10x1 0.28294 0.06845 4.134 3.57E-05 *
GIFT5x2 -0.05519 0.06786 -0.813 0.41599
GIFT30x1 0.40238 0.06984 5.762 8.3E-09 *
GIFT15x2 0.09997 0.06752 1.481 0.13874
GIFT25x2 -0.09715 0.06813 -1.426 0.15389
GIFT50x1 0 NA NA NA
GIFT10x1:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.10693 0.09777 1.094 0.27412
GIFT10x1:gr-Reciprocity -0.05406 0.09715 -0.556 0.57789
GIFT5x2:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.18689 0.09663 1.934 0.05309 *
GIFT5x2:gr-Reciprocity -0.08487 0.09731 -0.872 0.3831
GIFT30x1:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.1168 0.09982 1.17 0.24198
GIFT30x1:gr-Reciprocity 0.10068 0.10038 1.003 0.31586
GIFT15x2:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.29459 0.09716 3.032 0.00243 *
GIFT15x2:gr-Reciprocity 0.17128 0.0967 1.771 0.07651 **
GIFT25x2:gr-No-Reciprocity 0.05838 0.09742 0.599 0.54901
GIFT25x2:gr-Reciprocity 0.06869 0.09688 0.709 0.47827
GIFT50x1:gr-No-Reciprocity 0 NA NA NA
GIFT50x1:gr-Reciprocity 0 NA NA NA
Signif. **0.1, *0.05
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Among the different schemes compared in the third experiment, we could confirm in 
Table 10 that, as predicted in Hypothesis 1a, the most attractive scheme among 
participants was the programme in which 30% of the reward was shared with a 
friend (Gift30x1). Specifically, that LP had the highest estimate and was significantly 
different from the reference group (p=0.000). The scheme, in which the same 
proportion was shared not with one coffee partner but with two partners, was not 
significantly different from the reference group (p=0.139). This suggests that people 
care not only about how much they share with others but also about what the 
recipient’s expectations could be. The second most preferred loyalty programme 
was the one sharing 10% of the reward with one friend, which also resulted having a 
statistically significant difference from the reference group (p=0.000). Again, that 
difference was only observed when the reward was shared with one person but not 
with two people (p=0.416).  
In addition, some statistically significant interactions were observed between the 
experimental conditions and the schemes offering to share 30% (p=0,002) and 10% 
(p=0.005) of the loyalty reward with two people (but not with one person). 
Specifically, these programmes were more preferred when the coffee partner could 
not identify the client (No-Reciprocity Condition) compared to the reference group in 
which the sharing behaviour was anonymous (No-Awareness Condition). It 
suggests that people might find rewarding receiving positive feedback from the 
recipients regardless the possibilities of reciprocity, especially if such feedback will 
come from more than one person.  
We have also estimated the “worth” of each loyalty scheme by calculating the 
parameters π, based on the BTL model previously described, in which the 
experimental conditions have been included as a covariate. As mentioned in the 
description of the previous experiment, the worth parameters allow us to locate the 
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LPs in a measure of scale-invariant preferences in which the sum of the parameters 
considered is required to be equal to one (1). Moreover, based on the parameters λ 
and π, the odds in favour of preferring the different loyalty schemes compared to a 
reference group can easily be estimated. In Table 11, the π parameters of the model 
are presented, and Figure 12 shows a graphic representation of the preferences 
structure based on the worth parameters.  






Figure 12: Worth parameters of each loyalty scheme in Experiment 3, compering the three 
experimental conditions (possibilities of reciprocity). 
 
NO Awareness NO-Reciprocity Reciprocity
1 Cofee Partner (GIFT10x1) 0.222 0.209 0.181
2 Cofee Partners (GIFT5x2) 0.113 0.125 0.087
1 Cofee Partner (GIFT30x1) 0.282 0.271 0.313
2 Cofee Partners (GIFT15x2) 0.154 0.211 0.197
1 Cofee Partner (GIFT50x1) 0.104 0.089 0.108
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The previous tables and graph allow us to appreciate that the variance of the 
preferences structure, depending on the experimental condition that participants 
partook; however, some aspects were common across conditions. For instance, it is 
apparent that allowing customers to share 30% of the reward with only one friend is 
the most attractive incentive scheme regardless of the experimental condition and 
that preference is particularly more remarkable for the Reciprocity Condition. In 
contrast, we can see for example that, sharing 10% percent of the reward with two 
friends (GIFT 5x2) ranked last only when the coffee partner and the client were 
aware of the sharing behaviour and the coffee partner could participate in a similar 
programme (Reciprocity Condition), but not in the other two conditions in which 
direct reciprocity might not be expected.  
An interesting result observed in the preferences structure is that, overall, the 
different loyalty schemes tended to be slightly more valued for participants in the 
No-Awareness Condition than in the No-Reciprocity Condition. It is worth noticing 
that in both conditions, customers knew with whom they were sharing the reward; in 
neither scheme, the coffee partner(s) had the possibility to directly reciprocate the 
“generous action” from the customer. The main difference between the two 
conditions has to do with the information that the coffee partner had about where 
the reward received was coming from. That information was anonymous for the No-
Awareness Condition, but not for the No-Reciprocity group. Since the information 
was not anonymous in the No-Reciprocity Condition, people may find rewarding 
being socially accepted after receiving positive feedback from the coffee partner, but 
such scenario should not be expected in the No-Awareness Condition. Therefore, 
people might be more willing to share larger proportions of the loyalty reward with 
the friend(s) in the No-Reciprocity Condition than in the No-Awareness group. 
Surprisingly, we did not find such pattern. Instead, the two conditions were in 
general very similar, a result that suggests people are willing to favour programmes 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                                                                                 115 
 
sharing part of their reward regardless of the possibilities of receiving positive social 
feedback.  
In addition, the “worth” parameters π previously presented allow the estimation of 
the odds of preferring a given loyalty scheme to another. Table 12 shows the odds 
of selecting the schemes sharing the reward with one friend over the programmes 
sharing the incentive with two coffee partners, considering the different proportions 
of the total reward available to be shared that were included in the experiment.   
 
Table 12:  Odds of selecting schemes sharing the reward with one coffee partner over the 
ones sharing it with 2 people – Experiment 3 
 
 
The pattern observed in Table 12 clearly support our Hypothesis 3a. That is, when a 
large proportion of the customer’s loyalty reward is available to be shared with other 
people, participants are more likely to prefer to share it with two coffee partners 
instead of one partner. However, the opposite trend is expected when a smaller 
proportion of the loyalty reward is available to be shared with friends. In this regard, 
Table 12 shows that when the proportion of the reward to be shared was 50%, the 
odds of preferring to have one coffee partner over two coffee partners was below 1 
across the three conditions. Nonetheless, the reduction of the proportion to be 
shared to only 10% makes people on average almost twice more likely to prefer 
having one coffee partner to two coffee partners. These results suggest that people 
might engage in a meta-perception process in which they evaluate what others may 
think of their actions when deciding to share part of a loyalty reward. We will discuss 
NO Awareness NO-Reciprocity Reciprocity
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further this idea and the rest of the results presented for the three experiments in 
the general discussion (see the next section).  
 
2.5- General Discussion  
In the last decades, different industries have witnessed a strong competition 
to offer the most attractive LPs with the aim of engaging customers and 
guaranteeing businesses sustainability in the long term. In this regard, firms 
continuously try to increase the size of the rewards given to frequent 
customers in order to make more appealing the products or services 
offered. One of the main contributions of this study is to show that LPs 
could be more attractive not by giving larger rewards to customers as it is 
usually assumed, but by allowing them to sacrifice or share part of their 
loyalty reward with a relevant peer.  
Our three experiments based on different samples and various approaches 
to elicit participants’ preferences strongly suggest that people would be 
more engaged with LPs that allow them to share part of their reward with a 
friend. In particular, schemes sharing about 30 percent of the loyalty reward 
seemed, on average, to be the most appealing to the participants. That 
tendency clearly contradicts the predictions from standard economic 
theories underpinning most of the existent loyalty schemes, which assume 
that people engagement is driven by a selfish desire for maximising their 
own wealth and benefit. On the contrary, these results are clearly aligned 
with findings from other experimental paradigms in behavioural science 
such as the “dictator game” in which social preferences seem to have an 
important role in people’s preferences. 
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The reasons underlying the observed results seem to be diverse. We have 
attempted to test whether expectations of reciprocity from the person(s) 
with whom the reward is shared represents the main variable explaining the 
preferences for the kind of schemes previously described. We found that 
generally people were more likely to favour programmes sharing a larger 
proportion of the loyalty rewards when direct reciprocity was a possibility. 
However, expectations of reciprocity cannot fully account for the observed 
preferences for LPs. Our first experiment found no significant differences 
among the experimental conditions, whereas the models used to fit the data 
in Experiment 2 and 3 significantly improved when considering the 
possibility of reciprocity as a covariate. However, the final model still 
underfits the data. Therefore, some additional variables need to be 
considered apart from the possibilities of reciprocity in order to have a 
reliable model predicting preferences for LPs.  
Findings from neuroeconomics support the idea that social rewards such as 
positive feedback from others activate similar neurological pathways in the 
brain compared to monetary rewards (Izuma et al., 2008; Zink et al., 2008). 
In this regard, a potential reason explaining the preferences observed in the 
experiments is that people engage in behaviours that fulfil expectations 
from others because in that way, they can receive positive feedback that 
strengths their self-esteem. If that is that case, we should expect people 
favouring the schemes in our No-Reciprocity Condition in which recipients 
were aware of where the reward was coming from, in contrast to the No-
Awareness Condition in which the sharing behaviour was anonymous. Our 
results supported that claim and are aligned with previous evidence 
suggesting that people engage in a meta-perception process in which they 
anticipate recipient’s reactions and try to behave in a way that will not 
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violate other people’s expectations (Dana et al., 2006; Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2008). Nonetheless, our experimental design cannot rule out 
the possibility that participants in the No-Reciprocity Condition expect a 
reciprocal action from the recipient out of the context of the LP. Therefore, 
further research is needed to explore that possibility in grater details. In this 
regard, the next chapter implements a different experimental design in 
order to approach, among other aspects, the role of expectations on the 
type of incentive schemes proposed. 
Moreover, previous studies have found that unselfish giving might be 
influenced by participant’s need to make a positive impression on the 
experimenter (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1994). Such situation is 
particularly likely when participants perceive that experimenters have the 
possibility to identify them. However, this is not likely to occur in our online 
experiment, in which participants are anonymous and physically distant.  
Another important finding was that people not only aim to avoid uncertainty 
regarding their own expected rewards; they were also motivated to avoid sharing 
part of their loyalty rewards with friends when the outcome for the recipient was 
uncertain. This insight should be carefully considered in the design of LPs in the real 
world because promotions offering rewards under uncertainty may need to increase 
their attractiveness by providing an amount of reward that is significantly higher.  
The results from this study offer a novel approach that challenges previous 
theoretical assumptions about the design of LPs and might provide commercial 
opportunities for business owners and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, previous 
research has started to show how incentives can be used as a mechanism to 
promote peer pressure and encourage the adoption of behaviours such as physical 
activity (Mani et al., 2013). In this regard, the insights from this study can also be 
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extended to other contexts different from LPs, in which the adoption and diffusion of 
behaviours are the aim of the research.  
From the methodological point of view, we have used an experimental paradigm 
that resembles the setting presented in the popular dictator game but framed in a 
more realistic situation. The use of a similar paradigm in further research could help 
to study unselfish behaviours incorporating more context-specific variables in order 
to improve the external validity of findings from context-free laboratory experiments.  
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CHAPTER 3: STRENGTHENING SELF-CONCEPT BY FULFILLING OTHER’S 
EXPECTATIONS: A MECHANISM FOR IMPROVING LOYALTY PROGRAMMES 
 
3.1- Introduction 
A significant amount of money is spent on gifts, charitable contributions and other 
prosocial behaviours every year. For instance, in the UK charitable giving exceeds 
10 billion pounds per year (Charities, 2015), and people have been found to spend 
normally between 3% to 4% of their income on gifts (Prendergast & Stole, 2001). 
Giving something away is a costly action that people are not forced to do. However, 
the fact that these types of behaviour are consistently observed across cultures 
suggests that they are part of human nature and should lead to greater beneficial 
outcomes in people’s lives (Aknin et al., 2013). In fact, a relatively recent body of 
evidence suggests that people who spend money on others report higher levels of 
well-being and happiness compared to those who spend their wealth on only 
themselves (Aaker & Akutsu, 2009; Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008). That is 
consistent with our results presented in the second chapter, in which we observed 
that on average, people preferred to participate in loyalty schemes that allow the 
sharing of part of their rewards with friends rather than programmes offering a 
reward that is entirely kept by customers.  
If we assume that people naturally aim to maximise their happiness and given that 
prosocial behaviours seem to be an important source of well-being, we might expect 
people to give away substantial amounts of their wealth and continuously engage in 
unselfish behaviours. However, this is clearly not the case. Despite its apparent 
benefits on happiness, most people spend a relatively small amount of their money 
or time on prosocial actions. According to the main authors linking prosocial 
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behaviours and happiness, such habitual tendency is mainly because people are 
inaccurate when forecasting their emotional states (Aknin et al., 2013; Dunn et al., 
2008; Dunn, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011). In other words, individuals tend to assume 
that their emotions would be more positive when spending money on themselves 
rather than on others, even though the evidence categorically suggests the 
opposite. Therefore, based on this perspective, the willingness to engage in 
prosocial behaviours should increase once people understand the facts about which 
actions would make them happier.  
The experiment performed in the present study aims to shed some light on some of 
the conditions in which people are motivated to engage in prosocial actions. 
Specifically, we explore whether such actions are affected by our expectations 
about how the recipients of our prosocial actions may perceive us. In addition, we 
explore the relationship of such variables with the fears of receiving negative 
evaluations from others. Similar to our second chapter, the experiment presented is 
framed in the context of loyalty schemes that allow the sharing of part of a loyalty 
reward with relevant peers. In this case, however, we manipulate the size of the 
reward being offered (large or small), the way in which the incentives are framed 
(cash or product), and the number of people with which the reward is shared (one or 
two friends).    
Our experimental design attempts to demonstrate, among other aspects, that 
preferences for engaging in prosocial actions are not simply given by the ability to 
forecast the positive feelings that helping others may produce. On the contrary, we 
propose that such positive feelings will not necessarily emerge as a result of a 
prosocial action. Instead, we argue that they will occur only if the prosocial action 
leads to a significantly favourable reaction in the recipient, which help givers to 
strength their self-esteem and self-concept. In other words, the willingness to 
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engage in prosocial actions may be related to our expectations about how others 
may react or feel as a consequence of our behaviours because such positive 
reactions will make us perceive ourselves as better persons. For example, we 
observed in the results from our second chapter that having the possibility of 
sharing a loyalty reward with two people instead of one person reduced the 
willingness for giving, especially when the amount available to be shared was 
smaller. Stated another way, people were less inclined to show prosocial 
behaviours when they had to share the money with more people because each 
recipient would receive a smaller amount; consequently, recipients would be less 
likely to react positively. In this sense, one of the purposes of the present study is to 
understand better the mechanisms that lead people to obtain personal satisfaction 
as a consequence of their prosocial behaviours as well as examining how such 
satisfaction can be used as a driver to encourage desirable behaviours.  
Understanding what drives people’s happiness can not only help governments to 
translate national wealth into national well-being (Dunn et al., 2008) but also inform 
firms and organisations in the design of initiatives promoting diffusion and adoption 
processes. Ultimately, individuals adopt products and behaviours that make them 
feel satisfied. When promoting adoption behaviours, the predominant paradigm until 
now had been to assume that relative advantage of a product or behaviour could be 
improved by providing economic incentives that made offers more appealing 
(Rogers, 2003). This kind of approach is based on the principles of human 
behaviour underpinning standard economic theories, which assume that people are 
motivated by a desire to maximise their utility and are characterised by selfish 
motives (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). On the other hand, as it was mentioned in our 
first chapter, developments in behavioural science have challenged this perspective, 
proposing that people frequently make decisions that go against their interest and 
suggesting that individuals are affected by emotions and social preferences (Daniel 
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Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, our results from the set of experiments in chapter two 
can be a powerful tool as findings suggest that incorporating insights from 
behavioural science in the design of commercial initiatives encourages the adoption 
of products. In the present study, we aim to expand the reach of our previous results 
by exploring further how the expectations about others’ reactions may affect ones’ 
willingness to engage in loyalty schemes that promote prosocial behaviours.  
A large body of knowledge regarding charitable giving and other prosocial 
behaviours is available in the literature, and variables such as empathy (de Waal, 
2008; Telle & Pfister, 2016), identity (Aaker & Akutsu, 2009; Gneezy, Imas, Brown, 
Nelson, & Norton, 2012), status signalling (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 
2010; Kumru & Vesterlund, 2010) and social pressure (DellaVigna, List, & 
Malmendier, 2012), among many others; have been identified as potential drivers of 
such behaviours. However, very limited amount of research has focused on 
understanding how prosocial behaviours can be used as a mechanism for 
encouraging the adoption of products or behaviours in general (e.g. Strahilevitz & 
Myers, 1998; Strahilevitz, 1999). Particularly, apart from the studies developed in 
our second chapter, we are unaware of any previous attempt to understand whether 
giving people the opportunity to share their incentives for adopting a product with 
relevant peers can actually be more engaging than the traditional selfish rewards in 
which sharing is not a possibility. In the present study, our purpose is to understand 
better the conditions in which that could occur by focusing particularly on the impact 
that the expectations about others’ reactions may have.  
The experiment performed in the present study, which was briefly described before, 
allows us to test numerous hypotheses. In the following table, we depict each of the 
hypotheses to be evaluated in the present chapter:  
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Table 13: Hypotheses summary -Experiment 4. 
    
1b ▪ People will expect more positive reactions from friends (recipients) when they face loyalty schemes 
that share a larger proportion of the reward, compare to the situation in which the proportion being 
shared is smaller. 
2b.1 ▪ Changes in the amount of the reward will not affect participants’ preferences for loyalty schemes 
when sharing the loyalty reward with friends is associated with expectations about recipients’ reactions 
that are sufficiently positive. 
2b.2 ▪ When sharing the loyalty reward with a friend is not associated with sufficiently positive reactions from 
the recipient(s), smaller rewards will encourage people to prefer loyalty schemes in which they keep the 
entire incentive for themselves, whereas larger rewards will make them more inclined to prefer 
schemes that allow them to share the reward with friends. 
3b ▪ People receiving a reward framed in terms of “Cash” will be more likely to prefer loyalty schemes in 
which customers keep the entire reward for themselves, compared to those individuals receiving 
rewards framed as “Products”. 
4b ▪ When the loyalty reward is framed in terms of “Products”, people would expect more positive 
reactions from recipients in loyalty schemes that share part of the reward with friends, compared to the 
schemes in which the reward is entirely kept by the customers. 
5b ▪ Loyalty schemes offering to share part of the incentive with other people would be more attractive 
when the loyalty reward is framed in terms of “Products” (non-monetary incentive), instead of framed as 
a “Cash” incentive. 
6b ▪ Peoples’ predisposition to fear negative evaluations from others will influence both their willingness to 
favour loyalty schemes that share part of the reward with friends, and their expectations about how 
others may react after sharing the loyalty reward with them.  
 
 
In the following sections, we will develop and justify the above hypotheses based on 
the relevant theoretical background of the variables being considered.  
3.1.1- Reward size and willingness to give 
The literature in economics has shown particular interest in exploring social 
preferences, in other words, in understanding why people show regard for others 
while sacrificing their benefits. The dictator game is one of the main tools that have 
been traditionally used to explore such behaviours. As we have described in 
Chapter two, in the dictator game, participants are given the option of sharing a 
certain amount of money between themselves and a second player (recipient). The 
second player has a passive role and has no choice but to accept any amount that 
the participant decides to share (it can be zero). The extent to which participants are 
willing to share part of their endowment is typically considered a measure of social 
preferences. The loyalty schemes explored in the present study resemble a dictator-
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game type of situation because customers are provided with a reward and because 
they can choose to share part of it with someone else. Therefore, the insights 
obtained after more than 30 years in research focusing on the dictator game may 
also be relevant in understanding the type of reward schemes proposed in this 
research. 
The results observed in the dictator game have varied depending on the conditions 
been controlled. The simplicity of the game has allowed to test more than 600 
experimental conditions in order to understand social preferences (Engel, 2011). A 
clearly relevant variable to explore is the size of the stake in place. In other words, 
the amount that participants are expected to split between themselves and the 
recipients. Surprisingly, the studies based on dictator game focusing on the effect 
that the size of the stake can have on prosocial behaviours have been relatively few 
despite the level of the attention given to it in the literature regarding other 
experimental economic games (Carpenter, Verhoogen, & Burks, 2005).  
Intuitively, we should expect people who have more resources to be more willing to 
share many of their possessions with others. The crucial question is whether the 
proportion of the endowment that people are willing to share increases 
proportionally with their resources. For instance, let say that a person has £10 of 
which he or she is willing to share £3 with someone else. Such action implies that 
the individual intends to give away 30% of the initial endowment. Now, imagine that 
the same person has £100 instead of £10. Would this person still be willing to share 
30% of the endowment which represents £30? or would the person be willing to give 
away only the same £3 regardless of the increase in the endowment? We will 
explore this idea as a part of our experiment.  
In the context of the loyalty schemes considered in this study, the previous 
questions would translate into wondering whether the size of the loyalty reward 
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being offered by a firm would affect customers’ preferences for participating in 
schemes that allow the sharing of part of the incentive with friends. Understanding 
the impact of the size of the stake on prosocial behaviours is particularly relevant for 
this type of applied settings in which organisations need to identify the most cost-
effective ways to implement incentive schemes. 
Mixed evidence has been found regarding the willingness of people to give away 
their belongings when they have more resources. For instance, some authors argue 
that wealthier people are more likely to engage in charitable giving and contribute a 
higher proportion of their wealth to philanthropic programmes compared to poorer 
people (Korndorfer, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2015). On the contrary, some studies claim 
that the poorest individuals are more willing to engage in prosocial behaviours and 
sacrifice a higher proportion of their wealth to help others (Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, 
& Keltner, 2010). In the specific context of the studies approaching prosocial 
behaviours based on the dictator game, the same type of contradictory results is not 
uncommon. 
One of the classic and most cited studies in which the size of the endowment in 
dictator games was manipulated is the research performed by Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, and Sefton (1994). The authors compared the willingness of individuals to 
share an endowment of either $5 or $10. They found no significant differences 
between the two conditions. Similarly, more recent studies have compared stakes 
as large as $100 with conditions providing a stake of $10 (Carpenter et al., 2005)  or 
$20 (List & Cherry, 2008). Again, no significant differences were found between the 
proportions of the endowment allocated by the participants in the experimental 
conditions with a high or low stake. On the contrary, there are studies in which the 
proportion of the endowment that participants are willing to give away decreases 
when the stake provided in the game is larger (e.g. Bechler, Green, & Myerson, 
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2015; Novakova & Flegr, 2013). Moreover, in a remarkable meta-analysis, Engel 
(2011) evaluated a large number of studies which considered stakes ranging from 
$0 to $130 with a mean of $27.77. The results from his regression analysis showed 
no differences in the proportion of the endowment being shared when the stake was 
increased. Nonetheless, when the same author excluded from his analysis those 
studies that did not directly manipulate the size of the stake, the regression became 
significant (although the effect was very small). Put simply, higher stakes slightly 
decreased the proportions of the reward being shared.  
The inconsistencies in the behaviours observed in the dictator game when varying 
the stake available could be partially explained by the differences observed across 
several studies in terms of experimental designs and controlled variables, among 
other factors. However, even when maintaining the same experimental conditions, 
variations in the willingness of people to share their rewards have been found when 
testing different samples. For instance, Raihani, Mace and Lamba (2013) compared 
the endowments of $1, $5 and $10 in two different samples; one was from the 
United States and the other from India. They found that the proportion of the stake 
shared by participants in the US was roughly the same regardless of the size of the 
stake, whereas in the Indian sample, participants were less generous in the 
condition providing the largest endowment. The authors of the study could not 
provide a conclusive explanation to account for these results. However, they 
mentioned as a potential justification that the Indian population has a significantly 
lower annual income; therefore, they would value more the endowment in the game. 
In other words, for this subsample, giving away part of the stake would be more 
painful. Nonetheless, if that were the case, we would expect to consistently observe 
less generous behaviours in samples from high-income countries when the stake 
reached very high values, like the $100 used by Carpenter, et al. (2005) or by List 
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and Cherry (2008). Consequently, there should be other variables producing the 
variations among different samples.  
Our preferred interpretation is that the expectations that people have about how 
others may react when they give their friends something have a crucial impact on 
prosocial behaviours. For instance, a person would not expect a positive reaction 
from a friend if such individual gives a £1 gift during the friend’s birthday. 
Nevertheless, the same friend may be extremely happy if the same person gives 
him or her £1 to pay for the parking when he or she had no money. Therefore, a 
person may be more likely to give the £1 away in the second situation because of 
the expected positive reaction from the friend. Similarly, regarding the study 
conducted by Raihani, et al. (2013), sharing $1 would probably produce more 
positive reactions in a low-income Indian sample than in a more wealthy American 
sample. In this regard, previous research is consistent with this idea. A good 
example was presented by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) who allowed 
recipients in a dictator game to send an unrestricted anonymous message to the 
participant responsible for dividing the stake. The authors found that the anticipation 
of the feedback from the recipient significantly increased donations, compared to 
the control treatment in which such feedback was not allowed. It is worth noting that 
in any of the conditions, reciprocal behaviours were expected because identities 
remained anonymous. Therefore, the expected feedback from recipients seems to 
be the main factor driving the results.  
In terms of the size of the stake, overall, we could intuitively expect more positive 
reactions from recipients that received larger amounts of money. Therefore, in the 
specific context of loyalty schemes, customers should expect more positive 
reactions from their friends when they can share a larger loyalty reward. In this 
sense, we formalise our first hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1b: People will expect more positive reactions from 
friends (recipients) when they face loyalty schemes that share a 
larger proportion of the reward, compare to the situation in which the 
proportion being shared is smaller. 
 
We have previously argued that more positive expectations about how others may 
react should increase the preferences for engaging in prosocial behaviours like 
giving. As stated in Hypothesis 1b, larger amounts should generally translate into 
more positive expectations about recipients’ reactions and consequently higher 
willingness to share the reward. Nevertheless, we also propose that once the 
expectations of others’ reactions are positive enough, a further increase in the 
amount being shared will not produce a proportional increase in expectations nor in 
willingness to share the reward. For example, we can imagine that surprising 
someone with a £100 dinner would produce a reaction in the recipient significantly 
more positive that a £1 chocolate. Nevertheless, we would not necessarily expect a 
reaction significantly more positive for a £150 surprise-dinner compared to one 
costing £100.  
The idea underlying our proposal is related to the “satiation” concept studied in 
other contexts. It suggests that people’s drive decreases when their needs are met. 
For instance, an individual who has not eaten will have an increasing desire for 
food. Once, the person is allowed to consume the required amount of food, the 
desire is satiated; consequently, the wish for additional food will disappear (at least 
in the short term). The satiation cycle is expected to occur not only in physiological 
processes like hunger but also in any general motivational process (Baumeister, 
2016). In this sense, we propose that when others’ expectations seem to be fulfilled 
and our need for behaving “altruistically” is satiated, and then the motivation to give 
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away larger amounts of money to others will be reduced. Therefore, in our 
experiment, we do not expect changes in the reward amount to affect participants’ 
preferences for the loyalty schemes, especially in the case of individuals who have 
very positive expectations about how friends may react after sharing their loyalty 
reward with such friends, because from their perspective even a small gift will result 
in positive reactions from others. The first part of the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2b.1: Changes in the amount of the reward will not affect 
participants’ preferences for loyalty schemes when sharing the 
loyalty reward with friends is associated with expectations about 
recipients’ reactions that are sufficiently positive. 
 
 
On the contrary, expecting that giving something away to others will result in a 
negative reaction (or not sufficiently positive reaction) should make the size of the 
amount available for sharing more relevant. For instance, imagine that you wish to 
tip a waiter and you know they would be unhappy with the gratuities that they 
receive. If you have only two pence to tip the waiter, you may prefer leaving no 
gratuity at all, instead of the two pence, because such small amount is expected to 
cause a very negative reaction from the waiter. Similarly, in our experiment, when 
the amount available for sharing is too small, it is very likely that sharing it with 
someone would not produce the expected outcome (a positive feedback); therefore, 
being selfish could be considered a better strategy. In summary, we propose the 
second part of the second hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2b.2: When sharing the loyalty reward with a friend is not 
associated with sufficiently positive reactions from the recipient(s), 
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smaller rewards will encourage people to prefer loyalty schemes in 
which they keep the entire incentive for themselves, whereas larger 
rewards will make them more inclined to prefer schemes that allow 
them to share the reward with friends. 
 
In the next section, we will focus our discussion not on the size of the 
loyalty reward available but on how such reward is framed. 
 
3.1.2- Reward framing and willingness to give 
Under the circumstances hypothesised in the previous section, the magnitude of the 
reward provided is expected to affect participants’ preferences for loyalty schemes. 
Also, we are interested in clarifying whether incentives of similar magnitudes can 
produce different effects on customers’ preferences depending on the way in which 
they are presented.  
Behavioural economists have largely argued that the way in which an incentive is 
framed affects its perceived value. For example, contrary to the traditional views 
from standard economics which assume that people care only about final outcomes, 
behavioural economics argue that the perceived value depends on our 
perspectives; consequently, changes in the reference point can drastically affect 
people’s preferences (Dolan et al., 2012). In other words, subjective preferences are 
prone to context effects and can make our choices inconsistent (Bown, 2007). 
Under this assumption, a £2 incentive would be highly valued if in the recent past, 
the person received a £1 reward for a similar action. However, the same £2 would 
probably be considered unattractive if a £5 incentive has been provided in the past 
for doing a comparable action. Therefore, making more salient different reference 
points may change the perceived value of a given incentive. Moreover, even very 
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small changes in the framework in which a decision is presented can alter the 
perceived value of a given prospect. For instance, Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, 
Shafir and Zinman (2010) offered loans to real customers from a South African 
bank, and they found that small manipulations such as suggesting a particular use 
for the loan or adding the picture of an attractive woman in the offering can increase 
loans demand in a proportion equivalent to the effect of reducing about 25% of the 
interest rate. In the present study, we explore whether a subtle change in the way in 
which the reward is presented can affect people’s preferences for different loyalty 
schemes. Specifically, we compare rewards framed as incentives in “Cash” (e.g. £2) 
with rewards of equivalent value presented as “Products” (e.g. A Coffee worth £2). 
In our experiment, we expect the type of framing to affect participants’ preferences 
differently depending on the number of people with which each scheme allows the 
sharing of the loyalty reward. 
Below, we will first discuss the case of the scheme in which people keep the entire 
reward for themselves (selfish schemes). After that, we will examine the schemes in 
which people are allowed to share part of the incentive with either one or two friends 
(unselfish schemes).  
 
3.1.2.1- Reward framing and selfish loyalty schemes 
Firms and organisations encouraging the adoption of products have traditionally 
relied on incentive schemes that directly reward customers for their loyalty. In this 
regard, the type of reward being offered is one of the large numbers of variables 
that have been approached in order to understand what makes this type of 
initiatives more effective (for a review see Dorotic et al., 2012). A first insight from 
the literature suggests that incentives framed as pleasurable experiences or things 
on which people would not normally spend money (e.g. luxury spa treatment) have 
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been found to be more effective than utilitarian incentives (Nunes & Dreze, 2006b). 
In the case of the type of incentives being considered in our experiment, both the 
Cash and Products types of reward framing could be considered utilitarian rewards; 
therefore, based on this characteristic, no differences should be expected between 
conditions. 
Classic studies have also differentiated between primary and secondary rewards 
used to promote products and services (Rothschild & Gaidis, 1981). The former 
refers to those incentives of intrinsic utility that can be directly enjoyed by customers 
(e.g. a product), whereas the latter involves rewards that have no such utility and 
need to be converted (e.g. vouchers and coupons). In this regard, the two types of 
rewards presented in our experiment can be framed within the “secondary” type of 
incentive; consequently, no differences should be expected based on this criterion. 
Moreover, previous research has compared the nature of loyalty rewards based on 
their level of tangibility; findings show that abstract and intangible rewards (e.g. club 
membership) tend to be less preferred by customers than other material incentives 
(e.g. a product) that are more palpable (Meyer-Waarden, 2015). However, Roehm, 
Pullins, and Roehm (2002) argue that more tangible rewards undermine loyalty in 
the long term because they may interfere with brand associations. In our 
experiment, neither the reward framed in terms of Cash nor the one presented as 
Products involves the relational, psychological or emotional benefits associated with 
intangible rewards; therefore, both types of incentives can be considered 
equivalents in terms of their tangibility.  
Among the limited number of previous studies in which the types of reward have 
been experimentally manipulated, the research from Nunes and Park (2003) was 
the closest approach to our experimental paradigm that we are aware of, even 
though that research was not framed within the context of loyalty schemes. In this 
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regard, the authors of the study compared the perceived value of marketing 
promotions presented in monetary and non-monetary terms. Specifically, they 
contrasted, among other aspects, a first condition offering $10, the second 
promotion of a free umbrella (which was estimated to cost $10), and a third 
condition offering the same free umbrella but stating that it “costs the retailer $10”. 
The offering in cash and the umbrella in which the cost was stated were equally 
attractive; on the other hand, the umbrella in which the monetary value was not 
stated was perceived as less beneficial in relation to the product price. Considering 
that both the Cash framing (e.g. £2) and the Products framing (e.g. a coffee worth 
£2) compared in our experiment show the monetary value of the offering, we would 
expect, based on this evidence, that the schemes in which the customers keep the 
entire incentive will be equally attractive regardless of the types of reward framing.  
The previous evidence regarding the experimental manipulation of reward framing 
does not allow us to assume a clear direction in the results of our experiments, 
among other reasons because the number of relevant studies is very limited and not 
closely related to our research design. Nevertheless, we can intuitively assume that 
the Cash framing may be more attractive. The reason is that in the Cash framing, 
participants have the freedom to choose their preferred alternative from the store, 
whereas in the case of the Products framing, customers are constrained to a 
specific alternative that may or may not matches their preferences. It means that if 
the participants do not like the products being offered, they may be more open to 
sharing the loyalty reward with others. Consequently, we hypothesise the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: People receiving a reward framed in terms of “Cash” 
will be more likely to prefer loyalty schemes in which customers 
keep the entire reward for themselves, compared to those 
individuals receiving rewards framed as “Products”.  
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On the contrary, In the case of the loyalty schemes that allow the sharing of part of 
the reward with friends, we expect different results. In the next section, we will 
develop the corresponding hypotheses.  
3.1.2.2- Reward framing and unselfish loyalty schemes  
Unlike the “selfish loyalty schemes”, the programmes that allow the sharing of part 
of the reward with other people involve the social concerns that emerge in gift 
giving. Not every gift seems to be appropriate at any circumstance; therefore, the 
decision of giving depends heavily on those who receive the reward as well as 
social norms. For instance, Anton, Camarero, and Gil (2014) found that depending 
on whether the occasion was a commercial situation (dates marked by retailers in 
which most people give gifts) or a personal situation (dates given by private 
celebrations), gifts generated different expectations on recipients; hence, the extent 
to which the gift is appropriate may change. In our experiment, we aim to explore 
whether offering rewards framed either in terms of Cash or Products would be 
perceived as more appropriate; consequently, they would be more attractive in the 
context of loyalty schemes that allow the sharing of part of the rewards with others.  
From the standard economics point of view, people should always give cash (or 
monetary rewards) instead of non-monetary gifts (if anything) because it is more 
economically efficient to do so (C. Camerer, 1988). Since we do not perfectly know 
people’s preferences, it is very common to give away things that others end up not 
liking. Similarly, we commonly find ourselves in the situation of receiving gifts that 
we never use. Such gesture represents an inefficiency from an economic 
perspective because money is being wasted in the gift-giving process. In contrast, 
giving cash allows recipients to buy something that perfectly matches their 
preferences, thus maximising the use of resources. Surprisingly, most people prefer 
to give away non-monetary gifts rather than monetary presents. In fact, it was 
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estimated that only about 10% to 15% of all gifts were provided in the form of 
money (Prendergast & Stole, 2001). 
When gift giving occurs within a commercial context, it helps participants to 
preserve or enhance their relationships by meeting or exceeding their friends’ 
expectations (Ruffle, 1999). In this regard, people engaging in such giving are 
mainly driven by a desire to generate positive feelings of surprise and gratitude on 
the recipients. An advantage of in-kind gifts in this context is that they allow donors 
to signal how much they know about recipients’ preferences, and consequently, how 
much the receivers care about them (Prendergast & Stole, 2001). This approach 
implies that people with closer ties between one another would be more inclined to 
provide non-monetary gifts because they would be able to predict more accurately 
recipients’ tastes. For that reason, we expect participants in our experiment to be in 
general more willing to share part of their loyalty reward with friends when the 
incentives are framed in terms of Products instead of Cash because in that way, 
they will be able to signal their knowledge about the recipients’ preferences. Also, 
such trend should be equally observed in both the scheme in which participants 
share the reward with one friend and the programme in which two friends receive 
part of the reward.  
In addition, previous research on dictator game has revealed that givers’ behaviour 
is driven by a desire not only to surprise the recipient but also to avoid feelings of 
guilt (Khalmetski, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2015; Ruffle, 1999). In this regard, giving 
away amounts in cash that may be perceived as “too small” by recipients are likely 
to produce feelings of guilt on the giver because they may not fulfil what is socially 
acceptable as a monetary gift. However, we argue that gifts presented in terms of 
non-monetary rewards are governed by different social norms. Specifically, we 
claim that the social cost of sharing a small reward is reduced when incentives are 
framed as a non-monetary reward compared to a cash (monetary) incentive. For 
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example, we may not feel comfortable surprising a colleague with a £1 gift because 
such amount of gift is very uncommon or probably because it is not socially 
acceptable. On the contrary, we are likely to be happy sharing a chocolate worth £1 
to give a positive surprise to the same colleague. In short, we hypothesise the 
following: 
Hypothesis 4b: When the loyalty reward is framed in terms of “Products”, 
people would expect more positive reactions from recipients in loyalty 
schemes that share part of the reward with friends, compared to the 
schemes in which the reward is entirely kept by the customers. 
 
In the developing of the hypotheses 2b.1 and 2b.2, we have suggested that the 
expectations about how others may react after sharing part of a loyalty reward with 
them are closely related to the willingness of people to engage in this type of 
behaviour. In addition, previous studies based on the dictator game (Franzen & 
Pointner, 2012; Ockenfels & Werner, 2012, 2014) and other experimental paradigms 
(Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Dufwenberg, Gachter, & Hennig-Schmidt, 2011) 
have also shown a link between the willingness to give to others and the 
expectations about how they may react. Consequently, we anticipate that the 
differences in expectations based on the reward framing proposed in Hypothesis 4b 
will translate into similar differences in terms of the preferences for the loyalty 
schemes. Our next hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 5b: Loyalty schemes offering to share part of the 
incentive with other people would be more attractive when the 
loyalty reward is framed in terms of “Products” (non-monetary 
incentive), instead of framed as a “Cash” incentive.  
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3.1.3- Fears of negative evaluations (FNE)  
We have previously argued that the expectations about how others may react after 
sharing a loyalty reward with them is a crucial driver for people to engage in the type 
of “unselfish” loyalty schemes that we have proposed. The expectations created as 
a consequence of a giving behaviour can be the result of social norms as well as 
factors related to the context in which the decision is made. Such factors are the 
reward size or the reward framing experimentally manipulated in our study and 
many other aspects, including the social distance between givers and recipients 
(Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2008), the type of occasion in which the 
giving behaviour occurs (Anton et al., 2014) and scale variations in the possible 
values to be given away (Ockenfels & Werner, 2014), among many other variables. 
Nonetheless, we believe that factors not related to the decision context but 
associated with personal predispositions to make judgements in certain ways can 
also influence peoples’ preferences for engaging in this type of behaviours. 
Specifically, we argue that personality traits, which affect how sensitive people are 
about the feedback from other individuals, may play a key role in their willingness to 
engage in commercial initiatives that promote prosocial behaviours towards friends.  
People prone to have high concerns about being perceived or judged in a negative 
way would probably be more inclined to behave in ways that avoid the possibility of 
receiving unfavourable evaluations (Leary, 1983). Therefore, these individuals are 
more likely to be sensitive to the relevant contextual factors that increase negative 
judgements from others, compared to people who show less apprehension 
regarding other people’s evaluations about them. For instance, if we assume that 
sharing “very small” rewards with friends is likely to result in negative feedback from 
others, people with high Fears of Negative Evaluations (FNE) should be less likely 
to share such amounts than do people with low concerns for receiving negative 
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feedback. Moreover, it is logical to presume that some people’s personal 
predisposition to fear negative evaluations from other individuals is related to the 
expectations that are created by others’ reactions during such giving. In summary, 
we anticipate that the predisposition to fear negative evaluations from others will be 
related to both the expectations about friends’ reactions after sharing the reward 
with them and, in general, with the willingness to share part of a loyalty reward with 
others. Below is our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6b: Peoples’ predisposition to fear negative evaluations 
from others will influence both their willingness to favour loyalty 
schemes that share part of the reward with friends and their 
expectations about how others may react after sharing the loyalty 
reward with them.  




3.2.1- Participants and Data Collection 
A total of 401 participants took part in the experiment, and they were recruited using 
the same online platform provided by Bilendi Ltd. (formerly known as Maximiles) 
and implemented in the experiments from Chapter 2. They were randomly assigned 
to different experimental conditions in which the size of the reward being provided 
(large or small) and the framing of the reward (Cash or Products) were manipulated. 
Participants in the sample had an average age of 52.1 years old and consisted of 
183 males and 218 females. Additional details regarding the distribution of 
participants’ age, gender, income and employment status can be appreciated in 
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Appendix 36. Like in the experiments from the previous chapter, the data was 
collected by using Qualtrics, and the R coding regarding the data cleansing 
(http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213245), data exploration and inferential analysis 
(http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213252), and choices modelling 
(http://rpubs.com/carpio_ucv/213253) is available on line in the links just provided.  
 
3.2.2- Experimental design and variables 
The experiment in the present study was characterised by a 2x2 design; in other 
words, two independent variables, with two possible values each, were 
manipulated, resulting in four experimental conditions. First, the size of the 
proportion of the loyalty reward available to be shared with friends could be either 
small (£2, equivalent to 20% of the total reward) or large (£5, equivalent to 50% of 
the total reward). Second, the framing of these rewards could be presented in terms 
of either Cash (e.g. £2 rewards) or Products (e.g. a Biscuit worth £2). It is important 
to note that in the product type of framing, the cost of the reward (in British pounds) 
was provided alongside the product description in order to guarantee that the 
perceived value of the two types of rewards was the same (although in a real world 
setting, that would not be necessary). In other words, we aim to avoid people 
assuming that the in-kind reward had a higher or lower monetary value than it had.     
The manipulations of the two independent variables previously described were 
expected to affect participants’ preferences for three different loyalty schemes, which 
represented our dependent variable. Specifically, participants had to rank the three 
loyalty schemes from 1 to 3. The features of the loyalty schemes were as follows: 
1- Scheme in which the participants keep the entire loyalty reward for 
themselves.  
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2- Scheme in which a proportion of the loyalty reward is available to be shared 
with one friend.  
3- Scheme in which a proportion of the loyalty reward is available to be shared 
with two friends (who receive the same amount each).  
In addition to the dependent variable just presented, three additional measures were 
taken in the experiment. The first measure was the expectations about how others 
may react after sharing the loyalty reward with them. In particular, participants were 
asked to indicate, in their opinion, what their friends might think of them after 
sharing part of the reward via e-mail. Participants had to indicate their position on a 
9-point scale between two bipolar adjectives. In total, four pairs of adjectives 
(Kind/Unkind, Thoughtful/Inconsiderate, Selfish/Giving, and Generous/Greedy) were 
used in the experiment, although a larger number of adjectives were piloted and 
those that were the clearest and discriminative between participants were finally 
retained for the final version.  
The measure of Expectations about Friends’ Reactions was taken twice. The first 
measure was to evaluate the reactions to the possibility of sharing the available 
reward with two friends, and the second was to assess the reactions after potentially 
sharing part of the incentive with only one person. These measures were taken 
regardless of the preferences for the three loyalty schemes previously described. 
Moreover, for the purpose of our analyses, we estimated the average score for both 
4-item scales in order to obtain one single measure of expectations when sharing 
was expected to occur with two friends (alpha= 0.94) and the other for the case in 
which the incentive was meant to be shared with only one person (alpha=0.95).  
The second additional measure considered in the experiment intended to capture 
participants’ apprehension to the prospects of being evaluated in a negative way by 
others. In this regard, the scale of FNE proposed by Watson and Friend (1969) is 
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widely used in many fields, especially in studies approaching personality and social 
psychology. However, the fact that the scale consists of 58 items has limited its 
utility in some contexts because of its length (Leary, 1983). For that reason, Leary 
(1983) have proposed a shorter version of the same scale containing only 12 items, 
which shows a high correlation with the original scale (r = 0.96, p<0.001) and an 
internal reliability index as high as the ones in the original scale (alpha FNE= 0.92, 
alpha Brief-FNE= 0.90). In our experiment, we presented the brief version of the 
FNE scale to participants across conditions, and we obtained very high internal 
reliability levels (alpha=0.90).  
Finally, the third measure considered in the experiment was represented by socio-
demographic information. In particular, we collected information regarding gender, 
income, employment and age. In the following section, we will provide further details 
about how the experiment was conducted.  
3.2.3- Procedure 
Participants who enrolled for the experiment in the online platform described in 
Section 3.2.1 commenced the task with a screen providing general information 
regarding the characteristics of the experiment. People had to hit a button to accept 
the conditions and continue with the experimental task (see Appendix 14). In the 
next screen, two items were presented with the purpose of screen out participants 
who were not part of the target audience. First, we asked whether they lived in the 
UK or outside the UK, and those not living in the country were excluded because 
they may not be familiar with the products and amounts presented in the 
experiment. Second, in order to exclude participants clicking the options randomly, 
we added an item stating the following: “Please click on the Strongly Agree option. 
This is just to screen out random clicking”. Individuals who did not choose the 
indicated option out of the six possible alternatives were excluded from the 
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experiment (See Appendix 15). This type of items, also known as instrumental 
manipulation checks, was designed to detect participants who were not reading the 
instructions, and its use has been found to increase statistical power and reliability 
of data sets (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). In total, 128 people were 
excluded from the experiment for one of the above reasons. 
The experiment continues with a screen in which participants needed to type their 
names (which were used later to personalised a message). Then, they were 
presented with a hypothetical scenario in which participants needed to imagine that 
they visited coffee shops regularly, and these shops were offering certain loyalty 
reward schemes, relatively similar to the scenarios used in the experiments from 
Chapter 2 (see Appendix 16). In the next screen, further details regarding the loyalty 
reward were provided as shown in Appendix 17. Next, the details of the offerings of 
each of the three stores were randomly presented on individual screens. The 
characteristic of the incentive schemes just mentioned were varied depending on 
which of the four possible experimental conditions described in Section 3.2.2, and 
the subjects were randomly assigned by the platform (see Appendices from 18 to 
26).  
After seeing the details of each loyalty scheme, participants were asked to rank 
them from 1 to 3 based on their preferences, following the format shown in 
Appendix 27. The order, in which the incentive programmes from each store were 
displayed when participants had to rank them, was random because we wanted to 
avoid any order effect. Once participants indicated the rankings, they were told in a 
subsequent screen that regardless of their preferences for the different loyalty 
schemes, they needed to indicate how their friends might react after receiving part 
of their reward via e-mail (see Appendix 28). Specifically, they were presented with 
bipolar adjectives in which they had to mark on a 9-point scale where their position 
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lied in relation to their prediction regarding friends’ reactions. The same list of 
bipolar adjectives was presented twice in separated screens; one was for 
expressing the expectations about sharing the reward with only one friend (see 
Appendix 29 for an example), and the other was for the case in which two friends 
were expected to receive part of a loyalty reward (see Appendix 30 for an example).  
The scale of FNE was the next screen that participants faced in the experimental 
task. In particular, they had to indicate how their characteristics were a list of 12 
statements according to a 5-point scale provided for each item (see Appendices 30 
and 31). Finally, in the last few screens, participants were required to complete 
socio-demographic information such as gender, income, employment and age 
(similar to the information collected in the experiments from Chapter 2).  
The next section will specify in detail how the data collected were processed and 
analysed. 
3.2.3- Analytical strategy  
We have previously mentioned that the main objective of the present study is to 
understand what are the most important variables predicting preferences for 
different types of loyalty schemes. Usually, multiple regression is the default 
approach to answering this sort of questions. However, the type of data collected as 
the dependent variable is not suitable for this approach because of its ordinal 
nature. Stated another way, preferences have been measured in terms of a ranking 
that does not have an absolute meaning, but it indicates the order among the 
options. In addition, since most people decided to rank the same alternative as their 
first choice, the answers distribution is highly skewed and violates the normality 
assumption required in the variables of multiple regression. Such distribution can 
distort relationships and significance tests (Osborne & Waters, 2002). Therefore, a 
generalised linear model seems more suitable for our data.  
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The ordinal logistic regression is a possible generalised linear model that can be 
implemented in our data set. Nonetheless, a key assumption required for this 
method seems not to be met. The outcome of this approach is represented by odds 
ratios, which in this case inform the extent to which a unit increases (decreases) in a 
given predictor and which affect the odds of moving from a lower (higher) to a 
higher (lower) category in the ordinal variable been predicted (e.g. from ranking 
programs in the third place to ranking them in the second place). A crucial 
assumption for this type of models is that such odds are proportional (Hosmer Jr & 
Lemeshow, 2004). That is, the odd ratios remain the same across ratings because 
the effects of the predictors are expected to be consistent with all the different levels 
of the ordinal outcome variable. In the case of our data, it would involve, for 
instance, assuming that predictors would impact in the same way the likelihood of 
changing from ranking 3 to 2, rather than from ranking 2 to 1, given a unit change in 
one of the predictors. The exploratory analysis of our data shows that it is not 
possible to hold this assumption.  
Furthermore, analysing the rankings given to each of the three incentive schemes 
presented and estimating the odds ratio of changing from one level to another in the 
ordinal outcomes may not be the most appealing approach to address our research 
questions. Instead, it would be more desirable to understand the level of 
attractiveness of the untraditional loyalty schemes proposed in our study in 
comparison to the traditional selfish schemes in which customers keep the entire 
reward for themselves. For that reason (and the justification previously mentioned), 
a multinomial logistic regression represents a more suitable approach for our data. 
This method allows us to predict the odds of preferring a given alternative within a 
set of three or more categories. In this regard, we have defined the first choice 
(ranking = 1) of each participant as a categorical outcome variable to be predicted 
by all the variables measured or manipulated in the experiment. Since the 
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multinomial regression provides odds ratio of each outcome category in relation to a 
reference point, we have set the scheme in which customers keep the entire reward 
for themselves as a reference category. That reference category is then compared 
with the other two schemes in which part of the incentive can be shared with either 
one or two friends. In this way, it is easier to shed some light to understand the 
circumstance that may lead people to prefer engaging in initiatives in which part of 
an endowment is given away, instead of favouring traditional selfish reward 
programmes. Moreover, the multinomial regression does not hold any assumptions 
regarding the odds ratio or the distribution of the variables; therefore, the robustness 
of its results is less likely to be challenged, compared to other linear models or 
generalised linear models.  
For the reasons just stated, in the result section presented later in this chapter, a 
multinomial model was developed and the most important predictors were identified. 
Additionally, based on the final model, the probabilities of selecting each type of 
scheme were plotted varying the values of some predictors while keeping others 
constant with the purpose of appreciating clearly the predictions and trends of the 
model.  
A drawback from the multinomial regression just described was that we lost 
information when only the first choice made by each participant was taken into 
account, while neglecting the data regarding the second and third choices. Because 
of that, as a complementary analysis, we explored the impact of relevant individual 
predictors on the ranking made by participants for each type of incentive scheme. In 
particular, we implemented a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test to compare the 
rankings of each type of schemes based on the reward (large vs. small) and the 
reward framing (Cash vs. Products). Also explored was the possible interaction of 
these two independent variables. Finally, by performing a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum 
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test, we analysed whether the rankings given to each type of incentive scheme 
differed according to the “Income” categories to which participants belong.  
In a similar fashion to the analyses performed with the ranking scores, we compared 
the effects of the different levels of the independent variables on the scores of both 
the measures regarding Expectations about Friends’ Reactions and the outcome 
from the scale of FNE. We also explored the correlation of these variables with 
other measures taken in the experiment. Moreover, a Mann–Whitney U test was 
utilised to compare the expectations about sharing the reward with two friends and 
sharing it with only one person. An additional comparison for both types of 
expectations was performed based on gender (which turned out to be relevant). 
In the complementary analysis just described, we performed a few times the same 
statistical inference tests over the set of measures. For that reason, it may be 
claimed that we had the risk of incurring, what is called in statistics, multiplicity or 
the multiple testing problems. In other words, when we simultaneously tested the 
difference between two (or more) groups based on many attributes, the likelihood of 
finding differences between the groups by chance would increase with the number 
of attributes being compared (Bender & Lange, 2001; Bland & Altman, 1995). In the 
case of our results, a very limited number of what is known as planned comparisons 
was performed by testing very specific a priori hypotheses. This was unlikely to be a 
source of serious concerns compared to situations in which a very large number of 
post hoc comparisons were made. When multiplicity is a high risk, many techniques 
can be applied to correct the thresholds for statistical significance. Probably the 
most popular and common method is the Bonferroni correction in which the 
significance threshold (e.g. 0.05) is divided between the number of comparisons 
(tests) being made (Bland & Altman, 1995). Some authors have challenged the 
utility of this type of corrections (Perneger, 1998; Savitz & Olshan, 1998). However, 
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even if we adjust our significant thresholds based on the Bonferroni method, the 
differences found in our data were still statistically significant (p=.095). Therefore, 
we could consider our results fairly robust in that respect.  
 
3.3- Results  
We initially suggested that people find it very rewarding to engage in prosocial 
actions; therefore, such motives could be useful in encouraging other desirable 
behaviours. For that reason, we were generally expecting most participants in our 
experiment to favour the loyalty schemes that allowed people to share part of their 
loyalty reward with relevant peers. However, the preferences turned out to be 
entirely different from what we anticipated. Specifically, when participants had to 
rank loyalty schemes that offered to share the reward with one friend and two 
friends or that kept it for themselves, 84% of the people selected their first 
(favourite) choice as the option in which no reward was shared. On the other hand, 
the schemes offering to share the loyalty reward with one friend and two friends 
were selected 7% and 8% of the times respectively. Such differences among the 
three alternatives regarding the proportion of choices ranked in the first place were 
clearly statistically significant (X2 = 468.67, df = 2, p = 0.000). In the following 
section, we model such decisions in order to understand better which of the 
variables considered in the experiment were the most relevant in explaining the 
preferences observed.  
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3.3.1- First choice preferences modelling 
In this section, we aim to shed some light on why people find a given loyalty scheme 
more appealing than do others as well as estimating a statistical model to predict 
such preferences. Our results showed that both the expectation about other’s 
reactions and the anticipation about people’s income were particularly relevant in 
explaining participants’ preferences.  
The predicted outcome was represented by the selected loyalty scheme as the first 
option by each participant. Such decision embodied a variable that could be 
considered “categorical”. In other words, each of the three schemes being selected 
could be characterised according to certain attributes but should not be considered 
as a continuous measure. As it was mentioned in the Methodology Section, a 
multinomial regression was the most suitable tool to predict categorical variables 
containing more than two possible outcomes; in our case, there were three possible 
loyalty schemes. In terms of the predictors, we considered in principle all the 
variables that were either manipulated or measured in the experiment. Specifically, 
the type of reward (Cash vs. Products of equivalent value) and the amount of the 
reward (£2 vs. £5) were varied in the different experimental conditions. Also 
measured were FNE and the Expectations about Friends’ Reactions after sharing 
the reward. The latter variable represented two measures; the first considered the 
expectations of reactions when sharing the given reward with only one friend, and 
the second anticipated the reactions when sharing the same amount of reward with 
two individuals. Both measures were highly correlated (r =0.80, p=0.000). That can 
lead to multicollinearity, in other words, having one or more variables that can be 
accurately predicted by another variable in the model. High levels of multicollinearity 
are problematic when estimating regression models (Blalock, 1963; Marsh, Dowson, 
Pietsch, & Walker, 2004). Considering that the two measures of expectations are 
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capturing a similar construct, for the purpose of building the predictive model, we 
decided to join them into a single variable by averaging the two scores. However, 
the two measures are considered separately in other parts of the present work in 
which such analysis is methodologically appropriate. Finally, demographics 
variables such as income, employment status and gender were also considered as 
potential predictors. 
3.3.1.1- Model selection and estimation  
After identifying the potential predictors of the outcome variable, the main challenge 
was to decide which of the many variables should be included or excluded from the 
final model. Usually, the starting point was a full model containing all potential 
covariates, which were reduced to a simple model based on specific criteria. The 
rationale for minimising the number of covariates was to achieve a model 
numerically stable while keeping parsimony. The different methods and strategies 
available for selecting and comparing models were extremely vast, and its review 
was beyond the scope of this work. Such techniques usually varied from one 
discipline to another and even from one problem to the next. According to Hosmer 
and Lemeshow (2004), the variables’ selection methods could be divided into those 
relying on automated and statistically driven algorithms, and those in which the 
researcher was in control of the decision process with the support of specific 
statistic criteria. Over the years, observing the later type of selection method, also 
known as “purposeful selection”, has been increasingly more common. In our 
modelling of the participants’ preferences, we adopted that kind of approach.  
The first step taken to achieve the final model was to simultaneously exclude all 
terms whose elimination did not result in a significant reduction of the model fitness. 
One of the tools through which such goal could be achieved is by evaluating the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) (Fox, 2015; Hosmer Jr & Lemeshow, 2004; Lewandowsky & 
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Farrell, 2010). This measure allows us to compare two nested models by estimating 
whether the addition of a specific term significantly increased the likelihood of the 
model to be an accurate representation of the data set. By nested model we refer to 
the situation in which one of the models being compared represents a reduced 
version of the other model, and therefore, all terms contained in the smaller model 
occur in the larger. By implementing the “Anova” function from the “car package” 
(see http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=car) in the software R, we could perform the 
so-called Type II test to estimate the LR for each of the potential covariates included 
in the full model. In particular, this method was used to calculate the LR by 
comparing a model that excluded each individual factor with a model that included 
all the other possible covariates (Fox & Weisberg, 2010). Those variables with a p-
value lower the 0.05 were retained for the second step in the process of building the 
final model.  
An alternative method to start the process of selecting the covariates for the final 
model consisted of performing the univariable regression analysis of each predictor. 
After following that method, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2004) recommend to retain in 
the model those variable with a LR below 0.25. When performing the two different 
types of variables’ selection process previously described, we found convergent 
results. Specifically, “Reward Framing”, “Expectations about Friends’ Reactions” 
and “Income” were in both cases the variables to be retained in the model. In Table 
14, we present the p-values from the LR obtained for each predictor after following 
the two different types of methods of filtering the number of covariates.  
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After reducing the model to only three predictors, some of the coefficients varied by 
more than 20%. When that happens, it is likely that one or more of the excluded 
variables might be relevant in adjusting the effects that the remaining variables had 
in the model. In such circumstance, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2004) suggest that as 
an additional step in the purposeful selection of the model, the eliminated variables 
should be assessed to decide whether they needed to be included again based on 
the statistical and theoretical criteria. Moreover, the addition of interaction terms 
should also be considered based on similar standards.  
The main criterion for evaluating the improvement of a given model after adding or 
deleting variables is its goodness of fit, in other words, the level of accuracy of the 
model representing the outcome observed in the data. In this regard, the Akaike’s 
Information Criteria or AIC is one of the most commonly used criteria to compare 
the fitness of different statistical models (Fox, 2015). Developing a detailed 
explanation of the mathematical background underpinning this measure is beyond 
our analysis (see Fox, 2015; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010). However, it is worth 
Type II test 
Univariate 
Analysis

















*Variable to be retained in the model
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mentioning that it provides a measure of how much information is lost when a 
specific model is implemented as a representation of the outcome in the data. In this 
regard, the AIC value is not interpretable and does not represent an indicator of the 
model’s quality in absolute terms. Instead, different models can be compared based 
on that value, and the model with the smallest AIC can be considered as the 
preferred model (Fox, 2015; Fox & Weisberg, 2010).  
In order to identify the final predictors, we compared in Table 15 the goodness of fit 
of several models. The Model 1 contains all possible predictors considered in the 
experiment, whereas Model 2 involved only the variables: Reward Framing, 
Expectations about Friend’s Reactions, and Income, all of which were previously 
identified as important covariates to be retained. Table 15 shows that Model 2 
resulted in a much better goodness of fitness in relation to the initial model. In 
Models 3 to 7, we considered the three variables included in Model 2, and in 
addition, we individually included back each of the variables that were initially 
excluded from Model 2. As observed in Table 15, none of the models in which we 
included again one variable had a better goodness of fit compared to Model 2.  
In Table 15, we also assessed models containing interaction terms that were 
theoretically relevant. Specifically, apart from the three predictors presented in 
Model 2, Model 8 included a term with an interaction between “Reward Amount” and 
Expectations about Friend’s Reactions, and also the Reward Amount as an 
independent covariate was added (because it was found to improve model fitness 
when added alongside the interaction term). The inclusion of the terms just 
described was associated with a highly significant LR (LR chisq = 12.09, df = 2, p = 
0.002). Moreover, Model 8 significantly outperformed Model 2 in terms of AIC and 
reduction of Residual Deviance.  
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In Model 9, we intended to improve Model 8 even more by adding an interaction 
term between Reward Amount and Reward Framing. However, that addition did not 
result in a better goodness of fit. In Model 10, we assessed the addition of a 
different interaction term. That was the interaction between Reward Framing and 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions, all of which were also theoretically relevant. 
Incorporating such interaction reduced importantly the residual deviance, but still the 
AIC was not better than that from Model 8. Furthermore, the LR associated with the 
addition of the interaction term was insignificant (LR chisq = 3.013, df = 2, p 
=0.222). Therefore, we considered Model 8 as our winning model.  
Finally, in Model 11, we wanted to assess the consequences of extracting the 
covariate Income from Model 8 because it was relevant to understanding the impact 
of the only demographic variable being considered in the model. After dropping that 
variable, we observed small changes in the model coefficients, and the AIC showed 
a minor improvement. Nonetheless, the Residual Deviance from Model 10 was 
larger than that from Model 8. Since AIC was an indicator that penalised more 
complex models (Hosmer Jr & Lemeshow, 2004; Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2010), the 
slight improvement in AIC was caused by a reduction in the number of parameters 
in comparison with Model 8, not as a consequence of a significant improvement in 
terms of Residual Deviance. Therefore, we selected Model 8 as our preferred 
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Table 16 depicts the parameters estimated after fitting our preferred predictive 
model (Model 8). 
 
Model Model Covariates Residual Deviance AIC
1
Reward_Type + Friends_Expectations

























+ Income + Employment_status
397.208 445.208
8*
Reward_Type + Friends_Expectations + Income 
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Table 16: Multinomial fit of selected model. 
 
 
The multinomial regression offers parameters that reflect the probability of a specific 
outcome in relation to a baseline established by the researcher. In terms of the 
outcome been predicted, that is, the preferences for sharing the reward with two, 
one or no friends, we set the option of “not sharing the reward” as a baseline 
because it represented the null hypothesis being tested. In the case of the variable 
Reward Framing, the reward framed as a Cash gift has been established as a 
baseline. Regarding the covariate Income, the category of people earning “less than 
£15,000 a year” was established as a baseline. This group represented the largest 
proportion of people in the sample and the ones with the lowest annual income. 
Finally, for the variable Reward Amount, the smallest amount (£2 reward) was 
established as a baseline.  
The coefficients offered in the model represent the rate of change in the "log odds" 
as the predictor change. These types of coefficients are not very intuitive. However, 
Condition Variable Coeff. Sd.Error z.value p.(2-Tails) odds
1_Friend (Intercept) -4.339 1.605 -2.704 0.007* 0.013
Reward_type(Product) -1.117 0.435 -2.57 0.010* 0.327
Friends_Expectations 0.382 0.202 1.886 0.059* 1.465
Income15k-19k -0.627 0.624 -1.005 0.315 0.534
Income20k-29k -0.533 0.545 -0.979 0.328 0.587
Iincome> 30k -0.596 0.535 -1.112 0.266 0.551
Income_No.Ans -1.018 0.798 -1.275 0.202 0.361
Reward_amount(£5) 4.211 1.959 2.15 0.032* 67.439
F.Expectations:R_amount(£5) -0.573 0.26 -2.2 0.028* 0.564
2_Friends (Intercept) -5.940 1.641 -3.619 0.000* 0.003
Reward_type(Product) 0.254 0.391 0.651 0.515 1.290
Friends_Expectations 0.565 0.199 2.834 0.005* 1.759
Income15k-19k -2.217 1.057 -2.098 0.036* 0.109
Income20k-29k -1.755 0.779 -2.253 0.024* 0.173
Iincome> 30k -0.288 0.460 -0.626 0.531 0.750
Income_No.Ans -0.207 0.563 -0.368 0.713 0.813
Reward_amount(£5) 5.442 2.173 2.504 0.012* 230.819
F.Expectations:R_amount(£5) -0.795 0.284 -2.802 0.005* 0.452
*Statistically significant
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when estimating the exponential of these coefficients we could obtain the “odds 
ratios”, which are much more easy to interpret (Hosmer Jr & Lemeshow, 2004). We 
described below the trends observed in the odds ratios for the coefficients that 
showed significant p-values.  
In general, the impact of varying the reward framing was different across conditions. 
Particularly, the relative probability of preferring to share the reward with one friend, 
instead of not sharing it at all, was 0.327 times lower in the condition in which the 
incentive was framed as Products than when it was presented as Cash, keeping all 
other variables in the model constant. On the contrary, preferring to share the 
reward with two friends rather than not sharing it at all was 1.29 times more likely 
when the reward was framed as Products instead of being presented as Cash. In 
other words, the preference for Products or Cash depended on the number of 
friends with which the reward was expected to be shared. These results were 
consistent with Hypothesis 5b.  
The expectations about how other people may react if part of a loyalty reward was 
shared with them also resulted in being highly relevant when predicting participants’ 
preferences for loyalty schemes. Indeed, the model supported the prediction from 
Hypothesis 1b. Specifically, the more positive the expectations about others’ 
reactions, the more people were likely to favour schemes in which part of the reward 
was shared. More specifically, augmenting in one unit our measure regarding 
others’ expectations increased the odds of selecting the programme in which the 
reward was shared with one friend by 46.5% compared to the scheme in which no 
reward was shared, keeping constant all other variables in the model. Also, a one-
unit increase in positive Expectations about Friends’ Reactions increased by 75.9% 
the odds of preferring the scheme in which the reward was shared with two friends 
compared to the scheme in which no reward was shared.  
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Our model also found the differences to be statistically significant in the case of 
middle-income groups. In particular, the odds of preferring a loyalty scheme in 
which the reward was shared with two friends to the scheme in which the reward 
was not shared at all decreased by a rate of 0.109 times for people earning between 
£15,000 and £19,000 a year compared to those earning less than £15,000 a year. 
In the same way, after controlling for the other covariates in the model, the relative 
probability of preferring to share with two friends rather than not sharing at all was 
0.173 times lower in people earning between £20,000 and £29,000 a year 
compared to the reference group. In other words, the middle-income groups were 
less likely to share part of their rewards with two people.  
In terms of the Reward Amount, it turns out to be the variable with the highest 
weight when predicting participants’ preferences. In short, the bigger the reward, the 
more likely there was a preference for sharing part of the loyalty incentive with 
friends. Particularly, the relative probability of preferring to share the reward with 
one friend rather than not sharing it at all was 67.44 times higher when the amount 
was £5 compared to a £2 reward. Moreover, the relative odds of sharing the reward 
with two friends against not sharing it with anyone were 230.82 times higher when 
the amount available was £5 compared to the situation in which only £2 were 
provided as an incentive, after controlling for the other covariates in the model. In 
other words, we should expect about 230 people preferring to share the reward with 
two friends for every such person who prefers to share nothing when the reward 
was £5 instead of £2. 
The interaction effect between Expectations about Friends’ Reactions and Reward 
Amount was also significant, meaning that the effects that changes in expectations 
have on participants’ preferences depended on the size of the amount available for 
sharing. If a person preferred to share the incentive with one individual instead of 
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not sharing it with anyone, the odds ratio of such interaction occurring increased by 
a factor of 0.56. For people who favoured the scheme in which the incentive was 
shared with two friends, the odds of the interaction increased by a factor of 0.45 
compared to individuals not sharing the reward with anyone.  
The direction of the interaction just described, as well as the tendencies associated 
with the coefficients in the model, is presented in a more intuitive way in the next 
section where the predicted probabilities of each of the three possible outcomes 
(loyalty scheme preferences) are estimated and plotted. 
 
3.3.1.2- Model predictions 
In the previous section, we have presented the odds ratio associated with the 
estimates of the Final model. Such estimates consider the variation of a given 
variable by keeping constant all other variables in the model. In this section, we will 
plot the predictions of the model when varying more than one variable 
simultaneously. This analysis will allow us to assess visually how predictions may 
behave in a more dynamic modelling. However, unlike the odds ratios, this 
approach represents an exploratory examination that cannot establish whether the 
differences observed are statistically significant.  
In Figures 13 and 14, we varied all the variables in the model while keeping the 
Income constant. Specifically, the income category of people with “annual income 
lower than £15.000 per year” was kept unchanged because it represented our 
baseline in the model, and it was the category that contained more participants from 
the sample. Additionally, in our data exploration, we found that regardless of the 
income level kept constant, the general trends in the graph remained, but the 
magnitudes may vary slightly. It is worth noting that both Figure 13 and 14 were 
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based on the same information, but they are presented in different ways. We found 
that by doing so, the insights from the trends could be more easily appreciated by 
the reader.  
 
Figure 13: Estimated probabilities of the fitted model keeping “Income” constant, and 
comparing the “Reward amount” within each group. 
 
 
Figure 14: Estimated probabilities of the fitted model keeping “Income” constant and 
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In the previous two figures, we can observe how preferences for the 
different loyalty schemes were predicted to chance when expectations 
about positive friends’ reaction increased or decreased. Particularly in 
Figure 13, we can appreciate that such differences diverged depending on 
the amount available for sharing. In the case of the smallest amount (£2), 
when expectations about other people’s reactions were more positive, the 
probabilities of selecting the scheme in which no reward was shared 
decreased. However, the probabilities of choosing any of the schemes that 
allowed the sharing of part of the incentive increased. The opposite trend 
was observed when a large incentive was available (£5). That is, more 
positive expectations about the reactions from friends were predicted to 
increase preferences for the scheme in which the reward was not shared; 
however, in such circumstances, the appeal for schemes that allowed the 
sharing of the incentive with others tended to decrease.  
An additional observation from Figure 13 was that changes in the amount of 
the reward produced small differences in participants’ preferences when 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions were sufficiently positive. In 
contrast, larger differences in participants’ preferences were appreciated 
when such expectations tended to be more negative. This finding aligned 
with what we have predicted in Hypothesis 2b.1. Moreover, having more 
negative Expectations about Friends’ Reactions made people with smaller 
amounts available to be shared with others more likely to prefer the “selfish 
scheme”, whereas having a larger proportion of the reward available to be 
shared made participants more likely to select schemes in which part of the 
incentive was given away to friends. This is what we were expecting based 
on Hypothesis 2b.2.   
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Regarding the Reward Framing, the predictions trend can be clearly 
appreciated in Figure 14. For both the scheme in which no reward was 
shared and that in which the incentive was shared with two people, the 
general trend was similar. Specifically, rewards framed as Products were 
more appealing than those framed as amounts in Cash, although the 
differences seemed to be very small for the selfish scheme. This result 
supports Hypothesis 5b but contradicts Hypothesis 3b because we 
predicted that the scheme not sharing the incentive with anyone would be 
more appealing in the case of the Cash framing. In the case of the loyalty 
scheme in which the reward was allowed to be shared with only one friend, 
rewards framed as Cash were more appealing than were the Products 
framing. This result is against Hypothesis 5b. 
Furthermore, when the Reward Amount and Reward Framing are 
appreciated simultaneously, we observed that the differences between the 
Cash and Products framings previously described varied as the 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions changed. In particular, we noticed 
that more positive Expectations about Friends’ Reactions tended to make 
such differences bigger if a £2 reward was available to be shared. 
Conversely, when the incentive represented a larger amount (£5), the 
opposite trend was observed. In other words, differences between the two 
types of reward framings decreased as the Expectations about Friends’ 
Reactions were more positives.  
As it was mentioned at the beginning of this section, the figures previously 
presented showed the choice probabilities for each possible outcome when 
varying all the variables in the model, but keeping Income constant. In 
Figure 15, we explored the effects of choice probabilities when varying 
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Income and other variables in the model, but we ensured that the value of 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions was fixed at 7, which was the 
closest entire number to the average score observed in the sample.  
 
Figure 15: Estimated probabilities of the fitted model keeping                                    
“Expectations about Friends” constant. 
 
Probably, the most remarkable tendency that could be appreciated in 
Figure 15 were the values for the group of people earning less than 
£15,000 a year (the lowest). In particular, people who decided to share part 
of their reward with either one or two friends were more likely to be within 
the income category of “less than £15,000 a year”, which represented the 
lowest earners group. Conversely, people who preferred the scheme in 
which the reward was not shared with anyone had the lowest probability of 
being part of the lowest earners category. This finding contradicted the 
natural intuition to assume that people with higher income would be abler 
and more inclined to give away part of their endowment. Figure 15 also 
allows us to visually observe the differences in middle-income groups 
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described in the model discussion. Specifically, people earning between 
£15,000 and £29,000 were significantly less likely to prefer to share the 
reward with two friends compared to the baseline option represented by the 
scheme in which the reward was not shared with anyone.  
Table 17 depicts the hypotheses being tested in the present research, 
including a summary of the results offered by the previous modelling.  
 Table 17: Results summary for the “First choice preference” analysis. 
  
 
The model predictions presented in this section were based on the 
alternative that each participant selected as their first choice. However, the 
information regarding the schemes that were ranked as the second and 
third option when each participant was asked to state their preferences was 
not being taken into account in the analysis. In the next section, we will 
analyse the impact of each individual predictor on participants’ preferences 
considering all the schemes’ rankings. Moreover, we will explore further the 
most relevant bivariate relationships. 
No. Hypothesis statement Results summary
1b ▪ People w ill expect more positive reactions from friends (recipients) w hen they face 
loyalty schemes that share a larger proportion of the rew ard, compare to the situation in 
w hich the proportion being shared is smaller.
▪ The hypothesis w as supported by the Estimates from the model.
2b.1 ▪ Changes in the amount of the rew ard w ill not affect participants’ preferences for loyalty 
schemes w hen sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith friends is associated w ith expectations 
about recipients’ reactions that are suff iciently positive.
▪ The results w ere alligned w ith the hypothesis' prediction.
2b.2 ▪ When sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith a friend is not associated w ith suff iciently 
positive reactions from the recipient(s), smaller rew ards w ill encourage people to prefer 
loyalty schemes in w hich they keep the entire incentive for themselves, w hereas larger 
rew ards w ill make them more inclined to prefer schemes that allow  them to share the 
rew ard w ith friends.
▪ The results w ere alligned w ith the hypothesis' prediction.
3b ▪ People receiving a rew ard framed in terms of “Cash” w ill be more likely to prefer loyalty 
schemes in w hich customers keep the entire rew ard for themselves, compared to those 
individuals receiving rew ards framed as “Products”.
▪ The results do not support the hypothesis.
4b ▪ When the loyalty rew ard is framed in terms of “Products”, people w ould expect more 
positive reactions from recipients in loyalty schemes that share part of the rew ard w ith 
friends, compared to the schemes in w hich the rew ard is entirely kept by the customers.
▪ The hypothesis w as supported by the Estimates from the model. 
5b ▪ Loyalty schemes offering to share part of the incentive w ith other people w ould be 
more attractive w hen the loyalty rew ard is framed in terms of “Products” (non-monetary 
incentive), instead of framed as a “Cash” incentive.
▪ The hypothesis w as supported by the Estimates from the model. 
How ever, the predictions' plot in w hich multiple variables w here 
simultaniously varied suggests that the hypothesis may not be valid 
for participants selecting the scheme in w hich the rew ard w as 
shared w ith only one friend. 
6b ▪ Peoples’ predisposition to fear negative evaluations from others w ill influence both their 
w illingness to favour loyalty schemes that share part of the rew ard w ith friends, and 
their expectations about how  others may react after sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith 
them. 
▪ Results do not support the hypothesis. Fears of negative 
evaluations w as not relevant as a preferences' predictor.
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3.3.2- Scheme rankings and Reward Amount 
In order to test whether the size of the reward being offered affects 
participants’ preferences, in this section, we evaluate the way in which 
people ranked each of the three types of incentive schemes and compare 
the differences in rankings between the condition in which the reward 
amount was £5 with the group receiving only a £2 reward. After performing 
a Mann-Whitney U Test to compare the rankings between the two types of 
conditions, we found no significant differences between the scheme in 
which the reward was not shared (W = 19632, p = 0.524), the scheme 
sharing the reward with one friend (W = 20045, p = 0.958), or the loyalty 
programme in which the reward was shared with two people (W = 21335, 
p= 0.236). 
In the previous section, participants’ preferences were modelled based on 
their first choice, and expectations about how friends might react when a 
reward was shared with them were identified as a highly relevant variable. 
For that reason, we explored further the differences in rankings between the 
Reward Amount by taking into account the expectations about how friends 
may react after receiving the rewards. In particular, we split the sample into 
two groups: those with “high positives expectations” about friends’ reactions 
and those with “low positives expectations”.  
Converting a continuous variable into a dichotomous measure by assigning 
participants above or below a given point in the scale is a practice widely 
found in the literature in a large variety of fields such as medicine (Kastrati 
et al., 2011; Lemanske et al., 2010), psychology (Buchner et al., 2015; 
Wang et al., 2013), finance (Hsu, 2013; Kalteier & Posch, 2013), among 
many others (for a review see Iacobucci, Posavac, Kardes, Schneider, & 
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Popovich, 2015b). However, this technique has been frequently criticised 
for having negative consequences such as the loss of information and 
statistical power (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; 
McClelland, Lynch, Irwin, Spiller, & Fitzsimons, 2015; Rucker, McShane, & 
Preacher, 2015). Instead, a regression analysis has been identified as the 
most suitable method to evaluate the impact of continues independent 
variables on a given outcome. In the case of the present research, the 
dichotomisation of the variable measuring “expectations about friends’ 
reactions” aim to complement, not to replace, the regression analysis 
performed in section 3.3.1. In particular, the purpose is to simplify the 
presentation of the results regarding the potential interaction of the 
“expectations about friends’ reactions” with other individual variables 
considered in the experiment.            
There are different criteria to establish the cut-off point in the 
dichotomisation of the continuous variable previously described.  For 
example, it is possible to establish a threshold based on the data by using 
the median or mean of the participants’ scores (Iacobucci, Posavac, 
Kardes, Schneider, & Popovich, 2015a; Iacobucci et al., 2015b) , or based 
on the scale by setting the cut-off threshold in the midpoint of the scale 
(Ames et al., 2015; Wiggins, Elliott, & Cooper, 2012). Both possibilities have 
their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, using the median 
value would allow to compare two groups of equal size, but skewed 
distributions would bunch half of the observations into a small range of 
scores which produces further losses of information. In addition, such 
dichotomisation would not recognise the participants’ decision to locate 
themselves in a given point of the continuous that was presented to them 
when making the decision. On the other hand, selecting the midpoint of the 
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scale as a threshold may create too unequal distributions of the participants 
in each of the two groups, but it would consider the score that is 
conceptually the middle response that participants faced when completing 
the scale.    
For the purpose of the present analysis, we assume that people who 
position themselves below or above the conceptual middle response are 
part of distinct groups of individuals. Therefore, the cut-off point for the 
dichotomisation has been set to the score 4.5, which represented the 
medium point of the scales used to measure expectations. In other words, 
people with scores below the threshold were considered in the category 
“low expectations” and scores above that point would make people fall 
within the category “high expectations”.  
It is worth remembering that after participants stated their preferences 
about the schemes in the experiment, they were asked to indicate their 
expectations about: 1) “sharing the reward with one friend” and 2) “sharing 
the reward with two friends”. In this regard, we have divided the analysis 
based on the two types of expectations measured. In total, we were able to 
perform 12 comparisons between £2 and £5 reward. It involved considering 
the three different types of incentive schemes being compared based on 
the two types of expectations measured (sharing with one or two friends) 
and the subgroups of participants created based on each expectation 
measured (high and low positive expectations). In Figure 16, we present the 
average ranking obtained for each of the three incentive schemes and 
compare subgroups based on the measure of Expectations about Friends’ 
Reactions when the reward was shared with only “one friend”. On the other 
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hand, Figure 17 show similar comparisons but based on the measure of 
expectations when the reward was shared with “two people”.   
 
Figure 16: Average ranking of each incentive scheme comparing the “Reward Amount” 
based on the expectations about sharing the reward with one friend. 
 
Figure 17: Average ranking of each incentive scheme comparing the “Reward Amount” 
based on the expectations about sharing the reward with two friends. 
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In both of the figures previously presented, the y-axis represents the average 
ranking given to each scheme. It means that lower bars indicate that the given 
loyalty programme was more appealing because it was closer to the rank 1 (most 
preferred). In Figure 16, the subgroup with “high expectations” about friends’ 
reactions, on the upper part of the graph, shows no differences between the 
condition in which the money available to be shared was £5 and the condition with 
£2, as it was expected according to Hypothesis 2b.1. Nonetheless, when we 
examined the subgroup that was categorised as “low expectations”, we appreciated 
that the scheme in which the reward was not shared with anyone was significantly 
more preferred when the available reward was £2 instead of £5 (W = 45, p = 0.021). 
In other words, participants were less willing to share a larger reward when the 
expectations about sharing the incentive with one friend were low, as it was stated 
in Hypothesis 2b.2.  
Furthermore, Figure 16 shows significant differences in the preferences for the 
scheme in which the reward was shared with one person (W = 8, p= 0.010). 
Specifically, as we predicted in Hypothesis 2b.2, the scheme sharing the incentive 
with “one person” was more appealing when the reward was larger (£5) but only in 
the cases in which participants had low expectations about how the receiver may 
react if the reward was shared with one friend. Put simply, when the Expectations 
about Friends’ Reactions was not positive, people were still willing to give away part 
of their reward to one friend but only when that reward was large enough. 
In the case of Figure 17, we observed a similar trend to Figure 16 regarding the 
scheme in which the reward was not shared with any friend. In particular, that 
scheme was significantly more appealing when the incentive available was smaller, 
but only if expectations about sharing the reward with two friends were low (W= 
76.5, p= 0.029). It means that with larger incentives, people might be more inclined 
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to give away part of the reward even if the Expectations about Friends’ Reactions 
was not completely positive. Moreover, we observed a trend to favour the scheme 
that allowed the sharing of the incentive with two friends when the reward available 
was larger (£5), but only in the case of the subgroup of people with low expectations 
about sharing the reward with two friends. Nonetheless, this difference was not 
large enough to be considered statistically significant (W= 38, p= 0.131). None of 
the other comparisons between the two types of reward presented in Figure 17 
were significant. Interestingly, the trends just described regarding Figures 16 and 17 
were consistent with the results displayed in Figure 13 and 14 from Section 3.3.1, in 
which the model predictions were displayed.  
In summary, the size of the Reward Amount affected participant’s preferences only 
when they had low expectations about how others may react after sharing the 
reward. In the following section, we will further explore the relationship between the 
size of the reward and the Expectations about Friends’ Reactions but without 
considering the participants’ preferences for each scheme. 
3.3.3- Reward Amount and Expectations about Friend’s Reactions 
In Hypothesis 1b, we predicted that, overall, when the amount available to be 
shared was larger, people would have more positive expectations about how their 
friends would react if the incentive was shared with them. Our results confirmed this 
hypothesis. That is, the availability of a larger reward improved the expectations of 
positive feeling from the friends with which the reward is expected to be shared. 
Figure 18 presents the differences between the conditions.  
 




Figure 18: Differences between “Reward Amount” and expectations about sharing the 
reward with one or two friends. 
 
 
To obtain the measures regarding friends’ expectations, participants were shown 
the hypothetical messages that friends would receive when customers selected the 
scheme sharing the reward either with one friend or with two friends. In both cases, 
participants were asked how their friends would feel after receiving such messages 
based on four bipolar adjectives. In this regard, when the reward was expected to 
be shared with one friend, people expected more positive feelings from their friends 
in the condition in which £5 were given away (median = 8, mean = 7.67) compared 
to only £2 (median = 7, mean = 7.03). That difference was statistically significant 
based on Mann-Whitney U Test (W = 15590, p= 0.000). Similarly, when participants 
were asked about friends’ expectations regarding the scheme in which part of the 
incentive was shared with two friends, more positive feeling were found when the 
amount was £5 (median = 7.25, mean = 7.23) than with a £2 reward (median = 
6.75, mean = 6.69). Again, the differences observed were considered statistically 
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We have previously observed that the size of the reward could affect both 
participants’ preferences regarding sharing part of their loyalty reward and the 
expectations about how their friends may react after doing so. In the next section, 
we will discuss whether the way in which the reward is framed also affect 
participants’ preferences and expectations.  
 
3.3.4- Scheme rankings and Reward Framing 
We were expecting different reward framings to have a dissimilar impact on how 
participants rank the loyalty schemes, depending on the number of people with 
which each scheme offers to share the reward. In Figure 19, the trends observed in 
the results can be appreciated.  
  
 
Figure 19: Average ranking of each incentive scheme comparing the “Reward Framing”. 
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As it was the case for the Reward Amount plots in Section 3.3.3, in Figure 19 we 
presented the average ranking given to each loyalty scheme, considering that lower 
bars involved higher preferences because it meant that the average rank was closer 
to one (1). In this sense, we can appreciate that, for the scheme in which the reward 
was not shared with anyone, no significant differences (W = 20934, p= 0.253) were 
observed between rewards framed as Cash (Avg. Ranking= 1.26) or Products (Avg. 
Ranking= 1.19), which contradicts Hypothesis 3b. Moreover, when the incentive to 
be shared was framed in terms of Cash, people significantly ranked higher (closer to 
1) the scheme sharing the reward with only one friend (Avg. Ranking=2.06) 
compared to the situation in which an incentive of equivalent value was offered but 
framed as “Products” (Avg. Ranking=2.68), which was also unexpected according to 
Hypothesis 5b. This difference was statistically significant based on the Mann-
Whitney U Test (W = 9107.5, p= 0.000). In other words, people favouring the 
scheme in which the reward was shared with only one friend preferred to give away 
rewards in cash that could be spent in the store, instead of providing a voucher to 
enjoy a specific product from the coffee shop.  
The situation was different in the case of the loyalty scheme offering to share part of 
the reward with two friends because each friend was expected to receive a smaller 
incentive. In this regard, we expected this scheme to be more popular when the 
reward was framed as Products instead of Cash because it might reduce the social 
cost of giving away a small reward. That was exactly what we observed in the 
results, as we anticipated in Hypothesis 5b. Specifically, the two-friends-share 
scheme was ranked better (closer to 1) when the reward was framed as Products 
(Avg. Ranking= 2.12) rather than “Cash” (Avg. Ranking=2.68). That difference was 
statistically significant (W = 30030, p= 0.000). In summary, our Hypothesis 5b was 
valid in the case of the scheme offering to share part of the reward with two friends, 
but not when the incentive was expected to be shared with only one person.  
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We were also interested in exploring whether incorporating in the analysis the 
variable Expectations about Friends’ reaction would change the observed trends, as 
it happened when we analysed the impact of the Reward Amount. In this regard, we 
split again the sample between participants with “High positive expectations” about 
how their friends might react, which involved those with scores higher than 4.5 in 
the expectation scales, and those with “Low positive expectations”, which consists 
of participants with a score below 4.5 out of 9. In Figure 20, we present the 
comparisons between the condition Cash framing and Products framing considering 
the expectations about sharing the reward with only “one friend”, whereas Figure 21 
shows a similar comparison but taking into account the measure of expectations 
about sharing the reward with “two friends”.  
 
 
Figure 20: Average ranking of each incentive scheme comparing the “Reward Framing” 
based on the expectations about sharing the reward with one friend. 
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Figure 21: Average ranking of each incentive scheme comparing the “Reward Framing” 
based on the expectations about sharing the reward with two friends. 
 
In Figures 20 and 21, it can be appreciated that the general trends observed for the 
schemes involving the sharing of the incentive with “one friend” and sharing it with 
“two friends” remain almost the same after considering the variable Expectations 
about Friends’ Reactions. Regarding the scheme in which no reward was shared, in 
both Figures 20 and 21, there was a difference between Products and Cash for 
those participants who reported low positive Expectations about Friends’ Reactions. 
Nevertheless, these differences were not statistically significant when splitting the 
group based on friends’ expectations about sharing the incentive with “one friend” 
(W = 42, p= 0.120) nor for the expectations about sharing rewards with “two friends” 
(W= 84, p= 0.166).  
In summary, we can confirm that the variable Expectations about Friends’ Reaction 
does not affect the relationship observed between scheme preferences and Reward 
Framing. In the next section, we will explore directly the bivariate relation between 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions and Reward Framing, but without taking into 
account participants’ preferences for each scheme. 
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3.3.5- Reward Framing and Expectations about Friends’ Reactions  
We predicted in Hypothesis 4b that rewards framed in terms of Products would be 
linked to more positive Expectations about Friends’ Reactions after sharing the 
reward with them. Such claim could not be confirmed in this analysis. We were 
surprised to find that the differences between the two types of framings were not 
statistically significant neither for the expectations about sharing the incentive with 
one friend (W = 18776, p = 0.246) nor for the case of sharing it with two people (W 
= 18350, p = 0.130). Figure 22 illustrates these results.  
 
 
Figure 22: Differences between “Reward Framing” in terms of expectations about sharing 
the reward with either one or two friends. 
 
3.3.6- Interaction between “Reward Amount” and “Reward Framing” 
In Section 3.3.1, we performed a preferences modelling based on the first choice 
made by participants, and we found no support to add an interaction term between 
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words, assuming that the effect of the Reward Framing on participants’ preferences 
for loyalty schemes would vary depending on the size of the reward available was 
not found to be relevant to improve the predictive power of the model. In this regard, 
we wanted to explore whether the interaction between the two variables previously 
mentioned would become significant when analysing participants’ preferences 
based on the rankings scores of each scheme, instead of the first choice only. As it 
can be appreciated in Figure 23, that was not the case. The average ranking for 
each loyalty scheme in the conditions Cash framing or Products framing was almost 
identical when the reward available to be shared was either £2 or £5. 
 
Figure 23: Differences between “Reward Framing” and “Reward Amount”. 
 
3.3.7- Fear of Negative Evaluations (FNE) 
The scale of FNE measures a personality trait that we were expecting to have an 
important impact on participants’ preferences for loyalty schemes, in particular on 
those schemes offering to share part of their loyalty rewards with relevant peers. 
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rankings given to each of the incentive schemes were virtually zero and were not 
statistically significant (sharing with no friends, p = 0.84; sharing with one friend, p = 
0.38; sharing with two friends, p = 0.28). Similarly, the correlations between the 
scale of FNE and the measure evaluating the expectations of sharing the reward 
with one (p = 0.65) and two friends (p = 0.62) were insignificant and with values 
close to zero. These results were consistent with the exclusion of the FNE measure 
in the preferences modelling presented in Section 3.3.1 and contradicted what we 
were expecting in Hypothesis 6b. 
Neither the preferences for the different loyalty schemes nor the expectations about 
how others may react after sharing the loyalty reward were directly correlated to the 
FNE scale. However, it could be the case that the FNE scale mediated the 
relationship between expectations about others’ reactions and preferences for 
loyalty schemes. In this regard, one of the main steps to establish the possibility of a 
mediation effect is to regress the mediator on the independent variable. According 
to Baron and Kenny (1986), if no association is found between independent variable 
and mediator, then the possibility of mediation has to be ruled out. After regressing 
the FNE scale on the measures of Expectations about Friends’ Reactions, we found 
that neither the expectations of sharing the reward with one friend (Coef.= -0.011, p 
= 0.646) nor that with two people (Coef.= 0.012, p=0.616) resulted in a significant 
association. Therefore, based on this method, the scale of FNE cannot possibly 
mediate the relationship between expectations and preferences for loyalty schemes.  
More robust methods than the one mentioned from Baron and Kenny (1986) have 
been recently developed in order to evaluate mediation (and moderation) by 
performing bootstraps (resamples). In particular, Hayes (2013) offered a popular 
tool known as the “Process macro” able to estimate mediation effects by running a 
bootstrapping routine in statistical programmes like SPSS and SAS. In Figure 24, 
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we present a summary of the results of running the “Process Macro” for models in 
which the Expectations about Friends’ reactions represents the Independent 
Variable, the FNE scale is the mediator, and the rankings given to each of the three 






Figure 24: Mediation Analysis, bootstrap method from Hayes (2013). 
 
No significant mediation effect was found by implementing the procedure from 
Hayes (2013). In this method, the estimation of the indirect effect (mediation) does 
not rely on comparing a parameter with a theoretical distribution (e.g. t distribution), 
instead, the bootstrapping process allows to build a sampling distribution by 
repeatedly randomly sampling observations with replacement from the data 
collected. Such process outputs a 95% confidence interval (CI), and cases in which 
zero falls within the interval are considered not significant mediation effects at the 
0.05 level. That was the case for the results presented in Figure 24, consequently, 
Hypothesis 6b could not be confirmed. Furthermore, we explored whether being 
part of a particular experimental condition produced differences in the scores of the 
FNE scale. In this sense, we did not find significant differences neither when 
comparing the FNE scores between the two Reward Amount (t = 0.241, df = 398.47, 
p = 0.810) nor between the two types of reward framings (t = 0.144, df = 398.17, p = 
0.886). Such finding was not unexpected given that the FNE scale measures a 
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personality trait that should be relatively stable despite the variations in the decision 
context.  
The only significant differences observed in the FNE scale were found for the 
demographic variables. First, for the variable “Gender”, males had a scored higher 
(Avg. = 3.55) than females (Avg. = 3.12) in the FNE scale. Put simply, women were 
reported to have significantly more concerns about being judged by others (t= 
5.586, df = 398.75, p =0.000). Second, there was a significant positive correlation 
between age and scores in the FNE scale (r = 0.29, p = 0.000). This suggested that 
the younger the participants, the more fears about receiving negative evaluations 
from others were present. In Figure 25, we plotted the relationship between age and 
the FNE scale taking gender into account.  
 
 
Figure 25: Relationship between age and the Fears of Negative Evaluations scale, 
considering Gender. 
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Figure 25 reveals that younger participants in the sample were female; 
therefore, gender and age were also correlated. Consequently, it was 
difficult to establish which variable was directly affecting the FNE scores. 
3.3.8- Expectations about Friends’ Reaction in general 
We previously noted that participants were asked about the feelings of their friends 
when hypothetically sharing part of their loyalty reward with either one or two of their 
friends. As anticipated, we found that participants expected more positive reactions 
when the reward was meant to be shared with one friend (median = 7.75, mean = 
7.35) than with two friends (median = 7.00, mean = 6.96). That difference was 
statistically significant (W = 91860, p= 0.000).  
In previous sections, we explored the relationship between the scales measuring 
Expectations about Friends’ Reactions and the variables manipulated in the 
different experimental conditions. Here, we will analyse whether these scales about 
friends’ expectations differ based on the demographic variables measured in the 
experiment. In this regard, we found the variable Gender to be the only one showing 
differences. Concretely, females (median = 7.75, mean = 7.43) were on average 
more optimistic than males (median = 7.00, mean = 6.83) in terms of their 
expectations about how friends might react after sharing part of the loyalty reward. 
That difference was statistically significant for both the measure considering to 
share with one friend (W = 15662, p= 0.000) and with two friends (W = 16220, p= 
0.001). Figure 26 depicts the differences between expectations about sharing with 
one or two friends taking Gender into account.  
 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                                                 182 
 
 
Figure 26: Differences between “Genders” in terms of expectations about sharing the reward 
with either one or two friends. 
 
3.3.9- Income and schemes’ preferences 
The variable Income resulted to be an important covariate to control in the 
preferences modelling performed in Section 3.3.1, in which participants’ first choices 
were predicted. Similarly, we found that Income categories may also be relevant 
when analysing the rankings given to the different incentive schemes. Specifically, 
we found that the Income categories showed significant differences in terms of 
participants’ rankings for the scheme in which the reward was not expected to be 
shared with anyone (chi.sq = 10.322, df = 4, p= 0.035). However, no significant 
differences were found for the schemes sharing part of the reward with one friend 
(chi.sq = 0.54003, df = 4, p= 0.970) or two friends (chi.sq = 6.8378, df = 4, p = 
0.145) based on the Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test. In Figure 27, the differences in 
rankings taking Income into account can be appreciated. 
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Figure 27: Income categories and schemes’ average rankings. 
 
Figure 27 clearly reveals that participants with the lowest income (< 15k) were those 
driving the differences between Income categories for the scheme sharing the 
reward with no friends. The result suggested that people with less economic 
resources were less inclined to participate in a scheme in which sharing the reward 
was not possible; instead, they preferred schemes in which they would have the 
opportunity to give away part of their endowment. This is contrary to our initial 
intuition of assuming that richer people would share their reward more than the poor 
individuals because they are in a better economic position to do so.  
The results just described to be associated with how participants from different 
income groups expected their friends to react after sharing a loyalty reward with 
them. In Figure 28, we can appreciate that people differed on their expectations 
about sharing their rewards with either one or two friends depending on the income 
to which group they belong. More interestingly, if we compare, for instance, the bars 
regarding expectations about sharing the reward with two friends in Figure 28 with 
the bars in Figure 27 showing the average rankings given to the scheme in which 
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the reward was shared with two friends, we can observe that they almost mirror 
each other. In other words, lower bars in one graph corresponds to higher bars in 
the other and vice versa, thus suggesting that higher expectations (closer to 9) were 
linked to higher preferences (ranking closer to 1). 
 
 
Figure 28: Income categories and expectations about friends’ reactions. 
 
We explored further the relationship between Income and expectations by 
estimating the correlation coefficients. Specifically, we transformed the Income 
categories into an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (lower income) to 4 (higher income), 
in which participants providing “No Answer” regarding their income were excluded 
from the analysis (52 in total). This ordinal scale was then correlated (using a 
Spearman coefficient) with the scores from the measures regarding expectations of 
sharing the reward with one and two friends. In this sense, we found that for those 
participants who selected as their first option the scheme in which the customer kept 
the entire reward for themselves, Income was negatively correlated with 
expectations about sharing the reward with one (r = -0.15, p=0.01) and two friends 
(r = -0.16, p=0.01). Moreover, as for the case of the scheme in which the reward 
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was shared with only one friend, we also found a significant correlation between 
Income and expectations about sharing with one friend (r=0.38, p=0.04). No other 
significant correlations were found, but this could be because the relationship 
between Income and expectations may not always be linear (as suggested in the 
trends from Figure 28).   
As we did for the modelling analysis performed in Section 3.3.2, we present again in 
Table 18 our research hypotheses along with a summary of the results developed in 
this section.  
Table 18: Results summary for the “Ranking preferences” analysis. 
 
  
4- Discussion  
The expectations about how others may perceive us after giving them away part of 
a loyalty reward turned out to be a critical aspect when showing this type of 
prosocial behaviour. Our results suggest that once the role of such expectations is 
understood, prosocial motives can be taken into account in order to design effective 
initiatives that aim to encourage the adoption of products or behaviours in general. 
In the last decade, evidence emerging from behavioural science has shown that 
No. Hypothesis statement Results summary
1b ▪ People w ill expect more positive reactions from friends (recipients) w hen they face 
loyalty schemes that share a larger proportion of the rew ard, compare to the situation in 
w hich the proportion being shared is smaller.
▪ The results w ere alligned w ith hypothesis' prediction.
2b.1 ▪ Changes in the amount of the rew ard w ill not affect participants’ preferences for loyalty 
schemes w hen sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith friends is associated w ith expectations 
about recipients’ reactions that are suff iciently positive.
▪ The results w ere alligned w ith hypothesis' prediction.
2b.2 ▪ When sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith a friend is not associated w ith suff iciently 
positive reactions from the recipient(s), smaller rew ards w ill encourage people to prefer 
loyalty schemes in w hich they keep the entire incentive for themselves, w hereas larger 
rew ards w ill make them more inclined to prefer schemes that allow  them to share the 
rew ard w ith friends.
▪ The results w ere alligned w ith hypothesis' prediction. How ever, 
differences w ere statistically signiff icant w hen people w here asked 
about the expectations of sharing the rew ard w ith one fiend, but not 
in the case of the expectations about sharing w ith tw o people. 
3b ▪ People receiving a rew ard framed in terms of “Cash” w ill be more likely to prefer loyalty 
schemes in w hich customers keep the entire rew ard for themselves, compared to those 
individuals receiving rew ards framed as “Products”.
▪ The results do not support the hypotnesis. No signiff icant 
difference w here found. 
4b ▪ When the loyalty rew ard is framed in terms of “Products”, people w ould expect more 
positive reactions from recipients in loyalty schemes that share part of the rew ard w ith 
friends, compared to the schemes in w hich the rew ard is entirely kept by the customers.
▪ The results do not support the hypothesis.
5b ▪ Loyalty schemes offering to share part of the incentive w ith other people w ould be 
more attractive w hen the loyalty rew ard is framed in terms of “Products” (non-monetary 
incentive), instead of framed as a “Cash” incentive.
▪ The results supprot the hypothesis in the case of the scheme 
sharing part of the rew ard w ith tw o friends, but not for the scheme 
dividing the incentive w ith only one person.
6b ▪ Peoples’ predisposition to fear negative evaluations from others w ill influence both their 
w illingness to favour loyalty schemes that share part of the rew ard w ith friends, and 
their expectations about how  others may react after sharing the loyalty rew ard w ith 
them. 
▪ The results do not support the hypothesis.
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people can improve their well-being and happiness when they give away part of 
their wealth to others instead of focusing on selfish consumption (Aaker & Akutsu, 
2009; Dunn et al., 2008). However, the fact that most people normally spend a very 
limited amount of their money or time on helping others may put in doubt the 
effectiveness of unselfish motives as a mechanism to encourage behaviours. Our 
results indicate that one of the reasons why prosocial behaviours are not more 
prevalent is because they occur only when givers believe that there is a high 
probability of fulfilling recipients’ expectations. In this regard, the present study 
provides important insights that shed some lights on the conditions in which 
prosocial motives can be effective in driving behaviours in a commercial context and 
probably in other environments.  
Our experiments challenge previous research suggesting that people engage in 
unselfish behaviours simply for the sake of helping others to improve the recipients’ 
situation (e.g. Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002). Instead, we argue 
that the possibility of fulfilling others’ expectations and receiving positive feedback 
from them has crucial element on prosocial behaviours. This is probably related to 
the human need for boosting or strengthening the self-concept, maintaining self-
esteem and reaching a positive image by behaving in ways that are likely to result in 
a positive reaction from others (Baumeister, 2010; De Angelis et al., 2012; Wien & 
Olsen, 2014). We have shown in our experiment that commercial initiatives like 
loyalty programmes can be more appealing to customers when they represent a 
mechanism for maintaining a positive image about themselves. This evaluation 
could be achieved by allowing customers to show prosocial behaviours towards 
relevant peers as part of the loyalty scheme.  
The impact of allowing customers to share larger proportions of a loyalty reward 
with others was, overall, associated with more positive Expectations about Friend’s 
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Reactions and higher preferences for this type of “unselfish schemes”, compared to 
the traditional programmes in which the entire reward is kept by the customer. 
However, when we explored the possibility of an interactive effect between the 
Reward Amount and the Expectations about Friend’s Reactions, the results took an 
interesting twist. Specifically, we found that participants expecting more negative 
(instead of positive) reactions from their friends were more likely to prefer sharing 
the loyalty incentive with others when the reward was large (£5) instead of small 
(£2). We claim that this contradictory results can be reconciled in light of the trends 
observed in our predictive model (particularly in Figure 13). To be precise, either 
positive or negative, more extreme Expectations about Friend’s Reactions seems to 
increase people’s preferences for a given option. In the case of the anticipation of 
extremely negative reactions, people may be more inclined to share larger amounts 
of the reward because in that way, they are more likely to fulfil recipients’ 
expectations. On the contrary, smaller amounts may not be likely to fulfil the 
expectations of a friend who was already inclined to react negatively (or not positive 
enough) towards this type of gifts; therefore, participants may tend to keep the 
entire incentive for themselves in such circumstances. In the case of holding more 
positive expectations about recipients’ reactions, a similar effect could be 
anticipated; in other words, participants should be more inclined to share larger 
proportions of the loyalty reward. On the contrary, more neutral expectations 
seemed to discourage people to give away part of their endowment.  
The trends just described may relate to the literature on dictator game. This 
extensive literature approaching social preferences by implementing this 
methodological tool has found contradictory results when varying the size of the 
stake available. While some researchers have claimed that variations in the size of 
the reward do not affect significantly the proportion of the reward that participants 
are willing to give away (e.g. Carpenter et al., 2005; Forsythe et al., 1994; List & 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                                                 188 
 
Cherry, 2008), others suggest that increasing the stake reduces the proportion of 
the stake that people share with recipients in the game (e.g. Bechler et al., 2015; 
Novakova & Flegr, 2013). In this regard, we claim that the possibility of fulfilling 
recipients’ expectations, and consequently, the chance of strengthening the self-
concept, can account for this contradictory results. Nonetheless, we acknowledge 
that testing a larger range of reward amount and eliciting more extreme 
expectations about recipients’ reactions is something needed in further research in 
order to be more confident regarding the plausibility of our explanation.  
Another interesting result regarding the “unselfish” loyalty schemes proposed in the 
present study was related to the number of recipients with which the incentive was 
shared. In particular, we found in our predictive model that it was more likely to 
prefer to share a £5 reward than a £2 incentive. However, that likelihood was far 
larger when the reward was expected to be shared with two friends instead of one 
friend. In other words, people seemed to be concerned not only about giving away a 
gift to improve their friends’ situation but also about giving an amount that was 
“large enough” for each recipient, thus suggesting a concern for friends’ reactions. 
This result could account for the “identifiable victim effect” documented in the 
literature regarding charitable giving (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). Stated another 
way, people tend to care more about specific identifiable victims (e.g. one ill child) 
than about statistical victims (e.g. children with cancer). Our results suggest that 
having clearer expectations about the positive reactions that recipients may 
experience could help givers to strength the self-concept and self-esteem. 
Consequently, giving away something that is divided between too many people may 
feel as if the action is not making a significant impact in each recipient.  
Beside the amount available to be shared, the way in which the incentives were 
framed resulted to be relevant when predicting participants’ preferences. For 
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instance, giving the possibility of sharing a £2.5 voucher to purchase products in a 
coffee shop had a different effect on preferences compared to a situation in which a 
voucher for a biscuit (from the same store) worth £2.5 was made available for 
sharing with friends. It was particularly interesting to find that the Products framing 
(e.g. the biscuit worth £2.5) was more attractive than the Cash framing when the 
reward was expected to be shared with two people instead of one person; and 
therefore, each recipient would receive a smaller amount. We claim that this 
happens because it is more socially acceptable to give away small in-kind gifts than 
small amounts in the form of cash. This result suggests that organisations that aim 
to promote schemes in which the incentives can be shared with others will benefit 
from making available in-kind gift to share with friends when the incentives available 
are expected to be small.  
The manipulation of the Reward Framing previously mentioned was also expected 
to be closely linked to the measures capturing the perception of the potential 
reactions from friends after sharing part of a loyalty reward with them. Surprisingly, 
we found that the two variables were unrelated. A potential explanation is that the 
preferences for sharing gifts with others in the form of cash or in-kind gifts are more 
governed by social norms than by the anticipation of how friends consider the level 
of generosity of the customers. In other words, we have measured Expectations 
about Friend’s Reactions based on adjectives that assess whether friends would 
perceive customers like good and generous persons. However, it may be the case 
that measuring the extent to which friends were expected to see the customer like 
someone complying with what was socially acceptable in such situation (e.g. In 
which extent do you think your friend would consider that your gift is appropriate?) 
could produce a result closer to our prediction. However, we cannot be certain 
about this explanation; consequently, future studies can further explore this idea.  
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In addition to the size and framing of the reward, we hypothesised that the scale 
measuring FNE would be related to the preferences for the different types of loyalty 
schemes and also to the expectations regarding friends’ reactions after sharing the 
reward with them. Unexpectedly, neither relationship was found. The FNE scale 
was the only variable considered in the present study linked to personality traits, 
and not to contextual factors. Our results may indicate that the preferences for 
engaging in initiatives that allow the sharing of part of a reward with relevant peers 
rely more on contextual factors in which organisations can intervene than on a 
personality predisposition. However, this claim should be explored in future 
research by measuring different personality traits. 
Equally unexpected was the general trend observed in participants’ first choices. 
Most of them selected, as their first alternative, the loyalty scheme in which 
customers kept the entire loyalty reward for themselves. That pattern was 
surprising, considering that a significant proportion of the participants from the set of 
studies presented in Chapter 1 was willing to give away part of their loyalty reward 
in an experimental setting with comparable scenarios. In this sense, differences in 
the way participants’ preferences were measured may represent the source of 
variability. In the first two sets of experiments, preferences were measured by 
asking participants to state the specific amount of incentives that they were willing to 
share, or by presenting pairwise comparisons of different programs in which the 
proportions of the reward being given away was varied. These two methods 
produced fairly similar trends, but different to the preference observed in the present 
study in which participants were asked to rank a variety of schemes.  
Although the differences previously described may exist due to the way in which 
preferences were measured, we claim instead that such differences are a 
consequence of the mechanism through which participants were meant to share the 
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loyalty reward in the present study. Specifically, friends were expected to receive a 
voucher from a coffee shop via e-mail on behalf of the customer (participant), 
representing the specific amount being shared. Even though participants were told 
that “No additional information, apart from the gift voucher, will be sent to the friend 
by the shop“, there could still be concerns regarding the way in which retailers 
managed private information (Demoulin & Zidda, 2009). In this regard, participants 
may refrain from sharing part of the loyalty reward not because they do not wish to 
do so but because they may expect recipients to be unhappy after realising that 
their personal email was given to a company. If that is the case, our data may be 
noisier and the effects weaker than we expected. For that reason, we anticipate that 
larger effects can be found in our experiment if the concerns about sharing private 
information, in this case the email, are controlled in future research.  
In the present study, we did not establish hypotheses regarding the demographic 
information being measured. Nonetheless, we found a particularly curious link 
between participants’ income and the willingness to favour schemes in which part of 
the loyalty reward was shared with other people. Intuitively, we might assume that 
people with a higher income should be in a better economic position to give away 
economic resources, whereas those with more economic constraints should be 
more reluctant to share their endowments with others. Unexpectedly, we found that 
those with the lowest annual income were, indeed, the people less inclined to find 
attractive the “selfish” loyalty scheme in which no reward was shared; instead, they 
tended to favour more the “unselfish” loyalty programmes. This result is consistent 
with previous research arguing that people with less economic resources are more 
likely to engage in prosocial behaviours (Piff et al., 2010). We claim that our result 
can be explained, at least in part, by the differences in which people with different 
income expect their friends to react after sharing with them a small reward. Simply 
put, when poorer individuals give something away, we should expect recipients to 
Chapter 3                                                                                                                                                                                 192 
 
have a more positive reaction compared to a situation in which givers are richer 
because such action involves a bigger scarify by the poorest. Moreover, previous 
research (e.g. Aral & Walker, 2011b; Christakis & Fowler, 2007) has shown that 
social networks are characterised by homophily, in other words, a tendency to link 
with others of similar characteristics (including similar income). In this sense, we can 
assume that poorer people are more likely to imagine having friends of a similar 
economic status. Then, a poorer recipient (friend) should be expected to show more 
gratitude towards the giver than a richer recipient because the gift may be less 
valuable for the friend with more economic resources. That could explain why, in 
this context, lower income participants were more unselfish. Although this 
explanation is aligned with other results from our experiment, it would be interesting 
to explore further our claim in future research.  
A potential criticism of our study is that the decisions made by participants are not 
based on real incentives but related to hypothetical scenarios. In this regard, some 
studies have found that social preferences may change when participants are 
incentivised, and people will possibly be more selfish (Amir, Rand, & Gal, 2012; 
Buhren & Kundt, 2015; Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007). Nonetheless, other 
researchers claim that similar results can be found regardless of whether 
participants’ decisions are incentivised; consequently, there is no basis to assume 
that the absence of incentive can make invalid the results from experiments 
evaluating social preferences (Ben-Ner, Kramer, & Levy, 2008). Future studies may 
well explore whether the variables and principles tested in our experiment can 
behave in the same way when participants are incentivised.  
In brief, the insights obtained in the present study regarding the motives driving 
people’s willingness to share an endowment with others represent an important 
contribution to the literature on prosocial behaviour. Moreover, proposing that such 
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motives can embody an opportunity to design more effective initiatives that 
encourage the adoption of products and behaviour is an idea that can potentially 
stimulate further research in marketing and the broader field of diffusion of 
innovations. 
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CHAPTER 4- CONCLUSIONS 
The focus of the present research has been to explore how unselfish motives can 
influence people’s preferences, with the purpose of informing the design of 
initiatives promoting adoption behaviours. An enormous amount of empirical 
evidence has shown that even though new practices or products may be highly 
beneficial for people, such advantages do not necessarily lead to the adoption of the 
better solution (Rogers, 2003). This fact has encouraged both academics and 
practitioners to focus on understanding not only what makes a given innovation 
more advantageous but also which mechanisms can make a given innovation more 
likely to be adopted more rapidly, and for longer periods. In this regard, the insights 
provided by the present work regarding decision-making preferences represents a 
novel approach that can help to understand how adopting behaviours can be 
effectively promoted. 
The interest is not new for understanding how and why products or behaviours are 
adopted. Indeed, for more than 60 years, researchers from a tremendous number of 
disciplines (e.g. sociology, marketing, public health, anthropology, among others), 
have approached the issue by implementing a variety of methodologies and by 
focusing on different aspects of the same phenomena. In this sense, Chapter 1 
represents a useful tool provided by the present research, because it provides a 
succinct and cohesive review of the very extensive and diverse body of knowledge 
on the topic with the purpose of allowing people not familiar with the area to obtain a 
quick understanding of how the study of diffusion of innovations has been 
approached in the past decades. In addition, the chapter provides details about how 
some specific insights from behavioural science regarding judgement and decision 
making can be taking into account when promoting adoption behaviours.      
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One of the most common and probably simplest strategies that have been 
traditionally used to promote the adoption of specific behaviours has been the 
implementation of financial incentives. That is, anytime the adoption of behaviour 
occurs, rewards are offered to individuals under the assumption that making such 
offering would result in an increase of the perceived value and consequently the 
appeal for the specific practice. In the commercial context, a widely popular initiative 
of this type is represented by the implementation of the so-called Loyalty 
Programmes, in which firms attempt to retain customers or increase their 
consumption frequency by providing them with rewards associated with their 
behaviours. Unfortunately, the failures of this type of initiatives are not uncommon 
(e.g. Nunes & Dreze, 2006b; Obrien & Jones, 1995), and the evidence contradicting 
the positive effect that incentive can have on motivation has been increasingly 
frequent (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Garnefeld et al., 2012; Heyman & 
Ariely, 2004). In this regard, the need for achieving a better understanding of the 
mechanisms influencing the failure or success of incentives as a tool to encourage 
the adoption of desirable behaviours has driven the present research. Specifically, 
the results obtained in the set of experiments have identified ways in which 
traditional incentive schemes can be reframed by taking into account insights from 
behavioural science. To my knowledge, this approach has not been considered 
before and, consequently, it may stimulate future research. 
In the present work, four on-line experiments based on hypothetical scenarios have 
been run in order to evaluate participants’ preferences regarding different incentive 
schemes aiming to encourage consumption in coffee shops. In the first experiment, 
participants were asked to split a “loyalty reward” between themselves and a 
relevant peer (friend). Contrary to common assumptions from standard economics, 
people were willing to give away a substantial part of their reward to relevant peers. 
However, the first experiment did not support the hypothesis that such preferences 
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were driven by the expectation of receiving something in return from the recipients 
(reciprocity).  
In the second experiment, I decided to evaluate whether a change in the way in 
which preferences were elicited would affect the previous results. Specifically, 
different incentive schemes were presented in pairwise comparisons in which 
participants had to select their preferred option each time. The results were highly 
consistent with the first experiment, in terms of the preferences for sharing part of 
the reward with friends. In addition, a second stage of the second experiment 
identified the consequences of introducing uncertainty in the rewards being offered 
to the customers and their friends. By comparing schemes with different levels of 
risk but similar expected values for both the customer and their friend, I found that 
participants strongly preferred loyalty programmes in which elements of risk where 
not introduced, suggesting that risk aversion should be an element to considered in 
the “unselfish” incentive schemes proposed. Unlike the first experiment, the second 
study showed some support of the idea that the possibility of reciprocity drives the 
willingness to share part of the incentive with others. However, the participants’ 
choices model was not robust enough, which suggest that additional variables 
needed to be considered in the model to improve its predictive power.  
In an attempt to better understand the reasons underlying the preferences for 
sharing part of the loyalty reward, a third experiment was run varying the number of 
recipients with which a comparable loyalty reward was shared. Interestingly, the 
number of recipients had an important impact on participants’ preferences. In 
particular, people were more incline to share larger amounts with two friends, but 
when the amount available to be shared was reduced participants strongly favours 
schemes sharing the incentive with only one friend instead of two. In addition, 
similar to the second experiment, the possibility of reciprocity seemed to influence 
participants’ preferences for the loyalty schemes but it cannot fully account for the 
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results obtained. On the contrary, the preferences observed when varying the 
number of recipients suggested that people’s motivation could be given by a meta-
perception process in which they evaluate what others may think of their actions 
when deciding to share part of a loyalty reward. Such idea was explored in more 
detailed in the fourth and last experiment.  
One of the key results from the third experiment was that people behaved as if they 
were willing to share part of their reward with others only when each individual 
recipient would receive a portion of the incentive “sufficiently large”. It leaded me to 
assume that the expectations about how others may react after receiving the gift 
would have an important role in the tendency to engage in the type unselfish 
schemes proposed. However, such expectations were not directly measured on that 
study. In the fourth experiment, we incorporated this variable and found that the 
preferences for incentive schemes in which part of the reward was shared with 
others was strongly related to the expectations about friend’s reactions. Moreover, 
the way in which the incentive was framed and the size of the incentive available 
affected participants’ preferences for the unselfish incentive schemes. For instance, 
rewards framed as products (e.g. biscuit worth £2.5) was more attractive than an 
incentive framed in terms of cash (e.g. £2.5 to spend in the store) when the reward 
was expected to be shared with two people instead of one person; and 
consequently, each recipient would receive a smaller amount. Overall, our results 
suggest that people will be highly engaged with unselfish incentive schemes, and 
probably other prosocial behaviours, when positive reactions are expected from the 
recipients.   
In the following section, I discuss in more detail how the outcomes from this work 
contribute to the current body of knowledge. Moreover, I will present some practical 
implications that can potential result from the research insights, and finally, I will 
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discuss the limitations of my work and suggest some topics worth exploring in future 
research.  
4.1 - Theoretical Contributions 
One of the main results observed in the set of experiments was that at least under 
certain circumstances, individuals showed stronger preferences for firms offering 
them loyalty incentives that were partially shared with friends on their behalf, instead 
of comparable incentives that they could keep entirely for themselves. That seems, 
in principle, a counterintuitive result considering that people are usually expected to 
make decisions that maximise their own benefits as assumed by standard 
economics. However, these results are consistent with the research from 
behavioural science which shows that individuals frequently take decisions that 
seem to be unselfish and show regard for others (Kahneman, 2011; Wilkinson & 
Klaes, 2012). Surprisingly, the possibility of designing initiatives that take into 
account such “prosocial” motives with the aim of promoting adoption has been 
neglected in the past by the different research traditions studying how products and 
behaviours can be diffused. Instead, they have focused, among other elements, on 
identifying ways in which the perceived cost of an offering can be reduced or its 
perceived benefits can be increased because it is assumed that individuals pursue 
only the maximisation of their own outcomes when making adoption decisions. One 
of the main contributions of this work is to introduce the possibility of incorporating 
prosocial motives as one of the tools in the repertoire of mechanisms useful for 
encouraging adoption and diffusion processes.   
This research also contributes to improve the understanding of the motives driving 
prosocial behaviour, an important topic in such fields as economic and psychology. 
It is commonly assumed that altruistic or unselfish acts occur because individuals 
are motivated to improve the situation of others, and studies supporting that notion 
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are not uncommon (e.g. Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Charness & Rabin, 2002). The 
present work, however, supports the idea that self-interested motives underlie 
“altruistic” behaviours. In the second chapter, the possibility of reciprocity was 
highlighted as a factor affecting the preferences for giving away part of a reward. 
Nonetheless, the results could not fully explain the trends observed in the data. In 
contrast, the results from the third chapter showed, more conclusively, that the 
expectations about how the recipients of our unselfish acts might perceive us had a 
crucial role in the preferences for giving away resources to others. In other words, I 
argue that unselfish or altruistic motives are strongly linked to the need for fulfilling 
others’ expectations in order to strength the self-concept and maintain a positive 
self-image. 
These insights regarding the use of incentives and the role of expectations can also 
be extended to other important areas in diffusion research such as “word-of-mouth”, 
in which interpersonal communications are encouraged in order to persuade others 
to adopt new behaviours. As mentioned in the first chapter, these type of 
recommendations are frequently externally incentivised by implementing the so-
called Reward Referral Programmes. Previous research on these initiatives has 
shown that the willingness to give recommendations to others seem to be affected 
by a meta-perception process in which the givers evaluate how the will be viewed 
by the receivers (Wirtz et al., 2013; Xiao et al., 2011). Indeed, these types of 
initiatives have been found to be more attractive when both the referral provider and 
the receiver are incentivised (instead of only the referrer) and when symbolic 
instead of monetary rewards are provided (Verlegh et al., 2013). These results are 
highly consistent with what I have found in the present work. In this regard, I 
strongly believe that the insights from the present research can contribute not only 
to the understanding of variables affecting the effectiveness of Loyalty Schemes but 
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also to any other types of initiatives aiming to encourage adoption and diffusion 
processes in which incentives are used as a tool.  
Another contribution from the current research is to highlight the importance of 
considering contextual factors in adoption decisions. While diffusion traditions have 
mainly focused on areas such as the characteristics of the adopters (Mansori et al., 
2015; Rogers, 2003), social influence (Centola & Macy, 2007; Christakis & Fowler, 
2007), or the attributes of the innovations (Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Rogers, 2003); 
the impact of small changes in the environment in which decisions are made has 
been largely ignored. However, behavioural science has provided increasing 
evidence during the last few years, suggesting that such changes can result in 
important effects on behaviour (Dolan et al., 2012; Kahneman, 2011; Sustein & 
Thaler, 2008). This research show, for instance, how a minor change in the way in 
which an incentive was framed (e.g. £2 vs. A coffee worth £2) significantly changed 
participants’ preferences. This type of approach may open new possibilities when 
approaching option and diffusion processes. 
I discuss briefly in the following section some practical implications that can result 
from the insights obtained in the present research. 
 
4.2-  Practical Implications 
I have discussed in the first chapter how incentives have been widely used as a tool 
to encourage the adoption of behaviours because, among other reasons, they are 
relatively easy to implement and administrate compared to other mechanisms 
driving peoples’ behaviours that depend more on internal motives. Nonetheless, I 
have also mentioned that such incentive schemes may not always be effective and 
could actually crowd out intrinsic motivation, and consequently, it may be desirable 
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to identify different strategies that do not rely on rewards that are external to 
individuals. One practical consequence of the proposed type of schemes is that 
organisations do not necessarily need to choose between internal and external 
mechanisms to influence behaviours. Instead, I have provided a clear example of 
initiatives in which the benefits of administrating external rewards can be effectively 
combined with internal sources of motivation such as the need for strengthening the 
self-image and self-concept.   
From the commercial point of view, the “unselfish” loyalty schemes being proposed 
could present additional benefits. Specifically, this type of initiatives may help firms 
to introduce their products and services to friends of their customers that were not 
necessarily aware of them previously. Therefore, these “friends” can then potentially 
become part of their registered customers. Moreover, in terms of social influence, 
previous studies suggest that people are not only affected by specific behaviours 
adopted by their peers, but more importantly, by how frequently their peers use a 
given product (or show a given behaviour) (Iyengar et al., 2011). In this sense, the 
unselfish incentive schemes can encourage customers’ friends to consume more by 
providing information on the volume of customers’ purchases. 
The set of experiments were framed in a very specific commercial setting in which 
different conditions affecting loyalty schemes were tested. However, I do not believe 
that the practical implications of this research are limited to the scope of this type of 
commercial initiatives. For instance, I have previously presented in Chapter 1 an 
interesting experiment from Mani et al. (2013) in which physical activity was 
encouraged by incentivising participant’s based on the performance of two other 
peers, with the aim of promoting social pressure. That strategy outperformed a 
traditional incentive scheme in which people was directly rewarded by their own 
performance. This is an example of how incentive schemes can be reframed to 
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encourage desirable behaviours. In this sense, I claim that the insights from this 
research can inform the design of comparable schemes in a large variety of context 
that relies on incentives as an adoption and diffusion tool.  
Furthermore, this research raises some questions about assuming that people show 
prosocial behaviours with the only purpose of helping others, and consequently, that 
challenge may affect the strategies to promote this type of actions. For instance, the 
results suggest that people are highly motivated to strength their self-image by 
fulfilling others’ expectations. In this sense, organisations promoting prosocial 
behaviours could, for example, not only inform givers about how their actions will 
benefit the receivers but also make more salient the positive reaction that recipients 
may have after the prosocial action takes place. In short, some insights from the 
present work may be useful to inform the design of initiatives aiming to promote 
charitable giving and other prosocial behaviours.  
 
4.3-  Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
A potential criticism of the present study is that the decisions made by participants 
are not based on real incentives but on hypothetical scenarios. In this regard, some 
studies have found that social preferences may change when participants are 
incentivised, and individuals will possibly be more selfish (Amir et al., 2012; Buhren 
& Kundt, 2015; Dana et al., 2007). On the contrary, other researchers claim that 
similar results can be found regardless of whether or not participants’ decisions are 
incentivised; consequently, there is no basis to assume that the absence of 
incentive can invalidate the results from experiments evaluating social preferences 
(Ben-Ner et al., 2008; Engel, 2011). Future studies may explore whether the 
variables and principles tested in my experiments behave in the same way when 
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participants are incentivised. Even more interesting would be to run randomised 
controlled trials to evaluate, in a real-world setting, some of the ideas of the 
incentive scheme proposed in the experiments.  
In addition, the size of the unselfish incentives offered in order to influence peoples’ 
behaviours as well as it relation with the participants’ socioeconomic status are 
topics that needs to be explored in more detail in the future. For instance, in my 
experiments only incentives ranging from £1 to £5 were considered. However, some 
studies approaching prosocial behaviours have found that the willingness to give 
away a given endowment was affected by significant changes in the magnitude of 
the amount being considered (e.g. Bechler et al., 2015; Novakova & Flegr, 2013). 
Similarly, unselfish behaviours have been found to differ when comparing 
participants from countries with different income levels and/or cultures (Raihani et 
al., 2013). Consequently, incorporating these types of manipulations in the 
assessment of unselfish incentive schemes, while measuring the expectations 
about recipients’ reactions would be highly valuable to assess the robustness of my 
results.    
The preferences for incentive schemes considering rewards under uncertainty was 
another topic explored in one of the experiments. The risky schemes considered in 
the study involved a probability of 0.5 of obtaining a given outcome either for the 
customer, or the friend. In this regard, classic literature on decisions under risk and 
ambiguity suggest that when the probability of receiving a given outcome is low, 
people would be more likely to seek uncertain rewards, whereas outcomes with high 
probabilities would make people more likely to avoid uncertain rewards (Ellsberg, 
1961). For that reason, it would be worth testing in future studies the impact of 
introducing different levels of uncertainty on the preferences for unselfish schemes.  
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I have highlighted in this research how the link between our prosocial actions and 
the expectations about how others may perceive us can represent a useful driver of 
people’s preferences, and consequently, this evidence can inform initiatives aiming 
to encourage adoption and diffusion processes. On this subject, I have provided 
some insights regarding the variables affecting that link. Nevertheless, I believe that 
future research can explore other variables in order to understand more deeply the 
conditions under which the need for fulfilling others’ expectations and strengthening 
the self-concept may encourage preferences for unselfish incentive schemes. For 
instance, previous research suggested that when people’s self-concept is threaten, 
they have a higher need of engaging in self-enhancing behaviours in order to 
recover the positive image of themselves (De Angelis et al., 2012). In this regard, it 
would be interesting to evaluate whether in such conditions the preferences for 
unselfish incentive schemes increases. Furthermore, I have previously mentioned 
that the present research evaluated, among other aspects, how small changes in 
the decision context affected participants’ willingness to adopt specific products. In 
this regard, in the last few years, behavioural scientists have identified a large 
number of robust effects showing how peoples’ behaviours are influenced when the 
context within which individual’s act is modified (for an integrative review see Dolan 
et al., 2012). For example, in my fourth experiment I found that a small change in 
the way in which the loyalty reward was framed (product vs cash) affected the 
preferences for unselfish incentive schemes. Future research could assess other 
framing effects by manipulating additional elements such as the messages inviting 
people to participate in the incentive schemes, or the hypothetical message that the 
friend would receive after sharing the reward with them. In particular, such 
messages could be framed, for instance, in a way that produce feelings of self-
enhancement in the referee. Besides the messages framing, other contextual 
elements could be manipulated such as the inclusion of pictures priming prosocial 
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behaviours. These types of contextual changes could help to understand more 
deeply the promotion of desirable behaviours based on prosocial motives.  
I hope that the insights obtained in the present work have contributed to the 
understanding of how adoption and diffusion processes can be improved. In 
particular, I expect that the incentive schemes in which unselfish motives are 
incorporated will become part of the toolbox to influence behaviours. 
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Appendix 5: No Awareness Condition – Experiment 1. 
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Appendix 19: Message for condition £5 Reward / Cash Framing / 1 Recipient   
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Appendix 20: Message for condition £5 Reward / Cash Framing / 2 Recipients   




Appendix 21: Message for condition £5 Reward / Product Framing /                               
1 Recipient – Experiment 4. 
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Appendix 22: Message for condition £5 Reward / Product Framing /                               
2 Recipients – Experiment 4. 
 
 
Appendix 23: Message for condition £2 Reward / Cash Framing /                               
1 Recipient – Experiment 4. 
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Appendix 24: Message for condition £2 Reward / Cash Framing /                               
2 Recipients – Experiment 4. 
 
 
Appendix 25: Message for condition £2 Reward / Product Framing /                               
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Appendix 26: Message for condition £2 Reward / Product Framing /                               
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Appendix 29: Example, measure of expectations about sharing the reward 
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Appendix 30: Example, measure of expectations about sharing the reward 
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